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ABSTRACT
Unionization of federal employees, relatively Insignificant 
prior to 1960, accelerated sharply during the decade of the 
sixties. In 1974 more than 50 percent of all federal civilian 
employees are represented by a union. The development of collec­
tive bargaining in the federal sector stands in stark contrast to 
federal personnel policy throughout most of the history of the 
United States.
This dissertation traces the nature and growth of unions 
composed of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the 
United States Government. The purpose of the study is to compare 
and contrast the emerging formal industrial relations system in 
the federal sector with that presently existing in the private 
sector. The material used to investigate the conditions and con­
sequences of federal employee collective actions covers the ideas, 
events, institutions, motivations, and practices which have evolved 
during the approximately 200 years of employee management relations 
in the federal sector. The basic criterion for assessing the 
present federal system is: how nearly does this system merge with
that of the private sector?
Executive Orders 10988 in 1962, 11491 in 1969 and 11616 in 
1971 established a broad set of rules and procedures for employee
ix
management relations In the federal sector. These Executive 
Orders served as an effective transitional device from the civil 
service system to an evolving system of collective bargaining 
patterned after that presently existing In the private sector.
But the merging of the two systems at this time Is more procedur­
al than substantive. Though private sector Industrial relations 
practices have been adapted to a considerable degree by the 
federal sector, the real power to make substantive changes In 
employment relationships still remains with management. This 
power is illustrated by the limited scope of bargaining on sub­
stantive issues (wages, hours, and working conditions); and an 
almost absolute control of impasse settlement by management 
through the institutional arrangements Incorporated by law and 
executive order.
The principle of comparability, that is, comparing federal 
salaries with like salaries in the private sector, has enabled 
the federal employee to make impressive gains in both blue collar 
wages and white collar salaries. But the operation of the labor 
market and of private sector unions transmitted to the federal 
sector through the institutional arrangements for comparability 
are of significantly greater importance to the federal employee 
than the actions of his own union. The federal union serves only 
to lobby for improved institutional arrangements at the congres­
sional level and to ascertain that these arrangements are complied
x
with at the local level.
The principal gain for the individual employee from the 
appearance of the union in the federal sector is that he now has 
an indirect voice in determining his conditions of employment and 
methods of wage determination. This dissertation suggests that 
the voice of the employee, as transmitted through his union, has 
been effective in procedural areas but is severely limited in 
areas of real substance. Collective bargaining as practiced in 
the private sector has not been thoroughly transplanted to the 
federal civil service.
xl
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The 1960s have already earned the right to go down 
in labor relations history as the decade of the public 
employee . . . The growth of the public employee unions 
is the most significant development in the industrial 
relations field in the last 30 years.1
The two most important developments in government 
personnel administration in this century are happening 
simultaneously. Public employment has become the fast­
est growing sector in the U.S. economy and militant 
unionism is one of the major issues in public adminis­
tration.^
Employees in the public sector are one of the last great 
segments of American labor to become subject to unionization. 
Historically, American unions have concentrated their efforts in 
the private sector of the economy. Whether these efforts have 
been devoted to the achievement of higher wages, shorter hours 
of work, and better working conditions or to broader social and 
political issues, the primary focus of action has been in the 
private sector.
The vast majority of the research on collective bargaining 
also has been concentrated on unions of employees in the private
Jack Stieber, Director of the Michigan State University 
School of Labor Relations, cited in "Unionizing Public Service 
Employees," Human Events. Vol. XXVIII (July 20, 1968), pp. 4-6.
^Randy H. Hamilton, "The New Militancy of Public Employees," 
Good Government. Vol. LXXV (Spring 1968), p. 3.
1
2sector of the economy. However, the growth of employee organ­
ization and collective bargaining In the public sector during the 
decade 1962-1972 has created a need for greater knowledge and 
understanding of the organizations, both union and nonunion, that 
represent public employees, and of the industrial relations sys­
tems through which they operate. This study Is designed to meet 
that need, by exploring the evolving formal system of industrial 
relations in the federal sector and by showing that this system 
is procedurally approaching that which exists in the private 
sector.
The relative neglect of the public sector by the labor 
movement ended in the decade of the sixties. A program of 
employee-management cooperation in the United States federal civil 
service began with Executive Order 10988, issued in 1962 by Pres­
ident John F. Kennedy. This Order, which spelled out a government 
wide policy toward civilian employee organizations, made a great 
contribution to the changed environment in the public sector.
A decade after the promulgation of this historic Executive 
Order, an appropriate task of the researcher in labor relations 
is to analyze the effects of this Order and of Executive Orders 
11491 and 11616 on the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. 
These Executive Orders had wide ranging impacts on all public
3
employees, but this study will be limited to those employees in 
3
Generally, a public employee is an employee working for a 
federal, state, county, or municipal government, covered by civil
3a
the Federal Executive Branch.
The literature In American labor relations prior to 1962 
contains excellent works which endeavor to explain the position of 
labor on almost every Issue, both current and historical. There 
are exhaustive histories of specific unions and union leaders. 
However, unions of public employees have been mentioned only brief­
ly or Ignored entirely; certainly they have not been treated in 
any great depth. The principal writers who have addressed them­
selves to the area of public employee unions— primarily Spero,
Hart, and Godine^--did most of their work prior to the promulgation 
of Executive Order 10988. The fact that only these few saw fit to 
devote their energies to the public sector merely serves to empha­
size the relative unimportance of the public sector as a fruitful 
field of investigation by writers in labor and industrial relations. 
This lack of interest is partially accounted for by the relatively
service or other special regulations established by federal or 
state agencies, excluding elected officials and political appoint­
ees. In some jurisdictions certain positions usually professional 
in character are ,lexempted,, from provisions of the civil service 
system.
4
In general, this study will be limited to those federal em­
ployees covered by the provisions of Executive Orders 10988, 11491, 
and 11616. Exceptions will be noted, for example, employees of 
the Postal Corporation are no longer covered by the Executive Or­
ders but by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970.
5
Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil 
Service (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).
Morton R. Godine, The Labor Problem in the Public Service 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).
Sterling D. Spero, The Government as an Employer (New York: 
Ramsen Press, 1948).
4recent origin of negotiations between most agencies in the public 
sector and their employees.
Host of the research in federal sector labor relations 
since 1962 has been done by advocates of particular points of 
view: that is, by management officials on the one side and by 
union officials on the other, or by lawyers taking the "neutral" 
approach. Labor economists have shown little literary interest 
in the public sector.** One can conjecture, however, that the 
lack of interest in public sector labor relations by labor econ­
omists will soon end: thirty years after the Wagner Act, private
sector labor relations no longer seems to be stimulating; and the 
public sector, the "new frontier," is only now being discovered.7
There is little doubt that there are significant differences 
between labor relations in the private and public sectors. Writers
Among the basic texts used in many universities, Bloom and 
Northrup devote 16 pages to the subject, Gordon F. Bloom and 
Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations (7th ed.; Home­
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973); Gitlow devotes 13 
pages to the subject, Abraham L. Gitlow, Labor and Manpower Eco­
nomics (3d ed.; Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1971). 
Perhaps the best treatment of public sector labor relations is in 
Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and The American Conmunitv 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 312-341.
7For example, in 1967' Cartter and Marshall ignored public 
sector collective bargaining, Allan M. Cartter and F. Ray Marshall, 
Labor Economics: Wages. Employment. and Trade Unionism (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967). In their revised edition 
they emphasize the importance of investigations by labor economists 
into the public sector, Allan M. Cartter and F. Ray Marshall, Labor 
Economics. Wages. Employment. and Trade Unionism (rev. ed.; Home­
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 97-99 and pp. 
385-388.
5with a management bias generally emphasize these differences 
whereas writers with a union bias generally deny any differences. 
One intuitively feels that if a formal industrial relations system 
is evolving in the federal sector, it should be patterned after 
that of the private sector. If this contention is true, it should 
be subject to documentation.
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
Chapter II traces the historical evolution of federal 
management-employee dealings prior to the decade of the sixties, 
in accordance with Dunlop's suggestion that " . . .  the concept 
of an industrial relations system is used most fruitfully as a 
tool of analysis when a specific system is examined in its histor-
Q
ical context, and changes in the system are studied through time." 
Was there an industrial relations system developing in the federal 
sector paralleling that of the private sector? If there are 110 
differences in private and public sector practices, why were fed­
eral employees excluded from coverage of both the Wagner and Taft- 
Hartley Acts? How much voice did organizations of federal employ­
ees exert on their conditions of employment? Which employees were 
attempting to have a voice in the determination of their employment 
and what methods did they use? Why was Executive Order 10988 pro­
mulgated in 1962? What were the interacting factors, including the
Q
John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New York: Holt
& Co., 1958), p. 388.
6existing framework of government institutions and policies, 
the political and executive decision-making processes, and the 
motivations, attitudes, and ideas, of the various principal "ac­
tors,” which made possible a major reversal of federal government 
policy towards federal employee unionism in the sixties?
Chapter III analyzes the three principal Executive Orders. 
How did Executive Order 10988 change the system of employee- 
management relations which had evolved over the first 180 years 
of American government? How did Executive Orders 11491 and 11616 
alter the evolving system established by EO 10988? The regulatory 
basis of the evolving system is discussed in this chapter.
Chapter IV introduces specific evidence of the changing 
labor-management environment in the federal sector. Have the un­
ions (and associations) of federal employees grown or declined in 
terms of membership and representation during the decade of the 
sixties? Have there been discernible impacts on the sovereign con­
cept of government as it related to management-employee relation­
ships? Have there been changes in relations within and among un­
ions and associations? Has the professional association tended to 
retain its identity or is the association in the federal sector, in 
general, taking on the trappings of a "labor" organization? Have 
the events of the decade had any discernible impact on the basical­
ly unilateral management system of pre-EO 10988 days? Finally, has 
the cumulative effect of the events of the decade moved the federal 
sector system toward or away from the private sector system?
Are all indicators pointing to a merging of private and 
federal industrial systems in every area? Chapter V investigates 
the two principal areas in which the apparently evolving federal 
industrial system varies from that of the private sector: impasse
settlement and wage determination. Can baBic economic theory be 
applied to federal sector wage determination as it can in the pri­
vate sector? Does the rule of the "market place" have relevancy 
in the federal sector or are wage determinations institutionalized 
by the political process? What are the significant differences 
between impasse resolutions in the federal sector and the private 
sector? Is there a possibility that the federal sector may set 
standards and innovate ideas which may be adopted by the private 
sector or is the flow of ideas, information, and innovative prac­
tices a one-way channel flowing from the private to the federal 
sector?
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the research, reaches 
conclusions based on this research, and makes recommendations for 
changes in present practices.
SOURCES
The primary sources for the material in this dissertation
are both normative and positive. The normative sources incorporate
the value judgments of many of the principals involved, both labor
g
leaders and management officials. These judgments were obtained
partial listing of the names of the persons interviewed 
appears in the bibliography.
8from statements made by these men and from conversations and 
interviews with them. The documentary research has involved a 
wide assortment of published and unpublished materials. The most 
exhaustive and complete documentary source is the Government 
Employee Relations Reports, published weekly by the Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D . C . ^  A prime source of 
information is contained in current periodicals, such as The Civil 
Service Journal. The Monthly Labor Review. The Labor Law Journal. 
and The Industrial and Labor Relations Review. The union view­
point was obtained in some instances from union publications such 
as The Government Standard (American Federation of Government 
Employees) and The Federal Employee (National Federation of Fed­
eral Employees). The management viewpoint in several instances 
was obtained from publications of the Public Personnel Association, 
Chicago, Illinois. Another significant source of information was 
the records of hearings held by the President's Task Force on 
Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Civil Service (The 
Goldberg Comnittcc), the President's Committee to review the 
Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Civil Service (The 
Wirtz Committee), the President's Study Committee on Labor- 
Management Relations in the Federal Service (The Hampton Commit­
tee) , and the records of hearings held by the various committees 
and subcommittees of the Congress. Useful information is contained
^Hereinafter cited as GERR. Number, Date, and Page.
9In the documents, bulletins, reports, and other releases of the 
Civil Service Commission, the Department of Labor, and other 
federal departments and agencies. Executive Order 10988, Executive 
Order 11491, Executive Order 11616, and relevant Air Force Manuals 
and Regulations were prime data sources.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study is not intended as a theory of federal sector 
labor relations. The multiplicity of variables considered limits 
the ability of the study to contribute to the development of a 
systematic theory. The study is designed to add to the general 
knowledge of the current status and nature of employee-management 
relations in the federal sector.
Further, it should be pointed out that this study does not 
investigate in depth the experience of state and local governments 
in dealing with their employees. State and local employees are 
mentioned rarely, and only for comparative purposes.
Finally, the study is limited to the civilian component 
of the Civil Service of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Govern­
ment. In effect this means that the study is not concerned with 
those civilians in the Executive Branch who are elected or appoint­
ed or with any employee of the Judicial or Legislative Branches.
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATIONS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD THEM
The origins of union activity in the federal service can 
be found in the early 19th century. Unions existed only at the 
whim of management and there was insignificant "collective bar­
gaining" as we know it today. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
running deeply through English common law, was used by federal 
management to stifle any effort of employees to organize effec­
tively in the federal sector. Further, the doctrine of Delegate 
Potestas non Potest Delegari (constitutional power cannot be 
delegated) waB invoked to discourage collective action by federal 
employees.1 The source of this doctrine is the constitutional 
concept of the federal government consisting of three distinct 
branches with specified functions and powers, the branches aligned 
with each other to form an integrated whole through a system of 
checks and balances. In theory, none of the three branches of the 
federal government can delegate any of its powers to either of the 
other branches or to an independent agency. This chapter will 
document the evolution of unions in the federal sector with empha­
sis on their attempts to overcome these two very substantial road
^Wilson R. Hart, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Civil 
Service (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 46.
10
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blocks to existence and growth.
THE BEGINNINGS: 1790-1870
When George Washington became President, there were about 
350 federal employees. With this small number of employees, 
government was almost a family affair. The Civil Service System 
was unknown; most of the employees were, if not friends of the 
President, at least friends of friends of the President. But as 
the number of employees increased to 2,100 at the start of the 
Jefferson administration, labor problems began to appear. The 
first recorded instance of labor management difficulties was in 
1807, when the Secretary of the Navy dismissed blacksmiths who had 
complained of their low wages at the Portland Navy Yard.^ The 
first recorded strike of federal employees occurred at the Wash­
ington Navy Yard in August 1835, when workers struck for a ". . . 
change of hours and a general redress of grievances."'* The 
general climate of federal employment in the 1830s was described 
as follows:
^Eliot H. Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service (New York:
Matthew Bender and Company, 1958), p. 1.
3Ibid., p. 2.
^Chantee Lewis, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor 
Relations." United States Naval Institute Proceedings. Vol. 91 
(March 1965), p. 61.
3David Ziskind, One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 25.
I
12
. . . the spoils system, previously deprecsted 
and practiced on a small scale in the national gov­
ernment, became obvious, was openly Indulged in and 
taken for granted. Morale was low; nobody knew when 
he might be dismissed. Dishonesty went unpunished 
and good work unrewarded. Payment for jobs became 
commonplace.®
Within such a climate, it is not surprising that the 
employees of the government would seek, by collective action, to 
get some of the spoils for themselves. In 1836 workers in the 
Philadelphia Navy Yard struck for a ten hour day, which prevailed 
in the private shipyards.^ This strike lasted several weeks and 
was settled only after the workers appealed directly to Congress 
and petitioned President Andrew Jackson, who responded by estab­
lishing a ten hour day at the Philadelphia yard only. No record 
exists that the other yards achieved the ten hour day until 1840, 
when President Martin Van Buren issued an order establishing a 
ten hour day, with no reduction in pay, for all federal employees 
engaged in public works. This was the first documented use of 
union political power to influence working conditions in the fed­
eral service. Since 1840 was an election year, President Van Buren 
was accused of trying to "buy" votes of the federal employees. The 
Navy Department apparently agreed with that view; in 1852 it 
declared Van Buren's order void and returned its employees to an
^Kaplan, op. cit., p. 4.
^John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labour in the 
United States. Vol. I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), 
p. 395.
13
eleven hour day. In the face of widespread walkouts and strikes,
the Navy Department subsequently rescinded the order and restored
the ten hour day.®
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the ten hour day was well
established in the federal shipyards, but by this time a number of
private shipyards were operating on an eight hour day. As a result
of the efforts of craft unions in federal employment, Congress
enacted the first prevailing wage statute in 1861. This act set
a precedent by providing that working hours and wages in Navy
yards were to be the same as in private shipyards in the same 
9
vicinity. As a direct result of this act, the Navy established 
the first wage board in federal service in 1864.*®
In 1868 the first law establishing an eight hour day for 
federal employees was enacted by Congress. This law was to apply 
to ". . . all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by or on 
behalf of the United States government."** Since no specific men­
tion of wages was included in the law, the Secretary of the Navy
®Ziskind, loc. cit.
^Sterling D. Spero, Government as An Employer (New York: 
Ramsen Press, 1948), p. 84.
*®For a review of the wage board system see Harry A. Donian,
"A New Approach to Setting the Pay of Federal Blue Collar Workers," 
Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 92 (April 1969), pp. 30-34. For an 
analysis of Wage Board and General Schedule employees, see infra, 
Chapter V.
**United States Department of Labor, Brief History of the 
American Labor Movement (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1957), p. 67.
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determined that he was allowed a great amount of discretion in 
wage payments. When he reduced the wages of the affected employ­
ees by 20 percent, widespread work stoppages occurred. Congress, 
by joint resolution, stated that the Secretary's action was con­
trary to the intent of the law and directed him to pay all workers
the same rate of pay for an eight hour day as they had formerly
12
received for a ten hour day.
Up to this point, the history of labor-management relations 
in the federal sector was almost solely the story of the Navy 
experience. Prior to 1930 the Navy employed over 80 percent of all
13
federally employed blue collar workers, excluding postal employees. 
The only recorded unionist activity in any other sector of 
the federal service was in the Government Printing Office, where, 
in 1861, employees obtained the eight hour day. In fact, the Gov­
ernment Printing Office adopted a closed shop policy, allowing only
14
union printers to be employed. This policy was followed until 
1906, when President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the Office to 
operate under open shop rules. It is rather ironic that while many 
of the practices and policies of the federal government during the
12Office of Naval Industrial Relations, Important Events in 
American Labor History (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1 9 6 3 ) ,  p .  2 .
13
Lewis, loc. cit.
14Air Force Extension Course Institute, Introduction to Labor 
Relations for Air Force Supervisors. Vol. I (Montgomery, Alabama: 
Extension Course Institute, 1968), p. 20.
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latter part of the 19th century were In opposition to trade 
unions wherever located, one of Its own agencies tolerated a 
closed shop for over forty years.
THE LEAN YEARS: 1870-1912
In the years lnmedlately after the Civil War--and particu­
larly In the aftermath of the Panic of 1873--unionism in the 
federal sector, as In the private sector, suffered a steady decline. 
The most important events during the period 1870-1900 were the 
passage of the Pendleton Act (the Civil Service Act) and the organ­
ization of the various postgl unions, the forerunners of present 
day union organization in the federal sector.^
The Postal Unions
Letter carriers were among the first of the postal groups 
to seek the eight hour day. A law passed in 1888 equalized the 
workday for letter carriers and shipyard workers. Leaders in the 
fight for the eight hour day felt that a continuing organization 
would be helpful in their fight for further benefits for the letter 
carriers. In 1899 the National Association of Letter Carriers was 
formally established as the first national postal union, and 
shortly thereafter the United National Association of Post Office
^■*For the reader who desires a more definitive and 
comprehensive treatment of the United States Civil Service, see 
Paul P. Van Riper, History of the American Civil Service (New York: 
Row Patterson Company, 1958).
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Clerks was formed. The success of the postal unions Is 
Indicated by the fact that as of November 1972 they numbered over 
600,000 members— over 91 percent of all eligible employees, a 
record unsurpassed by any other major union . ^
The postal unions were very much aware of their dependence 
on the Congress for success in their efforts to better their work­
ing conditions. In their eagerness to work closely with the 
Congress, however, they clashed with their own supervisors, who 
resented being bypassed. This resentment resulted in a series 
of so-called "gag rules" promulgated by Presidents Theodore 
Roosevelt and William H. Taft. These rules were in effect from 
1902 until 1912, when they were negated by the passage of the 
Lloyd-LaFollette Act.
The "gag rules" effectively deprived the postal employees 
of their right to petition Congress on their own behalf. The 
pertinent portions of the Executive Orders defining these rules 
stated:
All officers and employees of the United States 
of every description, . . . are hereby forbidden, 
either directly or indirectly, individually or through
^Introduction to Labor Relations for Air Force Supervisors, 
op. cit., p. 21. For an excellent, though somewhat partisan, 
history of the NALC and related organizations see William C, 
Doherty, Mailman USA (New York: David McKay Company, 1960).
17
United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor- 
Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government.
A Statistical Renort (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1973), p. 1.
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associations, to solicit an increase in their pay 
or influence or attempt to influence in their own 
interests any other legislation whatever either 
before Congress or its committees, or in any way 
save through the departments . . .  in and under 
which they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the 
government service.
Nor may any such person respond to any request 
for information from either House of Congress, or 
any Member of Congress, except through or as author­
ized by the head of his department.'-®
Many of the benefits which federal employees enjoy today 
were initiated by the postal unions. Generally, gains secured by 
postal unions were extended to other federal employees. The postal 
unions also served as an example and as a source of practical 
techniques for new unions seeking to establish themselves in the 
federal sector.
The Army Experience
During the first century of its existence, the United States
Army had no serious labor problems. The first recorded dispute
over wages and hours occurred at the Watervliet Arsenal, West Troy,
New York, in 1893. That incident was followed by a walk-out at
19
the Rock Island Arsenal in 1899, These disputes were settled 
with minimum difficulty, but by 1904 labor conditions had deteri­
orated in several Army industrial establishments. This deteriora­
tion was due in part to an attempt by several military officers to
18
Executive Orders of January 31, 1902, January 25, 1906 and 
November 26, 1909, cited in Hart, op. cit., p. 19.
19
Ziskind, op. cit., p. 30.
18
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apply Frederick Taylor's new methods of scientific management.
The Taylor system was not only a technical Innovation; It also 
upset established roles and familiar patterns of behavior, estab­
lished new systems of authority and control, and created new
sources of Insecurity and anxlety--a result common to many 
21
Innovations. A strike at Watertown Arsenal In August 1911
dramatized labor's hostility to the Taylor system. This strike
caused a Congressional Investigation with resulting resolutions
22
condemning the Arsenal’s use of the Taylor system.
As World War I approached, unionism In the federal service 
was struggling for survival. There was no legal basis for unions 
of federal employees; moreover these employees were even prohib­
ited from taking their grievances and pleas for better wages and 
working conditions to the Congress without the approval of their 
department head. But the basic organization for the growth of 
powerful unionism had taken place during this period.
THE CONSOLIDATION ERA: 1912-1945
This era opened with the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, the only 
significant Federal statute on union-management relations in the 
federal service prior to Executive Order 10988. The pertinent 
section of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, enacted in 1912, states:
2 ®Lewis, op. cit., p. 63.
2 1 Ibld., p. 64.
22Ibid.
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. . . that membership in any society, club, 
association, or other form of organization of postal 
employees not affiliated with an outside organization 
imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in 
any strike against the United States, having for its 
object, among other things, improvements in the con­
ditions of labor of its members, including hours of 
labor and compensation therefor and leave of absence, 
by any person or groups of persons in said postal 
service, or the presenting by any such person or group 
of persons of any grievance or grievances to the Con­
gress or any member thereof shall not constitute or be 
cause for reduction in rank or compensation or removal 
of such person or groups of persons from said service.
The right of persons employed in the civil service of 
the United States, either individually or collectively, 
to petition Congress, or any member thereof or to furnish 
information to either house of Congress, or to any conroit- 
tee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered 
with . 2 3
This law was sought by and for the direct benefit of postal 
workers, since they were the ones on the "firing line" at that 
particular time; but it should be noted that the part of the law 
relating to the right of the employees to petition Congress applies 
only to postal employees. Intuitively, one suspects that the 
reason for this wording was that in 1912 the only effective federal 
employee unions were those in the postal service. Despite the fact 
that members of other unions are not protected by this provision 
of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, it has generally been assumed that the 
spirit of the Act gave all federal employees equal protection. As 
a matter of record, no administration has ever proceeded against a 
non-postal employee for union membership on the theory that the Act
*5 /
was inapplicable.
2337 Stat. 555. 2^Hart, op. cit., p. 34.
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The Lloyd-LaFollette Act succeeded in its basic purpose. 
Federal employees have enjoyed the right to petition Congress 
freely since its passage. They have also been free to join unions 
which engage in lobbying activities in support of legislation 
favoring the federal employee. There has not been another attempt 
at imposing any type of "gag rules" on the federal employee since 
the passage of Lloyd-LaFollette.
The National Federation of Federal Employees
The first general union of federal employees was organized 
when legal barriers discouraging federal unionism were removed.
This union was the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), 
organized in September 1917 as an affiliate of the American 
Federation of Labor. In contrast to the postal unions, which were 
basically craft unions, the NFFE would accept any federal employee 
to membership regardless of trade or craft. Its growth was rapid, 
perhaps because of its open membership policy. Additionally, 
because of the entry of the United States into World War I, wages 
rapidly increased and private industry intensified its competition 
for employees, including those in the federal sector. In order to 
keep the war effort running smoothly, government agencies declined 
to test the power of the new union. The NFFE was virtually unop­
posed by management since President Woodrow Wilson and Samuel 
Gompers, President of the AFL, had agreed on a "truce" for the 
duration of World War I. Membership in the NFFE increased from 
approximately 10,000 members in October 1917 to over 50,000 in
21
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The NFFE was effective in supporting and strengthening
the civil service system, and it strongly supported the enactment
of the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920. It took a strong
position in behalf of the Federal Classification System and after
passage of the Classification Act of 1923 urged extension of this
system across all government levels and to all crafts. The efforts
of NFFE were opposed by the other AFL national organizations, who
regarded support of the Classification Act as evidence that the
NFFE was attempting to expand its jurisdiction by raiding other
26unions, particularly the building and metal trades unions.
Following a period of decline in the immediate post World War I 
period, the NFFE reached a peak membership of just under 64,000
in 1932 prior to its split with the AFL,2^
The jurisdictional quarrels which were brought on by the 
chartering of the NFFE did not reach the stage of open hostility 
until the AFL convention of 1931. If NFFE competition for member­
ship had been the only issue the quarrel might have been resolved
2^Eldon l . Johnson, "General Unions in the Federal Service," 
The Journal of Politics. Vol. 2 (February 1940), p. 27. Due to 
the relationship established between President Wilson and Samuel 
Gompers, the AFL became, at least temporarily, a respected part
of the war effort. Thus it was quite natural that government
managers would not overtly oppose an AFL affiliate such as NFFE.
See Thomas R. Brooks, Toil and Trouble (New York: Delecoste Press, 
1964), pp. 132-138.
^Spero, op. cit., p. 189.
27
Johnson, loc. cit.
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even then. But the basic issue was the deeper one of craft 
versus industrial unionism. The battle for jurisdictional rights 
to organize federal employees at the AFL convention of 1931 was
the first skirmish of the war which was to erupt within the AFL
because of the craft-industrial controversy. Defeat of a consti­
tutional revision supported by NFFE was the occasion, but not the 
cause, of the split between the NFFE and the AFL. At this conven­
tion the NFFE voted to withdraw from the AFL. Johnson describes 
the consequences in this way:
Thus occurred the most unfortunate blunder in
the annals of unionism in the federal service. It
is understandable, but none the less unfortunate, 
because the two opposing sides never really met on 
common ground at any time. Cast against a tangled 
background of grievance, suspicion, misunderstanding, 
and personal feeling, a dispute was sufficient to 
break ties cemented by fourteen years of successful 
cooperation and to establish a system of dual unionism 
from that day to this . ^ 8
The American Federation of Government Employees
The withdrawal of the NFFE from the AFL left the AFL without 
a union formed and chartered specifically to represent the inter­
ests of the federal employee. Between December 1931 and August 
1932, efforts were made by the members of the NFFE who desired to 
remain in the AFL to bring back a portion of the membership into 
AFL ranks. They formed an organization known as the Joint Confer­
ence on Reaffiliation with the AFL. Failing in its efforts to
2 8 T b i d . ,  p .  30 .
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effect a reunion, this joint conference served as a nucleus 
for a new national organization, the American Federation of 
Government Employees, which was given a charter by the AFL on 
August 15, 1932.^®
Since this was a period of enthusiastic unionism, the new 
union grew rapidly, reaching a membership of over 34,000 by 1935. 
The 1936 convention of the AFGE surrendered the jurisdiction over 
state and local employees-'-approximately 9,000 members--to the 
newly formed American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME). The struggle between the independent NFFE and 
the affiliated AFGE, each competing for the same membership base, 
was soon joined by a third union, the United Federated Workers of 
America (UFWA). This union was formed by the more militant members 
of AFGE primarily as a result of the great cleavage in American 
labor. On June 21, 1937, John L. Lewis of the Congress of Indus­
trial Organizations (CIO) announced the formation of the new union
30
with the full backing of the CIO. However, this union was never 
an effective force in the federal sector. It was expelled from 
the CIO in 1950 for Communist leanings. Other unions raided its
^^Materials regarding the founding of the AFGE from an undated 
leaflet "The American Federation of Government Employees," pub­
lished by the AFGE, and J. B. Burns, "Government Workers Union is 
10 Years Old," American Federationist (August 1942), pp. 20-23.
30
"CIO to Organize 800,000 Government Employees," Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 144 (June 26, 1937), p. 4270.
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membership, and today the UFWA is no longer in existence.3*
The Waaner Act
Passage of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)
in 1935 was an important event for private sector unions. However,
public employees were specifically exempted from coverage by the
Act. There was no specific stated reason for the exclusion of the
public employee from provisions of the NLRA. Hart theorizes that
since " . . .  the purpose of the Act is to 'diminish the causes of
labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign
commerce* it seems reasonable to surmise that those groups of
people who, though employed for wages, do not work in commerce
were deliberately excluded so that they would not burden the board
32
and detract from its fulfillment of the purpose of the Act."
This is one logical reason, but another might be that neither the 
AFGE nor the NFFE was strong enough to make the Congress aware of 
the needs of the federal employee in this area.
Public Opinion
Public opinion of unions in the private sector was becoming 
more favorable, but not so in the public sector. Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover were of the
^*For a brief history of the demise of the UFWA, see 
F. S. O'Brien, "The 'Communist Dominated' Unions of the 
United States Since 1950," Labor History. Vol. 9 (Spring 1968), 
pp. 184-209.
3^llart, op. cit., p. 3b.
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□pinion that public employee unions were of limited benefit to 
11
the public. But perhaps the most famous, and certainly the most 
controversial, statement on the matter by a President was made by 
President Franklin Roosevelt, in a letter written in 1937 to NFFE 
President L. C. Steward:
All government employees should realize that the 
process of collective bargaining, as usually under­
stood, cannot be transplanted into the public service.
It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations 
when applied to public personnel management. The very 
nature and purposes of government make it impossible 
for administrative officials to represent fully or to 
bind the employer in mutual discussions with government 
employee organizations. The employer is the whole 
people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their 
representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administra­
tive officials and employees alike are governed and 
guided, and in many cases restricted, by laws which 
establish policies, procedures or rules in personnel 
matters.^
Spero contends that Roosevelt was not abandoning his role
35as a friend of labor by this letter. He indicates that members 
of Congress were becoming alarmed by the militant tactics of the
33The ceminents of Presidents Wilson and Coolidge were made 
regarding the strike of the Boston police in 1919. Wilson called 
the strike ". . . a n  intolerable crime against civilization." 
Coolidge, then Governor of Massachusetts, stated, "There is no 
right to strike against the public safety of anybody, anywhere, at 
any time." President Hoover stated in 1928, " . . .  the government 
by stringent civil service rules must debar its employees from 
their full political rights as free men. It must limit them in 
the liberty to bargain for their own wages, for no government 
employee can strike against his government and thus against the 
whole people." Cited in Spero, op. cit., pp. 6 , 279-280.
34
Cited in Hart, op. cit., p. 22.
Spero, op. cit., p. 345.
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CIO, which was then entering the federal employee field through
the UFWA. Congress was preparing to enact legislation outlawing
all forms of collective bargaining in the federal service. Such
a law not only would have stopped the militant CIO, but also would
have threatened the life of the other unions, AFGE and NFFE, which
16
had renounced militant tactics. Roosevelt's letter might have 
been written to convince the Congress that the administration had 
no intention of bargaining collectively with government employee 
unions, thus saving the two less militant unions.
Even during the period of World War II, when unions in the 
private sector were making gains in both numbers and power, the 
gains of the unions in the public sector were almost imperceptible. 
The general attitude of the courts toward unions of public employ­
ees is illustrated by the following statement made by a New York 
Supreme Court Justice:
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil 
service employees of the government as a labor organ­
ization or union is not only incompatible with the 
spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every 
principle upon which our government is founded. Noth­
ing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit 
that hired servants of the state can dictate to the 
government the hours, the wages, and conditions under 
which they will carry on essential services vital to 
the citizen.
The reasons are obvious which forbid acceptance 
of any such doctrine. Government is formed for the 
benefit of all persons, and the duty of all to support 
it is equally clear. Nothing is more certain than the
For the objectives of these two unions and the methods
employed to achieve these objectives, see L. W. Stewart,
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indispensable necessity of government, and it is 
equally true, that unless the people surrender some 
of their natural rights to the government it cannot 
operate. Much as we all recognize the value and the 
necessity of collective bargaining in industrial and 
social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossi­
ble between the government and its employees, by 
reason of the very nature of government itself. The 
formidable and familiar weapon in industrial strife 
and warfare— the strike--is without justification 
when used against the government. When so used, It 
is rebellion against constituted authority.
At the close of World War XI, there were four general unions 
working primarily in the field of public employment: the AFGE and
the AFSCME, affiliated with the AFL; the UFWA, affiliated with the 
CIO; and the NFFE, an independent.
PREPARATION FOR TAKE-OFF: 1945-1962
This period began with what might be considered a defeat 
for the public employee unions: the inclusion in the Taft-Hartley
Act of a section explicitly prohibiting the federal employee from 
striking. Strikes by federal employees had been prohibited by 
inference by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. The United Public Workers 
of America (UPWA) was responsible for the inclusion of this section
"Objectives of an Employee Union," Personnel Administration. Vol. 1 
(February 1939), pp. 6 -8 ,
and L. C. Stengle, "Objectives of an Employee Union, AFGE," 
Personnel Administration. Vol. 1 (March 1939), pp. 5-7.
37
From an opinion by Justice William H. Murray of the 
New York Supreme Court summarized in "Can Federal Employees 
Organize Labor Unions?" Personnel Administration. V o l . 6  
(March 1944), p. 2.
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in Che Taft-Hartley Act. The UIVA constitution contained a 
provision on strike procedure, and though union officials denied 
that the provision applied to chapters or locals of federal employ­
ees, Congress began attaching riders to appropriation bills to 
prohibit payment of salaries to employees belonging to organizations 
that asserted the right to strike against the Federal Government.
The Congressional furor, coupled with the fact that a number of 
UFWA locals actually did strike against city governments, led to 
the statement in Taft-Hartley which categorically denied the strike
-an
to all federal employees.
Section 305 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
(Taft-Hartley) states:
It shall be unlawful for any individual employed 
by the United States or any agency thereof including 
wholly owned Government corporations to participate 
in any strike. Any such employee who strikes shall 
be discharged immediately from his employment, and 
shall forfeit his civil service status, if any, and 
shall not be eligible for re-employment for three 
years by the United States or any such agency,^®
This provision was replaced on August 9, 1955, by a provi­
sion of law which makes it a felony, punishable by a year's
38
The UFWA was formed by combining the United Federal Workers 
with another CIO union, the State, County, and Municipal Workers 
of America, in 1946.
39
United States Civil Service Conrnission, Employee-Management 
Relations in the Federal Service. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1962), p. 2.06.
Cited in Labor Law Course (15th ed.; Chicago: Commerce 
Clearing House, Inc., 1965), p. 7063.
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imprisonment and a fine of $ 1 ,0 0 0 .0 0 , for a federal employee to 
strike, to assert the right to strike, or knowingly to maintain 
membership in an organization asserting that righ t . ^  Further, 
the new law required that each new employee sign an affidavit 
within sixty days of appointment certifying that he was not in 
violation of the Act.
This period might be designated as the period in which 
unions unsuccessfully tried to work through Congress, their tra­
ditional method of obtaining gain. In each session of Congress 
from 1949 to 1961, unions of federal employees sought statutory 
recognition. During this period approximately eighty bills were 
introduced in Congress on the subject of federal employee union 
recognition. The most important of these were the companion bills 
submitted periodically by Representative George M. Rhodes (D) of 
Pennsylvania and Senator Olin D. Johnson (D) of South Carolina.
Though each bill was altered slightly, the heart of each 
was as follows:
. . . (e) (1) The right of officers of national 
employee organizations representing employees of a 
department or agency to present grievances in behalf 
of their members without restraint, coertion, inter­
ference, intimidation, or reprisal is recognized.
(2) (A) Within six months after the effective date 
of this Act, the head of each department and agency 
shall promulgate regulations specifying that
41
PL 330 (69 Stat. 624).
^Sfillem B. Vosloo, Collective Bargaining in the U.S.. Federal 
Civil Service (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1966), P- 45.
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administrative officers shall at the request of 
officers or representatives of an employee organ­
ization meet and confer on matters of policy af­
fecting working conditions, safety, in-service 
training, labor-management cooperation, methods 
of adjusting grievances, transfers, appeals, grant­
ing of leave, promotions, demotions, rates of pay, 
and reduction in force. Such regulations shall 
recognize the right of such officers or representa­
tives to carry on any lawful activity without 
intimidation, coertion, interference, or reprisal.
(B) Disputes resulting from unresolved grievances 
or from disagreement between employee organizations 
and departments or agencies on the policies enumerated 
in subsection (e) (2) (A) shall be referred to an 
impartial board of arbitration to be composed of one 
representative of the department or agency, one 
representative of the employee organization and one 
representative of the Secretary of Labor who shall 
serve as chairman. The findings of the board of 
arbitration shall be final and conclusive.
(3) Charges involving a violation of this sub­
section shall be referred to the Civil Service Commission 
which shall be charged with making certain that effective 
grievance machinery is established within each agency, 
and that unresolved differences are referred promptly 
to the impartial arbitration board established in sub­
section (e) (2) (B). The head of the department or 
agency involved shall take such action as may be necessary 
to cause the suspension, demotion, or removal of any 
administrative official found by the board of arbitration 
to have violated this subsection . , .
These bills had the enthusiastic support of organized labor, 
but with a few minor exceptions, no support from either the Truman 
or Eisenhower administrations. The spokesmen for both administra­
tions objected to the various Rhodes-Johnson bills in four 
44principal areas.
4 3 Hart, op. cit., p. 141.
^ T h i s  section draws heavily from Hart, op. cit., pp. 143-173.
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First, the legislation was considered unnecessary. These 
spokesmen contended that various government departments had 
adequate administrative regulations and grievance procedures to 
effectively guard the rights and privileges of all government 
employees. Further, the Civil Service Commission had the authority 
to take whatever action was needed to insure that the administrative 
regulations proscribing union activity and the grievance procedures 
were faithfully observed at all levels. One of the significant 
features of every grievance procedure was the right of the employee 
to choose anyone he wished to represent him— a right he would lose 
under the Rhodes-Johnson bill.
Second, the administration spokesmen suggested that the 
granting of the right to ". . . carry on any lawful activity . . . "  
(Section 2-A) was such a broad delegation of power to unions that 
it could have effectively paralyzed the executive branch of 
government.
Third, the compulsory feature of the bill divorced executive 
responsibility from executive authority. The manager would no 
longer have been able to manage but would have been at the mercy 
of a decision-making process outside his own agency. Further, the 
provision that the manager must confer with the union on all policy 
decisions affecting working conditions would have opened a Pandora's 
box to the union, since almost any decision the manager would make 
could be construed to affect working conditions.
Fourth, these spokesmen believed that the bill nullified the
32
laws upon which the power of the Civil Service Commission rested 
and transferred these powers to the Department of Labor, thus 
striking at the very heart of the entire civil service system.
The union position was to deny all these allegations and
insist that all they wanted was true recognition, not preferential
treatment. Hart suggests that this stand was unrealistic and
argues that " . . .  they might be well advised to concede that the
Rhodes-Johnson bill does give them a preferential status which
goes further than accorded other union leaders under the NLRA, and
then to argue that such preferential treatment is fully proper and
deserved as a fair and just compensation for the willingness of the
government worker to relinquish all claim to free workers* normally
inherent right to strike, picket, boycott, and to bargain for union
4 5
security agreements."
Though these bills were favorably reported by the House and 
Senate committees in both 1952 and 1956, they were never brought 
to a vote in either house of Congress. As a preview of things to 
come, it is well to note the statement submitted by then Senator 
John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts during the hearings on the 1956 
bill:
It has always seemed to me that coimnonsense requires 
that, since the Government has authorized organizations 
of postal and Federal employees, there should be a re­
quirement that the appropriate officers of those organ- 
izations--both national and local--should be assured of 
the opportunity to bring to the government, the grievances
45
Hart, op. cit., p. 168.
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of the employees they represent. I am advised that 
In most Instances the appropriate government offi­
cials have been more than happy and willing to meet 
with the representatives of the employee unions.
However, this principle of the right to meet should 
not be left to the chance that reasonable men will 
occupy the governmental offices in question.^
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(Landrum-GriffIn Act) also expressly exempted unions of public 
employees from its provisions . ^  Perhaps the assumption was, as 
in the Wagner Act, that public employees were not in industries 
". . . affecting commerce."
This period closed with the unions marking time, consolidat­
ing their position, and preparing for the big push of the sixties. 
Perhaps Richard A. Silver summarized this decade beat in 1959 when 
he said:
The past few years can be termed a transitional 
period of labor relations in government. The changing 
concepts of public employee relationships have shown 
a tendency toward more frequent resort to the courts 
for relief. The question of collective bargaining and 
negotiations between public agencies and public employee 
unions, although not settled, has been answered in the 
affirmative; that is, such arrangements are at least 
permissible in order to promote orderly administration 
of government affairs.
. . . Greater recognition of the desirability of 
dealing with employee unions is manifest in the day- 
to-day relations of public employees with their 
employers. Less emphasis is being placed on the 
sovereign employer concept. Public administrators
46
Cited in Vosloo, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
^Gor d o n  F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of Labor 
Relations (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Co., 1965), p. 793.
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are being permitted, authorized or directed to 
negotiate with their employees in the interest of 
the public in general without any questions on the 
legality of such dealings.
Much interest has been evinced not only by the 
employee unions and the employees but by public 
administrators themselves. The employee unions have 
set as their goal a "state of full acceptance" rather 
than a "state of mere toleration."^®
THE PRELUDE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 10988
The evidence is overwhelming that both the Truman and 
Eisenhower Administrations held little sympathy for the unioniza­
tion of federal employees. The testimony of administration offi­
cials in hearings on the various Rhodes-Johnson bills clearly
indicates a belief that unions had little to offer the federal 
49
employee. The only positive indication from an official of 
either Administration was a letter published by the White House in
48
Richard A. Silver, "Collective Bargaining with Public 
Employees," Personnel Administration. Vol. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1959), 
pp. 33-34.
49
Typical of the comments of administration spokesmen was 
that contained in a letter from the Comptroller General of the 
United States to the House Post Office and Civil Service Commit­
tee, dated March 6 , 1952, regarding H. R, 554, one of the earlier 
bills introduced by Congressman Rhodes. The Comptroller General 
stated: "Although the ostensible purpose of the bill is to protect
employees, whatever 'protection* it might afford would be the wrong 
kind and for the wrong people. It has been my observation over a 
long period of years that the honest, capable, and conscientious 
Government employees--who are in the great majority— need no such 
protection as the bill would purportedly give. The plain fact of 
the matter is that the bill well could operate to help keep incom­
petent and even dishonest employees on the public payroll."
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1958, signed by Rocco Sciliano, Special Assistant to the Presi­
dent for Personnel Management, advising all department and agency 
heads to ", , . evaluate the personnel management activities of 
your own agency with respect to employee-management relations, 
including relations with employee organizations."^ This letter 
suggested that there might be some advantages to cooperation be­
tween management and organized employees, but it certainly did not 
indicate a change in official policy towards unions. Further 
evidence of the attitude of the Eisenhower Administration toward 
federal unions was President Eisenhower's message to the House of 
Representatives vetoing a federal employee pay raise bill in June 
1960. He made the following observations:
I am informed that the enactment of H. R. 9833 was 
attended by intensive and unconcealed political pressure 
exerted flagrantly and in concert on members of Congress 
by a number of . . . employees, particularly their 
leadership.
I fully respect the right of every Federal employee-- 
indeed all of our citizens— to petition the Government.
But the activity of which I have been advised so far 
exceeds a proper exercise of that right and so grossly 
abuses it, as to make it a mockery.
That public servants should be so unmindful of the 
national good as to even entertain thoughts of forcing 
the Congress to bow to their will would be cause for 
serious alarm. To have evidence that a number of them, 
led by a few, have actually sought to do so is, to say 
the least, shocking.^
50The Postal Record, Vol. 71 (July 1958), p. 20.
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President Eisenhower, message to the House vetoing the 
Federal Pay Raise Bill, June 30, 1960. Cited in Hart, op. cit., 
pp. 58-59. This was one of the two vetoes of President Eisenhower
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But 1960 was an election year, and a Democratic Congress 
passed the bill over Eisenhower’s veto. Though neither party 
made an issue of the unionization of federal employees, Senator 
John F. Kennedy, the Democratic Presidential nominee, wrote a 
letter to a postal union official giving his support to the prin-
C O
ciple of federal sector unionism.
In their experiences with the Truman and Eisenhower Admin­
istrations, the unions had fought a difficult battle against 
administrations of both major political parties. However, after 
the election of a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress 
in 1960, it seemed that continued union pressure, through the 
traditional means of legislative action, would finally bear fruit. 
Kennedy's narrow victory led leaders of organized labor inmediately 
--and perhaps correctly--to attribute this victory to the almost 
universal support of union membership.
After the election of President Kennedy, there came a grow­
ing demand by Congress and labor leaders for a statement of policy 
by the Federal Government regarding its own labor-management rela­
tions. The unions' position was that the government had taken the 
initiative in the area of labor-management relations in the private
which were overridden by the Congress. Sue Presidential Vetoes 
1789-1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 196- 
198.
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Letter from Senator John F. Kennedy to John Ames, Publicity 
Director of the Illinois State Federation of Post Office Clerks, 
cited in Vosloo, op. cit., p. 25.
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sector, but had actively prevented unionization of Government 
employees and the organization of union shops in Federal agencies. 
This line of argument was hard to counter. After the election of 
1960, the combined labor groups made it clear to the incoming ad­
ministration that they expected the "Democratic Congress and the 
Democratic leadership in the White House" to help rather than 
hinder their efforts to unionize federal employees. The words of 
candidate Kennedy were not forgotten when he became President 
Kennedy. Together with the repeal of the hated Section 14-b of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, J high priority was given to bills giving recog­
nition rights to federal employees in the union legislative 
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program. A special committee of the Government Employees Council 
of the AFL-CIO was established to draft a new bill prior to the 
first session of Congress.
The "new" Rhodes-Johnson bill was introduced by Congressman 
Rhodes on the opening day of the First Session of the 87th Con­
gress. ^  But no sooner had the bill been introduced than rumors 
began to circulate that President Kennedy had expressed a desire 
to issue an executive order providing for union recognition, thus 
effectively curbing the interest of Congress in the current Rhodes
ST
Section 14-b permits states to pass "right to work" laws, 
outlawing union security agreements.
54
Vosloo, op. cit., p. 59.
~*^For a discussion of the "new" Rhodes-Johnson bill, see 
Vosloo, op. cit., pp. 48-52.
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Johnson bill.^® The rumors proved to be correct, for on 
June 22, 1961, President Kennedy Issued a memorandum, the draft 
of which originated In the Labor Department, establishing a task 
force to study the Issue of union recognition In the federal 
service . ^  There were apparently two principal reasons for the 
proposed study. First, President Kennedy felt that some change 
was needed in federal employee-management relations, and since 
he did receive political support from the unions, this would be 
a way to repay the debt. Second, the pressure on Congress was 
becoming intense to pass some kind of legislation to codify 
federal labor-management relations. But the obvious opposition 
of previous administrations to legislation in federal employee 
relations inevitably affected the new President. The decision 
to establish the task force seemed to be a compromise designed 
to appease unions who had supported the Democratic Party so 
vigorously, while forestalling legislation which could have 
greatly restricted managerial decision-making in the federal 
service.
THE TASK FORCE
The task force established to study the issue of union 
recognition in the federal service was composed of the following
^^Vosloo, loc. cit.
-^Appendix A contains the full text of this memorandum.
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members, all top level political appointees:
Arthur J. Goldberg 
Secretary of Labor
John W. Macy, Jr.
Chairman
U.S. Civil Service Commission 
David E. Bell
Director, Bureau of the Budget
J. Edward Day 
Postmaster General
Robert F. McNamara 
Secretary of Defense
Theodore C. Sorenson 
Special Counsel to the President
The Staff Director of the task force was Daniel P. Moynihan. 
Hart summarizes the real power structure of the task forcc--tli.it 
is, the source of much of the ideological ami intellectual 
background for the study— as follows:
The guiding genius and prime mover was the then 
Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, who not only chaired 
the Task Force with extraordinary adroitness, but recruit­
ed its key staff members, notably Miss Ida Klaus, former 
NLRB Solicitor General, and more recently Counsel to the 
New York City Department of Labor, who was the working 
genius of the Task Force. There is little doubt that this 
approach to an old problem would not have been adopted if 
two unprecedented administrative procedures had not been 
employed.
I. The work of the Task Force was assigned to political 
appointees at the top level of the government who were not 
specialists in the field. If past precedent had been fol­
lowed, the task would have been assigned to non-political 
members of the federal personnel fraternity who could have 
been relied upon to reaffirm pre-existing policies as the 
best attainable.
Chairman:
Vice-Chairman:
Members:
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2. For the first time, the Department of Labor 
assumed the leadership of a program in the field of 
internal personnel management within the federal gov­
ernment. Heretofore, such programs had been looked 
upon as the exclusive province of the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission.
The only career civil servant on the task force was Mr.
Macy, and the alternate members were also relatively new to federal 
service. It seems clear that the task force was expected to take 
an objective view of employee-management relations In the federal 
sector unencumbered by past experiences, because "the Kennedy Ad­
ministration felt labor-management relations was one aspect of the 
civil service that was too Important to be left to the experts.
The task force accomplished its mission by surveying 
present and past practices.in federal sector employee-management 
relations and by holding hearings in seven major cities in the 
United States. In general, the task force was critical of existing 
practices in the federal sector:
The word "dealings" rather than "negotiations" most 
appropriately describes the relationship between employee 
organizations and management. Only a minority of federal 
employees belong to organizations, agencies deal with 
such organizations as they find it convenient, such deal­
ings are not regularly scheduled, and the weight given 
to the views of employee organizations by management is 
variable. . . .  of the fifty-seven departments and agen­
cies whose personnel practices were studied by the Task
"^Wilson R. Hart, "The U.S Civil Service, Learns to Live With 
Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal," Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review. Vol. 17 (January 1964), p. 206.
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Wilson R. Hart, "Government: Labor’s Hew Frontier Through 
Presidential Directive," Virginia Law Review. Vol. 48 (June 1962), 
pp. 898-899.
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Force, It appears that a relatively large number, 
twenty-two, do not have any stated labor policy 
whatever . . . eleven agencies have the barest 
minimum of policy, providing simply that employees 
have the right to join or not to join, legitimate 
employee organizations . . .60
The fifty-seven departments and agencies covered In the re­
port employed approximately 93 percent of the 2.4 million federal 
employees in mld-1961. The task force found that some 33 percent 
of all federal employees were members of an employee organization. 
This compares favorably with the national average of organized em­
ployees in non-agricultural establishments, which was 32.4 percent 
61
in 1960. This is not a representative figure, however, since 
some 490,000 of the approximately 760,000 employees who were mem­
bers of an employee organization were employees of the Post Office 
Department. Only about 15 percent of the employees of the other 
departments and agencies were members of an employee organization.
Excepting the Post Office Department, the agencies which had 
the greatest proportion of their employees as members of an employee
The Task Force Staff Reports were not published, but copies 
are available in the Department of Labor. These reports were over 
1600 pages in length, but the crux of the findings is contained 
in the Report of the Presidents Task Force on Etnolovee-Management 
Cooperation in the Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, November 30, 1961), hereinafter cited as the Task Force 
Report. A further condensation of the findings and a management 
translation of them is found in U.S. Civil Service Commission, 
Personnel Methods Series 15. Emplovee-Manaeement Cooperation in. the 
Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 
1962), hereinafter cited as Personnel Methods Series 15.
^ Task Force Report, pp. 1-2.
42
organization were:
(1) The Tennessee Valley Authority 82 percent
(2) The St. Lawrence Seaway 80 percent
(3) The Panama Canal Company 67 percent
(4) The Government Printing Office 34 percent
(5) The Treasury Department 46 percent
The Department of the Navy led the Departments within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) with 29 percent of its employees in 
employee organizations. This is not surprising since the Navy had 
long been the leader within DOD in dealing with employee organiza­
tions. The Department of the Army had 11 percent of its employees 
in employee organizations, the Department of Air Force had 9 per­
cent. The latter had approximately 25,000 members out of a
62
civilian work force of 285,000.
Testifying before the task force were representatives of 
employee organizations, civic groups, and professional organiza­
tions as well as management officials and interested citizens, a
6*1total of 117 witnesses. There was much commonality in the views 
expressed by the representatives of employee organizations, though 
there were sharp divisions on specific issues.
Spokesmen for the AFL-CIO proposed that (1) recognition be 
limited to bona fide national unions; (2 ) organizations which dis­
criminate on the basis of race or religion not be recognized;
6 ?The statistics for the various numbers of employees by 
agency and union membership by agency were extracted from the 
Task Force Report. pp. 10-11. Comparisons and conclusions drawn 
from them are those of the researcher.
63Vosloo, op. cit., p. 63.
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(3) all recognized organizations be consulted on personnel policy; 
and (4) exclusive recognition be given to unions with a majority 
status in an appropriate unit.**^ The AFL-CIO further recommended 
that disputes between employee organizations and agency management 
be referred to a conciliator assigned by the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, and if not settled, to binding arbitration 
by a Government Labor Relations Panel. They also endorsed dues 
check-off. Generally, affiliated unions endorsed the proposals of 
the parent group.
Representatives of the NFFE differed from the affiliated 
groups, especially in opposition to the exclusive recognition 
proposal. The NFFE spokesmen opposed bringing the patterns and 
practices of the private sector into the federal sector.^ 
Spokesmen for professional engineers and nurses asked for separate 
recognition for professional employees. Spokesmen for the Civil 
Service League opposed collective bargaining in the federal sector. 
Generally, spokesmen for church groups, veterans' organizations, 
and other diverse elements presented a broad spectrum of views
^Personnel Methods Series 15, op. cit., pp. 3.06-3.07.
^-*Even after Executive Order 10988 was promulgated, Vaux Owen, 
President of NFFE, was still unhappy with this provision. He went 
so far as to say that the Order " . . .  reflects alien ideologies 
that are repugnant to the American Government." Cited in Hart,
"The U.S. Civil Service Learns to Live With Executive Order 10988," 
op. cit., p. 208. In an interview with the researcher at the 
National Convention of NFFE in Sacramento, California, in Septem­
ber 1970, Mr. Owen, now the Grand Old Man of NFFE, indicated that 
he still believed that bringing private sector practices into the 
federal sector was a terrible mistake.
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concerning a federal labor relations policy, stressing the need for 
a careful consideration of the special requirements of personnel 
practices in the federal sector.
The surveys conducted by the task force also revealed that 
there were definite problem areas in the public service from both 
the union and management viewpoints. The problems reported by the 
Department of the Air Farce were: (1) unions appealed to Congress
when immediate satisfaction was not obtained from management; (2 ) 
there was a lack of union cooperation; (3) the multiplicity of 
employee organizations created an administrative burden . ^
The thirty employee organizations surveyed in the report 
listed the following areas as evidence of poor relations on the 
part of management: (1 ) excellent national policies are sometimes
established, but these are often ignored in the field; (2 ) existing 
grievance procedures are inadequate; (3) employee councils are lit­
tle more than "company unions"; (4) there is reluctance on the; part 
of management in the field to acknowledge the legitimacy of unions;
(5) anti-union attitudes are held by some local administrators and 
supervisors; (6 ) there is unwillingness by some management offi­
cials at all levels to deal fairly and honestly with unions; (7) 
too much "lip service" and little concrete cooperation is the rule; 
(8 ) management goes through the motions of consultation when a
^^Task Force| Report, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
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prior decision had already been m a d e . ^  One additional complaint 
was levied against the Department of Defense, that " . . .  unions 
experience difficulties with Commanding Officers who have had 
little past industrial relations experience and unions must have 
written agreements on all resolved Issues, since there is a con­
stant changeover in Commanding Officers with little managerial 
continuity
The findings and recommendations of the task force were sub­
mitted to the President on November 30, 1961. A paragraph from the 
letter of transmittal indicates the tenor of the recommendations:
At the present time the Federal government has no 
Presidential policy on employee-management relations, 
or at least no policy beyond the barest acknowledgement 
that such relations ought to exist. Lacking guidance, 
the various agencies of the government have proceeded 
on widely varying courses. Some have established ex­
tensive relations with employee organizations; most have 
done little; a number have done nothing. The Task Force 
is firmly of the opinion that in large areas of the 
government we are yet to take advantage of this means 
of enlisting the creative energies of government workers 
in the formation of policies that shape the condition of
their w o r k . 69
The executive order promulgated by President Kennedy on Jan­
uary 17, 1962, essentially contained the recommendations of the 
task force.^
6 7 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
6 8 Ibid., p. 43.
6 9 Ibid., p. 1 1 1 .
^Executive Order 10988 is included in this study as 
Appendix B.
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SUMMARY
This brief summation of the history of federal sector 
unionism may be divided into several stages. The first stage, 
that period prior to the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 
1912, may be designated as the traditional stage. During this 
period the public and the courts were tradition-bound by our 
heritage from both the agrarian economy, which was dominant in 
the early days of the Republic, and by reliance on the inherited 
English Common Law. This was the stage of the beginnings of 
organization, of the "gag rules," of public outcry at the mere 
mention of federal employees banding together for mutual benefit. 
Because of the politics of the day, the social structure, and 
societal values, survival of unions in the federal sector was no 
mean accomplishment.
The second stage, in which preconditions for take-off were 
established, might be considered to extend from 1912 through 1961. 
During this period unions per se were accepted and the banding 
together of public employees was at least tolerated. It was a pe­
riod of consolidation for the unions in the federal sector, during 
which the weaker unions disappeared or were absorbed by the strong­
er ones. It was a period in which the techniques of pressure 
tactics and lobbying the Congress were perfected. It was the peri­
od of covert collective bargaining in the federal sector. The 
stage is now set for the take-off period which was initiated hy the 
promulgation of Executive Order 10988.
CHAPTER III
UNIONS GAIN A LEGITIMATE ROLE: THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS
There is a specific reason for the recent growth 
of government unionism, and this is Executive Order 
10988 issued by President John F. Kennedy in January 
1962, which encouraged unionism in the federal sector.
In its support of public unionism, this Order was as 
clear and unequivocal as the Wagner Act of 1935 had 
been in its support for unions and collective bargain­
ing in the private sector.^
The take-off period begins with a landmark in the history 
of federal sector labor-management relations, the signing of Exec­
utive Order 10988. This Order established a comprehensive federal 
government-wide policy in labor-mandgement relations. It was 
hailed by unions as the "Magna Carta" for federal labor relations 
since it officially acknowledged the legitimate role the federal 
employees unions should play in the formulation and implementation 
of personnel policies and practices in the federal government. The 
first section of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of 
this historic document.
Executive Order 10988 was a modest but realistic beginning, 
considering the general inexperience of both unions and federal 
management in operating under any kind of industrial relations
^Everett M. Kassalow, "Trade Unionism Goes Public," Public 
Interest. Winter 1969, p. 118.
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system. In 1969 the President's Study Committee on Labor-Manage­
ment Relations in the Federal Service reported that although 
substantial progress had been made under EO 10988, the time had 
come to . . adjust the policies of EO 10988 to changing condi­
tions in the federal labor management relations program."^ Based 
on recommendations of this study group, President Richard M. Nixon 
issued Executive Order 11491 on October 29, 1969.^ The second 
section of this chapter analyzes this Executive Order, with empha­
sis on the significant changes to EO 10988 embodied in the new 
Executive Order.
When he signed Executive Order 11491, President Nixon 
directed that a review and assessment of operations under the Order 
be made after one year. Public hearings for this purpose were held 
in October 1970. As a result of these hearings Executive Order 
11616, amending Executive Order 11491, and a rationale for the new 
order were issued on August 26, 1971.^ The third section of this
2
United States Civil Service Commission, President’s Study 
Committee on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service, 
Report and Recommendations on Labor-Management Relations in the 
Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), 
p. 1.
Executive Order 11491 is included in this study as 
Appendix C.
^United States Civil Service Commission, Federal Labor 
Relations Council, Report on Labor-Management Relations in the 
Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). 
Executive Order 11616 is included in this study as 
Appendix D.
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chapter will analyze the changes instituted by Executive Order 
11616.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10988: A BRIEF SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Preamble
The preamble established the objectives and intent of the 
Executive Order. Briefly summarized, these were:
a. To provide orderly and constructive employee- 
management relations.
b. To assure greater employee participation in 
the formulation of policies and practices 
affecting their employment,
c. To enunciate a clear statement of the rights 
of union and management.
Section _1
This section establishes the right of the employee to join 
and organize employee organizations without fear of reprisal from 
management. It also reaffirms the right of an employee not to join 
such organizations. A further provision is for the strict neutral­
ity of management, to avoid either the promotion or discouragement 
of employee organizations.
Section 2
An employee organization is defined in this section. It 
must be a lawful organization whose purpose is the improvement of 
working conditions of federal employees; it must be formed on a 
voluntary basis by the employees themselves; it must not assert 
the right to strike; it must not advocate the overthrow of the
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government; It must not discriminate in establishing membership 
on basis of race, color, creed, or national origin; and it must 
not be subject to corrupt influences or to the influence of any 
group opposed to democratic principles.
•Section _3
(a) This section establishes the three types of recognition 
(informal, formal, and exclusive) which could be granted an employ­
ee organization.
(b) This section establishes, in the case of exclusive 
recognition, the so-called "twelve month" rule. This rule states 
that no election for union recognition will be held within a year 
after a previous determination of exclusive status has been made.^
(c) The right of the individual employee to bring any 
personal matter to the attention of management is established in 
this section. It also establishes the right to management to deal 
with such diverse groups as veterans' organizations, religious, 
social, fraternal organizations, or other lawful associations in 
the interest of the federal employee.
Sections 4, J3, and 6.
These sections define the rights of employee organizations 
under the three types of recognition: formal, informal, and exclu­
sive. (Table 1 gives this information in condensed form.)
^In its rules implementing this section, the Civil Service 
Commission initiated the "60 percent" rule; that is, in order for 
a union to be granted exclusive recognition, 60 percent of all the 
eligible voters in the bargaining unit must cast ballots.
TABLE 1
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION RIGHTS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF RECOGNITION
_______ Type of Recognition_____
Informal Formal Exclusive
None
Membership required in appropriate unit .................... 107 10%'
Right to be heard on personnel policy ...................... , , Yes1 Yes1 Yes
Right to be consulted on personnel policy . . ............. No Yes1 Yes
Right to negotiate written agreement ...................... . . No No Yes
Right to represent employee in grievances and appeals
fif he wishes) ...................... ...................... . . Yes3 Yes3 Yes
Right to negotiate for advisory arbitration of grievances
and a p p e a l s ...................................................... No No Yes
Eligible for voluntary dues withholding
(if lawful)  .............  ..................... No Yes Yes
4 5Department-wide or agency-wide relationships .................  Yes Yes Yes
TABLE 1, Continued
more than one organization within the same unit may be granted formal recognition. 
However, when an organization within a unit is granted exclusive recognition, all grants 
of formal recognition are withdrawn; other organizations concerned revert to informal 
recognition status.
But the organization must have majority support whether determined by membership, 
votes, or other evidence.
\ h e n  an employee organization is accorded exclusive recognition, then that organization 
shall have the right to be present and be consulted in these situations whether or not the
employee has designated another organization or person to represent him.
^Formal recognition and its rights may be granted at national level for the whole 
department when an organization is deemed to have a sufficient number of locals or of total 
membership within the department. The 10 percent rule does not necessarily apply as either 
a minimum or maximum.
^The emphasis of the program is on the development of local employee management
relations. Exclusive recognition on an agency-wide basis should be avoided and should not
be granted unless management is unable to carry on meaningful negotiations on a smaller 
unit basis.
Source: U.S. Civil Service Commission Training Booklet, Employee Management
Cooperation in the Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), 
p. 5.10.
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Section 1_
The right of management to direct, hire, promote, transfer, 
assign, suspend, demote, or discharge employees, and to take other 
management actions that may be necessary to carry out the mission 
of the agency Is established In this section.
Section 8
This section Is primarily concerned with the establishment 
of grievance procedures for an employee through his organization. 
Section _9
This section defines the rights of an employee organization 
regarding the activities which it can conduct during duty and non­
duty hours.
Section 10
The deadline date for Implementation of the Executive Order 
was set as July 1, 1962.
Section 11
The responsibility for unit determination is vested in each 
agency by this section. It also gives the conditions under which 
the Secretary of Labor will assist in determining the appropriate­
ness of a unit for exclusive recognition and in conducting and 
supervising elections.
Section 12
The Civil Service Commission is given the responsibility 
for establishing and maintaining a program to assist in carrying 
out the objectives of the Order.
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Section 13
The Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor 
are given the joint responsibility of preparing standards of 
conduct for employee organizations and a code of fair labor prac­
tices in employee-management relations in the federal service.^ 
This section also establishes a temporary committee to handle 
matters relating to the implementation of the Order.
Section 14
This section gives all employees in the Federal Civil 
Service the same rights in adverse action cases as are given 
veterans under Section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 
as amended.
Section 15
This section allows an agency and any representative of 
its employees to continue any policy agreed to prior to the Order. 
Section 16
The agencies excluded from the provisions of the Order are 
listed in this section. These are primarily agencies performing 
investigative, security, and intelligence functions.
Chapter 711 of the Federal Personnel Manual was revised 
to conform to the provisions of the Executive Order. Each agency 
was also required to change its regulations and directives. For 
example, in the Department of Defense (DOD), DOD Directive 1426.1, 
first issued in May 1962, provided the basic instructions for the 
implementation of the Executive Order. DOD Directive 1426.2, 
first issued in September 1963, provided instructions for imple­
menting both the Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations 
and the Fair Labor Practices provisions.
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Summary
Compared to the Wagner Act, Executive Order 10988 was 
Indeed a modest beginning, but it seemed to end the long fight 
of unions for recognition in the federal sector. The official 
policy of the executive branch of the federal government was now 
to encourage employee organizations. But the question still 
remained, was the Executive Order really the "Magna Carta" for 
federal unions? Or were the unions again finessed out of legis­
lation by the Executive Order? Hart summarized the dilemma of the 
union leaders in this way:
In some respects the Order achieved instant success.
It permitted the Administration to escape a series of 
political barbs which had been finely honed for years by 
critics--both in and out of the trade union movement--of 
the government's labor relations practices. The hooks 
and snares had been so strategically positioned by the 
critics that when the new administration took office 
impairment seemed Imminent and inevitable. Before the 
Administration acted, the government labor movement was 
on the brink of success in a twelve year campaign to 
achieve enactment of a bill (the Rhodes-Johnson Union 
Recognition Bill) which, though aimed essentially at the 
same broad objectives as the Executive Order, was loaded 
with boobytraps that could have snarled the machinery of 
government, even under the most sympathetic administration.
. . . The Executive Order pulled the rug from under the 
government unions just as they were about to pluck the 
golden apple. It not only deprived them of the prize but 
made them like it! It gave them what they said they wanted 
(recognition) while it deprived them of the windfall they 
hoped would come with it (a law which compels all but em­
ployees of extra-ordinary independence to join a union).
^Hart, The IJ.S.. Civil Service Learns to Live with Executive 
Order 10988. op. cit., pp. 204-205.
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However in the Gompers tradition of "More now," the 
unions quite logically preferred a promulgated executive order to 
an unpaased bill still languishing in the Congress. Now at least 
they had some "rule of the game," a system for operation, Imperfect 
though it may have been. The growth of the federal union movement 
under the "rules" prescribed in Executive Order 10988 will be dis-
O
cussed in a later chapter.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 
CHANGES IN THE EVOLVING FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM
Prelude
Executive Order 11491 was an outgrowth of study and commit­
tee work spanning the last two years of the Johnson Administration 
and the first year of the Nixon Administration. On September 8, 
1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a committee to evaluate 
the first five years of experience under Executive Order 10988 and 
to recommend changes in the program if needed. This committee 
consisted of the Secretary of Defense, the Postmaster General, the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Civil 
Service Commission, and a Special Assistant to the President.
Though the committee held extensive hearings, it presented no formal 
recommendations to President Johnson. The report of the committee, 
identified as a "draft" report, was made public on January 16, 1969,
®Infra, Chapter IV.
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by Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz as an attachment to the 1968 
Annual Report of the Department of Labor.® According to Wirtz, 
changes in the composition of the review committee made it impos­
sible to submit a final report to President Johnson. After the 
Nixon Administration took office in January 1969, the new committee 
members accomplished additional work on the "draft” report and 
submitted it to President Nixon in August 19 6 9 . ^  This report 
formed the basis for Executive Order 11491, issued by President 
Nixon on October 29, 1969,
Changes Embodied in Executive Order 11491
Centralized control of program. A primary problem area 
disclosed by almost eight years of operation under provisions of 
EO 10988 was that there was no one central point of control for the 
program. The administration of the program was scattered among 
many agencies on the supposition that since there was such a wide 
diversity of labor relations situations in the Executive Branch,
Q
United States Department of Labor, Fifty-Sixth Annua1 Report 
of the Secretary of Labor. Attachment "B" (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, January 1969), hereinafter cited as Wirtz Committee 
Report.
^United States Civil Service Commission, Office of the 
Chairman, Report and Recommendations on Labor-Management Relat ions 
in the Federal Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
August 1969). The five members of the Committee who signed the 
letter of transmittal to President Nixon were: Civil Service
Commission Chairman Robert E. Hampton, Secretary of Labor George 
P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Postmaster General 
Winton M. Blount, and Budget Director Robert P. Mayo.
This report is hereinafter cited as the Hampton Committee Report.
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each agency head was the beat Judge of his own labor relations
policies, within the broad framework outlined In the Executive
Order. This meant, for all practical purposes, that the agency
head became the prosecuting attorney, Judge, and Jury of all labor
disputes within his agency. Unions distrusted a program mandated
on the neutrality of the agency head, and the possibility of bias
led unions to believe that appeals and unfair labor practice
charges were exercises In futility.
In order to overcome this implied weakness in Executive
Order 10988, the new Order established " . . .  the Federal Labor
Relations Council, consisting of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, the Secretary of Labor, an official of the Executive
Office of the President, and such other officials of the Executive
Branch as the President may designate from time to tlme."^ It is
the responsibility of the council to make interpretations and
rulings on any portion of the Order; to decide major policy issues;
to entertain, at its discretion, appeals from decisions on certain
disputed matters; to issue regulations; and to report to the
President on the state of the program with appropriate recommends- 
12tions. Its primary purpose is to focus control of the program
Executive Order 11491, Section 4. The Council is 
presently composed of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, 
the Secretary of Labor, and the Director of the Office of Manpower 
and Budget.
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at one point rather than to leave the administration of the 
program to each individual agency. The two primary functions of 
the council are overall program direction and appeals of decisions 
made by certain officials. In the area of program direction, the 
council decides major policy issues; in the area of appeals, It 
considers, subject to the Executive Order provisions, certain 
decisions of the Assistant Secretary of Labor, agency heads and 
arbitrators. The council is designed to project an aura of impar­
tiality, but a special kind of impartiality. As Civil Service 
Commission Chairman Robert Hampton explained:
Let me point out that the Council is not 
intended to be impartial in the sense that its 
members have no other responsibilities in Government.
Rather, the Council is intended to represent the 
continuing presence of the President of the United 
States, in the form of three top administration 
officials to oversee the program, interpret the Order, 
and make necessary policy decisions. Just as the 
President is the President of all the people, the 
Council will be the program administrator for all the 
parties concerned.^
Types of recognition. The various types of recognition 
available to the unions posed another problem for both management 
and the unions as they became more sophisticated in their dealings 
with each^other. For example, the informal level of recognition 
had been intended to serve as a transitional device which would not 
disrupt existing relationships in the early developmental stages of
^Remarks of Robert E. Hampton, Chairman, United States Civil 
Service Commission, and Federal Labor Relations Council, to the 
Federal Bar Association Briefing Conference on Executive Order 
11491, Washington, January 19, 1970.
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the unionization program. As such, it was successful. By the 
time EO 11491 was issued, however, this level had long outlived 
its usefulness.
The new Order abolished formal and informal recognitions, 
but gave the unions a grace period in which to upgrade their level 
of recognition if they so desired and could receive the required 
support. Abandonment of informal recognition was no surprise to 
anyone familiar with the federal labor scene. Almost a year prior 
to the Order, Nathan T. Wolkomir of the NFFE warned his locals that 
. . i f  anything is certain in this uncertain world, it is that 
sooner or later the informal category will be dropped . . . The
end of the formal recognition option came as more of a surprise. 
This move strongly affected independent unions such as the NFFE and 
the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE), which had 
many locals with formal recognition. Under EO 11491 these locals 
had to secure exclusive recognition or lose recognition entirely.
Wolkomir immediately attacked the provision with the charge
that
. . . eliminating formal recognition places 
organizations of federal employees under severe 
handicaps. It is surprising that an Administration 
which prides itself on standing up for freedom of 
choice would thus take an action which will make it 
increasingly difficult for federal employees to 
exercise freedom of choice in a meaningful way. In 
these provisions the Order has played directly into
*^Nathan Wolkomir, President, NFFE, cited in GERR No. 286 
(March 3, 1969), p. A-2.
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the hands of private sector labor bosses who are 
seeking to get a stranglehold and centralized 
control of the federal service and its employees. ***
But the council stood firm in its enforcement of this 
provision of the Executive Order. Since July 1, 1971, the only 
recognition available to unions in the federal sector has been 
exclusive level; the union must represent all employees in the 
bargaining unit or it may represent none of them. This provision 
of the Executive Order conforms very closely to private sector 
practices.
Election procedures. All elections for union recognition 
under Executive Order 10988 were covered by the controversial "60 
percent rule." In essence this rule stated that for an election 
to be valid, at least 60 percent of the eligible employees in the 
bargaining unit must vote. Though not contained specifically in 
the Executive Order, the rule was issued by the Civil Service Com­
mission under its authority to issue guidelines for election 
procedures. The rule was the subject of a court case in which a 
federal appeals court ruled that EO 10988 created no judicially 
enforceable rights and that courts had no authority to oversee the 
administration of the Order.
^ N F F E  News Release, Washington, dated November 3, 1969.
^Slanhattan-Bronx Postal Union vs Gronouski, cited in GERR. 
No. 99 (August 2, 1965), p. A-7.
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An example of Che effect of the 60 percent rule Is the
invalidation of an election held in Brooklyn in March 1969. In
the Brooklyn District Office of the Internal Revenue Service, the
bargaining unit employees voting picked the National Association
of Internal Revenue Employees over the AFGE by a 6-1 ratio. The
election was invalidated, however, because a "no vote" campaign
managed to keep total participation one vote below the 60 percent
participation r e q u i r e d . A n  election at Fort Bliss, Texas, in
June 1969, in which NAGE received a substantial majority of the
18votes cast, was invalidated on the same grounds. By not voting, 
an employee was in effect voting for the status quo, whether it 
be for the union presently holding recognition or for no union.
Under the provisions of Executive Order 11491, exclusive 
recognition is determined by a simple majority of employees voting 
in any specific election. The requirement that a certain percent­
age of employees must vote in order that an election be "repre­
sentative" might have been appropriate in the early days of
operation under EO 10988; but just as the informal level of recog-
19nitlon, it had outlived its usefulness.
17Cited in GERR. No. 287 (March 10, 1969), p. A-7.
18
Interview with Allen Whitney, Executive Vice President, 
NAGE, October 30, 1969, Montgomery, Alabama.
19
Section 6 of E0 11491 mandates the Assistant Secretary 
of Labor-Management Relations to supervise federal employee 
representation elections and certify the results. The Secretary 
reported that in all elections held in 1970, the first year alter
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Election procedures under EO 11491 have been adapted from
the private sector almost in toto. but there is one significant
difference. In the federal sector, a union may obtain exclusive
representation rights only by winning an election, while in the
private Bector, under certain specified conditions, the NLRB may
grant exclusive recognition rights to a union on the basis of
20
authorization cards.
Supervisors. EO 11491 specifically exempts supervisors 
from its provisions, reasoning that the supervisor is a definite 
part of management. Although the supervisor may belong to a union, 
this section removes him from the bargaining unit, approximating 
private sector practice. This provision had helped to resolve 
some conflict of interest problems, though difficulties in inter­
pretation of the term "supervisor" have not been completely 
resolved. For example, Wolkomir contends:
Agency interpretation of the term "supervisor" has 
been so broad that it is almost literally true that an 
employee "supervising" one waste basket has been termed 
a supervisor. The restrictions on holding office are 
retained and sharpened . . .  a device by which manage­
ment obviously expects to further hamper unions in the 
selection of qualified leadership . ^
the 60 percent rule was removed, over 61 percent of all eligible 
employees voted in representation elections. He further noted that 
federal employees voted for union representation in 92 percent of 
the election held. Cited in GERR. No. 405 (June 14, 1971), p. D-l.
20
See Joseph B. Wollenberger, "Nixon vs Gissel: Shall the Twain 
Ever Meet?" Labor Law Journal. Vol. 20 (December 1969), pp. 787-789.
^ Report From Washington. NFFE, Vol. 5 (November 1969), p. 1.
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The selection and training of qualified union leaders at 
the local level is a problem separate and distinct from that of 
conflict of interest situations inherent in bargaining units that 
contain both employees and their supervisors. Removing the super­
visors from the bargaining unit seems to be an improvement, and 
does bring the federal sector more nearly in line with private 
sector practice.
Contract Approval. Under the provisions of EO 10988, the 
agency head gave the final approval to any contract affecting any 
employee in the agency. It was suggested that the agency head 
could thus "second guess" the contract on substantive issues as 
well as on issues of law or regulation. The* union complaint was 
that union negotiators came to the bargaining table with full 
power to act for the union, but management officials had only* 
limited authority. Therefore, while the contract was signed in 
good faith at the local level, it still was not effective until 
the agency head approved it. This process resulted in delays 
while the contract was processed through agency channels. For 
example, a contract between the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare and AFGE Local 2340 took 31 months to negotiate.
Negotiations began in August 1966 and the contract was approved in
22
March 1969. This period included several months in which the 
contract was detained at agency headquarters.
22Cited in GERR. No. 289 (March 24, 1969), p. A-l.
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It is not uncoranon in the private sector for a contract 
to be reviewed and approved by the national union headquarters 
and by top company management. Some unions require that the con­
tract be ratified by a vote of the membership, the requirement for 
contract review by parties other than the negotiating team is not 
confined to the federal sector. EO 11491 eliminated the preroga­
tive of the agency head to nullify agreements at the local level 
unless they were in violation of law, regulation, or higher 
directive. This provision of the new Executive Order has speeded 
the approval of contracts, since the agency head must now confine 
himself to the legality of the contract, whether or not it is 
advantageous for management.
As agencies have become more sophisticated in the negotiat­
ing of contracts, these contracts have become easier to review.
Some are now second or third generation contracts. For example, 
because its contracts are easier to review and because there is 
Increasing expertise at all levels, the Air Force has delegated 
contract approval authority to the first management level above 
the negotiating parties. But the impetus for change was the provi­
sion in EO 11491 which made the local negotiator responsible for 
the provisions included in the contract if he were legally able 
to negotiate them.
Impasse settlement. Executive Order 10988 did not outline 
any specific procedures for the settlement of negotiation impasses. 
President Kennedy's 1961 task force Felt that, in the then embryonic
66
stage of development of federal employee-management relations, 
the availability of arbitration could have escalated too many 
impasses to third party settlement. The methods used to settle a 
negotiating impasse under EO 10988 included a joint fact-finding 
committee, referral to higher authority within the agency, media­
tion by private third parties, and advisory arbitration.
Under EO 11491 there are two key elements in the settlement 
of disputes and impasses. These are the responsibilities specif­
ically assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor- 
Manageraent Relations (ASLMR) and those assigned to the newly 
established Federal Services Impasse Panel (FSIP). The Assistant 
Secretary was given more definitive authority under the new order.
He is required to decide the appropriate unit for exclusive recog­
nition; to supervise elections and certify the results; and to 
decide unfair labor practice charges against agencies and allega­
tions against unions of violations of the Standards of Conduct for 
Employee Organizations. He also " . . .  may require an agency or 
labor organization to cease and desist from violations of this Order
and require it to take such affirmative action as he considers ap-
23
propriate to effectuate the policies of this Order." The 
rationale of the Hampton Committee was that although the Federal 
Labor Relations Council would establish overall policy and be the 
supreme arbiter of disputes, much of the day-to-day administration
23EO 11491, Section 6 (4) (b).
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of the program should be handled by the Assistant Secretary. Much 
of the authority granted agency heads In the area of Impasse set­
tlement by EO 10988 would thus be shifted into the hands of the 
Assistant Secretary. The Hampton Committee reasoned that expanding 
the role of the Assistant Secretary would benefit both unions and
management and " . . .  bring impartiality, order and consistency 
..24
. . . to the entire process.
The principal means of securing a settlement in a negotiating 
impasse is through the Federal Services Impasse Panel (FSIP). This 
panel consists of seven private sector arbitrators appointed by the 
President in August 1970. The panel operates as a separate agency 
within the Federal Labor Relations Council, and considers negotia­
tion impasses presented to it by either a federal agency or union.
The Order requires the FSIP to ". . . take any necessary action
25necessary to settle the impasse . . including imposing its
own settlement on the parties. The panel does not sit fulltime, 
since its members are employed fulltime in the private sector; but 
it is available on call to settle disputes as they are submitted. 
When they are working on an impasse resolution, panel members
^Slampton Committee Report, op. cit., p. 26. The Assistant 
Secretary has been very active in pursuing his duties. His first 
decision was rendered on November 3, 1970. From that time through 
November 1973, he made 326 separate decisions. These decisions 
cover the range of his responsibilities from unit determination 
decisions to decisions in unfair labor practice cases.
^ E 0  11491, Section 5.
receive the daily rate of pay of a GS-18 civil service employee 
($136.56 in 1973).
During its first three years the FSIP made 14 recommen­
dations for settlement of impasses brought before it; all were 
accepted by the negotiating parties and signed into agreements 
But the cases in which the parties waited for a final decision 
from the panel constitute only a small part of the work being 
accomplished by the FSIP. For example, of the more than 120 
requests for assistance during this same period, all but 14 were 
settled by the parties themselves during or prior to the fact 
finding proceedings of the panel. A sampling of recent FSIP 
actions indicates the influence the panel exerts on the parties. 
Three impasses involving the issue of official time for employees
representing a union during negotiations were resolved at prehear
26ing conferences which had been ordered by the panel. However, 
a similar dispute was not resolved in the prehearing conference 
and will go to fact finding.^ FSIP told two other contending 
parties to resume bargaining with the assistance of higher level
26
These were: U.S. Forest Service, Bitterroot National
Forest, and NFFE Local 1492 (Case No. 73 FSIP 10, August 9, 1973) 
U.S. Forest Service, Nezperce National Forest, and NFFE Local 
1436 (Case No. 73 FSIP 13, August 9, 1973); and Bonneville Power 
Administration and AFGE Columbia Power Annual Employees Council 
(Case No. 73 FSIP 20, August 9, 1973). Cited in GERR. No. 525 
(October 15, 1973), p. A-13.
27Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Adminis­
tration, and AFGE Local 2814 (Case No. 73 FSIP 24, September 18, 
1973). Cited in GERR. No. 525 (October 15, 1973), p. A-13.
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agency and union representatives. The panel believes that if
these higher level representatives entered into the negotiations,
the issues might be resolved without further intervention by 
28
FSIP.
Based on the experience of the panel in its first three 
years of operation, it would seem that it has used great restraint 
in using its power to impose settlements on conflicting parties.
The Hampton Committee was aware that the ready availability of 
third party procedures for resolution of negotiating impasses 
could cause an escalation effect. That is, instead of working out 
their differences by hard, earnest, and serious negotiation, the 
parties might take their problems to a third party for settlement. 
This has not been the federal experience in the first three years 
of FSIP operation, however. To the contrary, it seems that the 
presence of the panel, with its power to impose a settlement which 
both parties must accept, has seemed to make the parties negotiate 
more diligently and compromise more easily. As long as the panel 
follows its present policy of being the "court of last resort," it 
will continue to make significant contributions to the Federal labor 
relations program.
Strike rights. EO 11491 is even more emphatic than EO 10988 
regarding the strike issue in the federal sector. "A labor
^®Naval Avionics Facility, Indianapolis, and AFGE Local 1744 
(Case No. 73 FSIP 19, August 8, 1973). Cited in GERR, No. 525 
(October 15, 1973), p. A-13.
organization shall not . . . call or engage in a strike, work 
stoppage or slow-down; picket an agency in a labor-management 
dispute; or condone any such activity by failing to take affirms-
2Q
tive action to prevent or stop it." This is a blanket provision 
which, in addition to prohibiting strikes, makes the national union 
responsible for seeing that none of its locals engage in these 
prohibited practices. The rationale of the Hampton Committee was 
that since some labor unions had recently dropped the no-strike 
pledge from their constitutions, the " . . .  strike and picketing 
prohibitions are needed in order to insure that there is no mis­
understanding as to the responsibility which accompanies union 
30recognition." This provision is in direct contrast to private 
sector practice and will be investigated in more detail in 
Chapter V.
Executive Order 11491 also provides for financial accounting
and disclosure similar to that required of unions in the private 
31sector. Commenting on these rules, Assistant Secretary of Labor 
Willie J. Usery, who was responsible for their promulgation, said 
that " . . .  just as those unions representing employees in the 
private sector are required to do, so will all unions representing 
federal employees now be required to report their financial
29EO 11491, Section 19 (b) (4).
30Hampton Coiranittee Report, op. cit., p. 54. 
31E0 11491, Section 18 (a) (4).
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transactions, meet bonding requirements, and abide by standards
of conduct for election of union officers and the establishment 
32of trusteeships." Unions of federal employees have had an 
excellent record for hone3t dealing with their members. This pro­
vision has caused no difficulty in the first three years of
operation under EO 11491, but only serves as a reminder of the new
status federal unions have achieved.
Two other provisions of EO 11491 were apparently taken from 
comparable rules in the private sector. The first of these is 
that guards may not be included in a bargaining unit which also 
includes other employees. The rationale for the inclusion of this 
provision was specifically that it was private sector practice.
The committee stated:
Xn the private sector, a unit is not considered 
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining 
if it includes, together with other employees, any 
individual employed as a guard to enforce against 
employees and other persons rules to protect property 
of the employer or the safety of persons on the
employers premises . . .
A "grandfather clause" in this section allows units already 
constituted which contain guards with other employees to retain 
their identity. In the first three years of operation under the
32
"Usery says Copying Private Sector Will Bring 'Bitter with 
Sweet' to Federal Bargaining," statement of Assistant Secretary 
Willie J. Usery to the Federal Bar Association Briefing Conference 
on Executive Order 11491, Washington, January 19, 1970, cited in 
GERR. No. 333 (January 26, 1970), p. A-8.
33Hampton Committee Report, op. cit., p. 20.
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new Executive Order, this provision has had little Impact since
most guards have opted to remain in the bargaining units as
originally constituted.
The second of the new provisions was the requirement that
". . . employees who represent a recognized labor organization
shall not be on official time when negotiating an agreement with
agency management."3^ The Hampton Committee used the rationale
that forcing union negotiators to draft contracts during off-duty
hours would speed up the pace of negotiation. Further, employees
negotiating for the union were working for the union, not the
government, and should not be receiving government pay for doing 
35union work. This provision drew immediate fire from union offi­
cials as being unfair to the unions and not in the spirit of the
i d  1 1
Executive Order. This was changed by Executive Order 11616.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11616, AN EXAMPLE OF FINE TUNING
Under the provisions of EO 11491, the Federal Labor 
Relations Council was mandated to continuously review operations 
under the Order and to make recommendations to the President for
34E0 11491, Section 20.
35Hampton Committee Report, op. cit,, p. 43.
36
See "Penalizing Employee Negotiators," The Federal Employee. 
NFFE (March 1970), p. 3, and The Government Standard. AFGE 
(March 20, 1970), p. 9.
^Infra, p. 74.
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changes. The first review was initiated with public hearings 
held in October 1970. Interested groups, including federal 
employees, representatives of labor organizations, and department 
and agency officials, were invited to present views of their 
experiences under the Order and to suggest changes for its improve­
ment. These hearings resulted in recommendations made by the 
council to the President for certain changes in the Order. These 
changes were incorporated in Executive Order 11616 of August 26, 
1971, effective November 24, 1971.
EO 11616 is an example of the advantage of an Executive 
Order over a law. Areas of discontent may be discussed and 
remedial action taken easily and simply. Though the council 
considered many policy issues raised by the various interested 
parties, it recommended action in four major areas: (1) grievance
procedures and arbitration; (2) the processing of unfair labor 
practice charges; (3) the use of official time for union negotia­
tors; and (4) negotiability of the costs of dues withholding.
Section 13 of EO 11491 was revised to provide that the 
negotiated agreement between management and the union with exclu­
sive representation rights must include a negotiated grievance 
procedure. This negotiated procedure is the only procedure 
available to all employees in the unit for grievances over the 
interpretation and application of the negotiated agreement.
This change accomplishes two important things: it enlarges
the scope of bargaining and it gives new status to the exclusively
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recognized union. The Individual employee's rights are protected 
since the negotiated grievance procedure applies only to alleged 
violations of the contract and not to any statutory rights which 
the employee might have. The contract cannot contain provisions 
which violate law or regulation of a higher authority. The union 
which has earned exclusive representation rights is protected since 
it may now negotiate any type grievance system it desires and can 
negotiate without the constraint of having to conform to guidelines 
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission. This freedom to 
negotiate a grievance system which is the product of the two par­
ties is another example of the merging of federal procedures with 
those of the private sector.
The second major change was a change in Section 19 (d) of 
EO 11491, regarding the processing of unfair labor practice charges. 
It was basically an administrative change which further clarified 
the role of the ASIXR, giving him exclusive jurisdiction of all 
unfair labor practice charges.
The third major change eliminated the prohibition on the 
use of official time by federal employees representing a labor 
organization in negotiations with management. The amount of time 
allowed union negotiators who are also federal employees is now n 
negotiable item. The maximum amount allowed for the negotiation 
of any one contract, however, is either (1) a maximum of forty 
hours or (2) one-half the total time spent in negotiations during 
regular duty hours. The time starts from the first meeting to
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establish ground rules and continues until the contract is
signed. Though this appeared to be an acceptable compromise
between the total time allowed by EO 10988 and the no time allowed
by EO 11491, it has not worked well in practice. During the first
two years of operation under this provision, there have been
instances where over forty hours have been spent negotiating on
the amount of time which the union negotiators might have "on the
clock." The tendency to spend an inordinate amount of time in
negotiating this issue has led the FLRC to prompt both labor and
management to spend less time and resources on procedural issues
38and more on substantive issues.
The fourth change eliminated the requirement that labor 
organizations be charged a flat fee of two cents per dues with­
holding per person. The fee for the service of dues withholding 
provided by management is now a negotiable item. As was the case 
with the previous change, however, this has been an area of much 
negotiation with little concrete results. The negotiating range 
for the unions has been between zero and the two cents previously 
charged. The negotiating range for agency negotiators has been 
between the alleged cost of withholding the dues and the previous­
ly charged two cents. The FLRC has also rebuked both parties for 
overemphasis on procedural issues in this area.
38
"Keep Official Time, Checkoff Cost Issues in Perspective, 
Don't Let Them Block Agreement on Contract, FLRC Urges," GERR. 
No. 521 (September 17, 1973), pp. A-14, 15, 16.
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None of these changes could be considered earthshaking, 
but they are Illustrative of the fine tuning of the system avail­
able under an executive order system. The problems these changes 
attempted to solve were brought to the attention of the President 
with recoamendations for a change, and these changes were imple­
mented immediately. As more experience is gained there will un­
doubtedly be more changes to refine the system. Apparently, the 
issues of duty time for union negotiators and the cost of dues 
deductions are issues which will have to be further adjusted. In 
a program which is only eleven years old, fine tuning by executive 
order would seem to be a better, easier method of change than the 
normal legislative process.
SUMMARY
The contention that the evolving labor relations system in
the federal sector is approaching private sector practices can be
buttressed by a comparison in eight specific areas. Considering
the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and actual practice,
39
collective bargaining in the private sector is characterized by:
1. Joint decision making. Management and union 
officials reach agreement on wages, hours and working 
conditions. In the federal sector, the principle of
39Industrial characteristics basically from Felix A. Nigio, 
"Labor Relations in the Public Sector," Personnel Administration 
(September - October 1970), pp. 34-38. Comparisons are those 
of the researcher.
required dealings with employee organizations was 
initiated by EO 10988 and affirmed by EO 11491. The 
preamble of both Executive Orders establishes that 
the principles of collective bargaining, bilateral 
agreement, and employee participation in decision 
making affecting their working conditions is the 
policy of the federal Executive Branch.
2. Recognition of an exclusive bargaining agent, 
representing a majority of the employees in a bargain- 
ing unit. EO 10988 permitted three levels of recognition, 
but the Hampton Committee emphasized that this system of 
recognition led to fragmentation and instability in labor 
relations. This is the same reasoning behind the 
recognition of exclusive bargaining agents in the private 
sector. Effective July 1, 1971, exclusive recognition
is the only recognition available in the federal sector.
EO 11491 also adopted the NLRB rule that there need be 
no set percentage of eligible voters participating in a 
representation election. A simple majority of those 
employees in the unit voting is sufficient for 
representation rights.
3. Union security. Private sector practice allows 
unions to negotiate union security provisions, except 
that Section 14 (b) of Taft-Hartley permits the individual 
states to pass legislation outlawing the union shop. In
this area, there is a divergence from private sector 
practices. Both Executive Orders affirmed that a union 
could not negotiate a union security agreement in spite 
of AFL President George Meany's request for at least an 
agency s h o p . ^  This decision to prohibit security 
agreements was based on the contention that unlike the 
federal government, private companies do not operate 
under merit systems which prohibit the use of any 
appointment or retention criteria which have nothing 
to do with job qualifications.
A. Broad Scope of negotiation. Although Taft- 
Hartley speaks only of bargaining over wages, hours, 
and other terms of employment, NLRB decisions have 
opened the door to negotiating on such subjects as 
fringe benefits, sub-contracting, and many other 
matters. The scope of negotiation is somewhat narrower 
in the federal sector. Matters determined by legisla­
tion such as wages and retirement programs, are not in 
themselves subject to bargaining. However, matters 
such as the system of overtime allocation are subject 
to negotiation. In essence then, it is the weekly pay 
rather than the wage rate that is being negotiated.
^ G e o r g e  Meany, "Making the U.S. an Ideal Employer," The 
American Federationist. Vol. 77 (December 1970), p. 8.
Further, as a result of the postal strike, the fact is 
that a precedent has been established for bargaining on 
wages and other Items heretofore negotiable only in the 
private sector. In addition to these provisions, EO 
11491 eliminated a management technique of abolishing 
provisions negotiated in a contract by adopting new 
agency regulations which took precedence. The provi­
sions of the collective bargaining agreement will now 
have precedence for the term of the contract.
5. Impartial third party machinery. The NLRB has 
authority to decide disputes over such questions as 
definition of the bargaining unit; determination of 
which union, if any, is entitled to be the exclusively 
recognized bargaining agent; and the scope of bargaining. 
It also investigates charges, by either management or the 
union, of unfair labor practices, and has the authority 
to issue cease and desist orders enforceable through the 
federal courts. Though there is no one board in the 
federal sector comparable to the NLRB, all comparable 
functions are accomplished by the machinery established 
by EO 11491. The Assistant Secretary of Labor makes 
final decisions on bargaining units, supervises and 
validates elections to determine the exclusive bargaining 
agent, and handles complaints of alleged unfair labor 
practices and alleged violations of the Standards of
Conduct for Unions. The Federal Services Impasses Panel 
has authority to take any action It deems necessary to 
settle a negotiating impasse. The Federal Labor 
Relations Council oversees the entire program and is 
the court of last resort for decisions made by the 
Assistant Secretary or the FSIP.
6 . Sharp demarcation of management and supervisory 
employees on the one hand and workers on the other. 
Supervisors usually are excluded from the bargaining 
unit. GO 11491 has taken the Taft-Hartley definition 
of supervisor almost verbatim. Since the ASUfR decides 
bargaining unit disputes, his definition of supervisor 
determines the similarity to the private sector. The 
adoption of the private sector definition of supervisor 
and the elimination from EO 11491 coverage of units 
containing only supervisors suggest that the line 
between supervisor and employee will be more sharply 
drawn.
7. Grievance arbitration. In the private sector
a grievance is usually decided by an arbitrator, accept­
able to both parties. The same provisions may now be 
negotiated in the federal sector under the amendment
^ S o m e  observers see this as an unfortunate move. See 
I. B. H e l b u m  and Stephen R. Zimner, "The Federal Supervisor: 
A Comment on Executive Order 11491," Public Personnel Review. 
Vol. XXXII (January 1971), pp. 2-7.
provided by EO 11616.
8 . Right to strike. Private sector employees are
given this right to Insure that bargaining takes place
between equals, since management retains the right to
lock out the employees. Federal sector practice varies
from private sector practice In this area. Strikes
(and lockouts) are still prohibited in the federal 
42sector.
While some significant differences between collective 
bargaining in the private sector and in the federal sector remain, 
the changes In the evolving federal system embodied in EO 11491, 
as amended, seem to be narrowing the gap between federal and 
private sector practices. The following chapter will investigate 
areas in which this gap is narrowing. Chapter V will investigate 
the two principal divergencies of the federal system from that of 
the private sector: wage setting and impasse settlement.
42See infra, 126-139.
CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON FEDERAL SECTOR 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
The cumulative thrust of this chapter will show that the 
series of Executive Orders initiated in the decade of the sixties 
drastically changed employee-management relations in the federal 
sector. If the purpose of this study is to be fulfilled, there 
should be data to support this purpose in terms of federal union 
activity paralleling that of private sector unions. The first 
part of this chapter will contrast union growth in the private 
sector with that in the federal sector. The second part will be 
devoted to an examination of specific behaviors which have been 
changed or tempered by the growing body of agreements and 
operating procedures initiated since January 1962.
UNION ACTIVITY
The Private Sector
With the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955, some observers 
of the American labor scene believed that the labor movement was 
on the verge of an era of growth in both number and influence.
This growth did not occur; in fact, the labor movement suffered 
a decline in membership. While It is difficult to assess the many
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factors contributing to the drop in membership in the years
immediately following the merger, losses may be attributed
primarily to the changing employment patterns. Employment war
increasing In the whi^e collar and service areas of employment
(that is, among employees traditionally difficult to unionize)
and decreasing in traditionally union oriented industries such
as railroads, textiles, and shoe manufacturing.^
One observer of the American labor scene described the labor
2
movement as "facing a series of crises." From 1957 through 1961, 
unions in the private sector suffered an absolute decline of 
approximately 1.2 million members and a relative decline from
3
33.4 percent to 30.2 percent of the nonagrlcultural work force.
This decline seems to have been dampened in the decade of the
4
sixties by the addition to union ranks of public sector employees.
For an examination of the reasons for the 1955 AFL-CIO 
merger and the lack of growth in the union movement see Abraham 
L. Gitlow, Labor and Manpower Economics (3d ed., Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1971), pp. 58-69.
2
Solomon Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement and 
What Can be Done About It (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for 
Study of Democratic Institutions, 1961), p. 1. Barkin gave 
several reasons for this decline. Among them was that unions 
had failed to enroll workers in government because of the 
basically anti-union attitude of the majority of government 
administrators.
3
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions 
in the United States. 1969 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1970), p. 67.
^"Public Sector" employees includes federal, state, and 
local governmental employees.
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For example, In 1970 union membership in absolute terms had 
increased to over 19 million and seems to have stabilized at ap­
proximately 28 percent of the nonagricultural work force. Table 2 
shows the ebb and flow of union membership from 1956 through 1970.
The growing activity of organizations of professional and 
public employees was recognized by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
of the Department of Labor in 1965, when the Bureau for the first 
time included a small number of employee associations with exclu­
sive representation rights in its Directory.^ The 1969 Directory 
contained a separate section for professional and public employee 
associations, though their membership was not included in the 
total membership statistics.^
As evidence of the growing importance of public sector 
unions and associations, they were listed in the 1971 Directory 
and were also included in the membership statistics for the first 
time.^ These statistics are included as Tabic 3. The inclusion 
of public employee unions and associations slowed the numerical
'^United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions 
in the United States. 1965 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1966), p. 58.
^United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions 
in the United States. 1969 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1970), pp. 52-54.
^United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee 
Associations. 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1972), p. 72.
TABLE 2
NATIONAL UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PROPORTION OF THE LABOR FORCE, I956-1970a
Total Union Membership as a Per Cent of
Year Membership Total Labor Force Nonagricultural Establishments
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
1956 17,490b 69,409 25.2 52,406 33.4
1957 17,369 69,729 24.9 52,894 32.8
1958 17,029 70,275 24.2 51,363 33.2
1959 17,117 70,921 24.1 53,313 32.1
1960 17,049 72,142 23.6 54,234 31.4
1961 16,303 72,031 22.3 54,042 30.2
1962 16,586 73,442 22.6 55,596 29.8
1963 16,524 74,571 22.2 56,702 29.1
1964 16,841 75,830 22.2 58,332 28.9
1965 17,299 77,178 22.4 60,815 28.4
1966 17,940 78,893 22.7 63,955 28.1
1967 18,367 80,793 22.7 65,857 28.0
1968 18,916 82,272 23.0 67,860 27.9
1969 19,036c 84,240 22.6 70,274 27.1
1970 19,381 85,903 22.6 70,644 27.4
aExcludes Canadian membership and members of single-firm unions, Includes members of 
directly affiliated local unions, membership in thousands.
^Statistics for the years 1956-1968 are from United States Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States. 
1969. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 67.
Statistics for the years 1969-1970 are from United States Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations. 1971. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 72.
TABLE 3
NATIONAL UNION AND ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP AS A PROPORTION OF THE LABOR FORCE, 1968-1970°
Membership Membership as a Per Cent of
Year Unions and
Associations Total Labor Force Nonagricultural Establishments
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent
1968 20,721 82,272 25.2 67,915 30.5
1969 20,776 84,240 24.7 70,274 29.6
1970 21,248 85,903 24.7 70,644 30.1
aExcludes Canadian membership and members of single-firm unions, includes members of 
directly affiliated local unions, membership in thousands.
Source: United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of
National Unions and Employee Associations. 1971. (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1972), p. 72.
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decline of the labor movement. Union and association membership 
as a percentage of the nonagricultural work force seems to have 
stabilized at approximately 30 percent.
Union Growth in the Federal Sector
No union of federal employees reported a membership of over
100.000 in 1960. Ten years later, both AFGE and NFFE had exceeded 
or equaled this number and were included in the select group of
48 unions reporting a membership of 100,000 or more to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.®
Until the promulgation of EO 10988, no machinery existed 
in the federal sector for union recognition as an exclusive bar­
gaining agent. There was no method of establishing bargaining 
units, nor was there a definitive description of union rights and 
responsibilities. EO 10988 outlined a system for union recognition 
and for the establishment of bargaining units. Figure 1 illus­
trates the growth of these bargaining units since 1962. The 26 
bargaining units in existence in 1962 were in two units composed 
of employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority and 24 units
O
Ibid., p. 108, AFGE reported a membership of 325,000 
ranking 17th in membership among all unions, NFFE reported a 
membership of 100,000 ranking 47th. Among other public employee 
associations and unions was the National Education Association, 
reporting a membership of 1,100,000, which would have ranked 4ih 
had it been included as a union; AFSCME, reporting 444,000 members 
ranking 11th; and the American Federation of Teachers, reporting
205.000 members, ranking 27th. It should be further noted that 
AFGE and NFFE accept only federal employees for membership.
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Figure 1. Growth in exclusive bargaining units in the federal sector, excluding the 
postal service, 1962-1972.
Source: Composite by author from various Civil Service Commission publications,
1970-1972 data from United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management 
Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Governmentr (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1973), p. 17. OO00
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g
composed of employees of the Department of Interior. These 
units were established under particular laws governing specific 
governmental corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
the Bonneville Power Administration, and the Alaska Railroad. 
Procedures for these bargaining units were peculiar to the indi­
vidual agencies and did not apply government wide.
Not only have unions of federal employees progressed in 
terms of numbers of bargaining units but also in terms of numbers 
of employees represented. Figure 2 illustrates the numerical 
growth of employees included in bargaining units in which a union 
is their exclusive representative in all personnel matters. Figure 
2 includes postal employees. These employees are now covered by 
the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-375) and are 
no longer governed in labor relations matters by the provisions of 
E0 11491. Prior to the promulgation of EO 10988, 84 percent of 
the approximately 600,000 postal employees were union members,^ 
while in November 1972, 91 percent of the approximately 665,000 
postal employees were represented by a union.^
Q
Personnel Methods Series 15, op. cit., p. 3.05.
10Ibid., p. 3.02.
^Uni t e d  States Civil Service Commission.
Office of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the 
Federal Government (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p . 442.
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Figure 2, Percentage of total federal employees (Executive Branch) in exclusive 
bargaining units (data for 1962-1966 as of mid-year, 1968-1972 as of November).
Source: United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations
Union Recognition in the Federal Government. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p. 20, and GERR Number 493, (March 5, 1973), p. D-l.
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Since there has been a high Incidence of unionism among 
postal employees for many years, EO 10988 cannot be considered 
the inmedlate cause of union activity In the postal service. EO 
10988 did give the postal employees additional advantages, such 
as a defined system within which to operate, but they had perfect­
ed their lobbying activity with the Congress to such an extent 
that postal unions could show a record of legislative achievement. 
Most postal employees were already union members when EO 10988 
was issued. The increase in postal union representation was 
brought about by increased employment in the postal service more 
than by an increase in union activity. A more significant measure 
of union growth than the postal service figures would be the 
growth of union representation in the federal executive branch, 
excluding postal employees. This growth is illustrated in 
Figure 3.
Another indication of the tendency of federal sector labor 
management relations to approach that of the private sector is the 
fact that a majority of organized federal employees have chosen 
unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO to represent them in negotia­
tions with management. For example in November 1972, 73 percent
of all federal employees in exclusive bargaining units were repre-
12
sented by unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO. National 
12
United States Civil Service Commission, Office of 
Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal 
Government. op. cit., p. 22.
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Figure 3. Percentage of total federal employees (Executive Branch) excluding postal 
employees in exclusive bargaining units (data for 1962-1966 as of mid-year, 1968-1972 as of 
November.)
Source: United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor-Management Relations,
Union Recognition in the Federal Government. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p. 20.
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Independent unions--that is, those not affiliated with AFL-CIO 
--represented 26 percent of all federal employees in bargaining 
units, while only 1 percent were represented by local independent 
unions.
Of the 1,082,587 federal employees represented exclusively 
by unions, 427,089 are wage board (blue collar) employees and 
655,498 are General Schedule (white collar) e m p l o y e e s . U n i o n s  
represent 83 percent of total employment in the blue collar sector 
and 46 percent of all federal white collar e m p l o y e e s . T a b l e  4 
illustrates the number of employees in exclusive bargaining units 
by agency. The majority of the non-postal employees represented 
by a union work in the Department of Defense. Table 5 illustrates 
the principal unions which represent these employees.
While the private sector union movement was in decline, the 
preceeding data suggest that the federal sector union movement was 
rapidly increasing, whether measured by numbers of employees repre­
sented or by new bargaining units established. Though a majority 
of federal employees opted for unions which represent only federal 
employees, the unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO also received 
majority support. In the first 10 years of operation under the
13
United States Civil Service Commission, Office of Labor- 
Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal Government. 
op. cit., p. 22.
14Ibid., p. 18.
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TABLE 4
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING UNITS 
BY AGENCY, NOVEMBER 1972
Agency Number
Per Cent of Total 
Agency Employment
Army 195,412 587.
Navy 192,659 607.
Air Force 181,632 767.
Veterans
Administration 120,344 637.
Treasury 64,327 617.
Health Education 
and Welfare 59,503 527.
All Other Agencies 268,710 417.
Total 1,082,587 557.
Source: United States Civil Service Commission, Office
of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal 
Government. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973),
p. 18.
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TABLE 5
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING UNITS, 
BY UNION, NOVEMBER 1972
Union
Number
of
Employees
Per Cent 
of
Employees
American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO 620,744 58%
National Federation of 
Federal Employees 114,420 11%
National Association of 
Government Employees 82,187 7%
Metal Trades Council AFL-CIO 57,038 5%
National Association of
Internal Revenue Employees3 46,522 4%
International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers AFL-CIO 30,585 3%
All Other Unions 131,091 12%
Total 1,082,587 100%
The National Association of Internal Revenue Employees 
changed its name to The National Treasury Employees Union at 
its August 1973 Convention.
Source: United States Civil Service Commission, Office
of Labor-Management Relations, Union Recognition in the Federal 
Government. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p . 19.
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Executive Orders, unions obtained representation rights for a 
majority of federal civilian employees.
The data suggest that there is a formal industrial system 
emerging in the federal sector. At least there is a system 
emerging whereby unions may secure exclusive bargaining rights 
for groups of employees. If these union gains are of consequence, 
it follows that there should be definite and discernible impacts 
on the traditional system of federal manager-employee relations. 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion 
of selected significant changes.
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN FEDERAL EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
The Sovereignty Doctrine
Any discussion of federal civilian labor relations would 
be incomplete without reference to the vague and highly abstract 
question of bargaining with the sovereign employer. Historically 
this concept has been used to discourage unionism in the federal 
sector. The American heritage from English common law dictated 
that the sovereignty doctrine would be reflected in decisions of 
American courts. What is the sovereignty doctrine? "All the 
characteristics of sovereignty are contained in this, to have 
power to give laws to each and everyone of his subjects and 
receive none from them . " ^  Briefly stated, as it applies to
*^Jean Bodln cited in Harold J. Laski, The Foundations of 
Sovereignty (Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries, Inc., 1968),
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employee management relations In the federal sector, the 
sovereignty doctrine dictates that federal government cannot 
be required to enter Involuntarily into collective bargaining 
relationships.
The important consideration Is that the doctrine does 
not preclude the enactment of legislation specifically author­
izing the federal government to enter into collective bargaining 
relationships with its employees. Employee organizations have 
sought such legislation and have applied pressure to the legisla­
tive branch for it consistently during the past thirty years. The 
various Rhodes-Johnson bills previously noted were manifestations
(originally published in 1921), p. 17. Laski gives an excellent 
historical review of the sovereignty concept in his Chapter 1, 
pp. 1-29. Vosloo, op. cit., also gives an excellent summation 
of this historical development (pp. 195-196). He states:
"Sovereignty describes a condition of supremacy: the
ultimate and final legal authority and political power in a state. 
It is generally agreed that this doctrine was introduced in 
political thought by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes. . . . since 
the days of the "absolute monarch" of Bodin and Hobbes the doc­
trine has undergone many interpretations. The most important of 
which are Rousseau's concept of sovereignty as the exercise of 
the "general will" the transcendental view of the absolute state 
as a supreme judicial personification of the collective will of 
the people expounded by the German idealists (Hegel, Treitschke, 
Jellinek) as well as by English idealists (Green and Bosanquet); 
the utilitarian view of sovereignty as based on "habitual obedi­
ence" created by a determined agent of government acting in the 
public interest expounded by Bentham, the Mills and Austin; and 
finally, the attack on the monistic concept of sovereignty by 
such leading exponents of pluralism as J. N. Figgis, F. W. Mait­
land, Harold J. Laski, A. D. Lindsey, G. D. H. Cole, Otto Gierke, 
Hans Krabbe, and Leon Duquit, on the grounds that the state does 
not, in fact, exercise the type of authority described as "sov­
ereign" because there are other sub-groups in society which have 
wills s b  well as the state's."
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of this pressure.
Lacking such legislation, the best alternative was an 
executive order which would voluntarily l-»mit the power of the 
government to make unilateral decisions in the area of personnel 
policy and permit employee participation in these decisions. An 
executive order would not have the force of law, but it would be 
an expression of public policy and would therefore carry consider­
able moral force. The fact that an executive order would not 
affect employees in the legislative and judicial branches of gov­
ernment was of minor importance to the federal unions since the 
executive branch employs over 98 percent of the total federal 
work force.
The decision to voluntarily limit the power of the "sover­
eign" was made by President Kennedy when he issued EO 10988, and 
reaffirmed by President Nixon through Executive Orders 11491 and 
11616. The decision as enunciated in the Executive Order to 
establish collective bargaining procedures is in itself a sover­
eign act. It should be emphasized that the Executive Orders did 
not constitute an abrogation of sovereign authority, since each 
contained provisions for management action during emergencies. 
"Emergency" was not defined, however, and as a last resort these 
Executive Orders could be "repealed" by another executive order.
Thus it is apparent that the concept of sovereignty 
remains valid as a device for legitimizing an ultimate source of 
authority in the American political system to be used to settle
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conflicting claims between competing individuals and sub-groups.
The "sovereign" employer still retains the right to change, 
repudiate, or even ignore, in certain circumstances, any collective 
bargaining agreement. The Executive Orders did not change in any 
way the legal Btatus of the sovereignty doctrine.
The relevant question in comparing the emerging federal 
sector system to that of the private sector is: how did the
Executive Orders change the practical application of the sover­
eignty doctrine in the day-to-day activities of employees and 
managers in the federal sector? From a practical standpoint, the 
Executive Orders ended the doctrine as a pragmatic concept in the 
federal sector. In the framework of the American democratic sys­
tem, strict legality is tempered by specific power relationships 
within the political system. In this system, the authority of 
the federal government comes from below, from the people who make 
up that government, not from above. Though there must be a final, 
sovereign, decision making process in matters such as national 
security, the Executive Orders seem to say that it is not neces­
sary to extend this finality of decision making to the conditions 
of employment of federal employees. Nigro states:
As to sovereignty, I do not think we have lost 
it; we simply have redefined it . . . the concept 
of sovereignty is essential as a means of legiti­
mizing governments' possession of supreme power 
but democracies respect the wishes of the people 
and consequently accept many obligations they 
legally could not be compelled to accept . . . 
the sovereignty issue really is dead, because
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recent statutes and judicial decisions prove 
that government can legally enter Into 
collective negotiations.^
In sunmary, It would not be precise to state that the
Executive Orders were the sole or even the major cause of the
demise of the sovereignty doctrine at the practical level. The
decision to allow collective bargaining in the federal sector
was itself a sovereign decision. The special status of the
federal government as an employer affects only the degree and
limitations of the collective bargaining process; this special
status as a sovereign employer no longer precludes the process.
Unions and the Merit System
Employment in the federal sector has not proceeded as in 
the private sector. Since the passage of the Pendleton Act in 
1883, all federal civilian employees are dealt with under one 
system expressing the merit principle. Simply stated, the merit 
principle is a concept whereby all federal civilian employees 
are selected, promoted, assigned, discharged, or retired solely 
on the Individual merit of the employee. Federal unions in 
general do not oppose the merit principle, but they do suggest 
that the employee, through his union, should have a greater voice
*^Felix Nigro, Commenting on a paper presented by Frank 
P. Zeidler to the 1966 International Conference on Public 
Personnel Administration, Washington, Cited in GERR. No. 138 
(May 2, 1966), pp. D-2 and D-4.
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In the determination of the system through which this principle 
Is applied.*®
Management officials seem to be more worried than union 
officials about the loss of the merit system. When discussing 
the compatibility of a collective bargaining relationship and ' 
the merit system, a management official states:
The decision is not where to draw the line.
The decision is about two different kinds of 
personnel systems. Which are we going go have?
They are different. They employ different 
principles, and they have different principles, 
and they have different concerns. We can no 
longer believe that we can be half collective 
bargaining and half merit system.*^
But the experience in the federal sector in the first 
decade of operation under the Executive Orders has been more of 
an accommodation of the two systems and a redefinition of roles 
than a replacement of one system by the other. For example, 
the role of the civilian personnel officer in the federal sector 
has undergone a rather drastic change. Under the pre-1962 
personnel system, the personnel officer in the federal sector 
performed the dual function of interpreting and representing 
employee interests to management while at the same time serving
18For example, see three books written by Hubert F. 
Hollander, Research Director of NFFE. These are:
Spoils (Silver Springs, M d . : Cornelius Publishing Company, 
1936); Crisis in the Civil Service (Washington: Current 
Publications, Inc., 1968); and Quest for Excellence 
Washington: Current Publications, Inc., 1968).
*^Muriel M. Morse, "Shall We Bargain Away the Merit System?" 
Public Personnel Review. Vol. 24 (October 1963), p. 243,
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as advisor to management in all personnel matters. To accomplish 
the function of employee protection ” . . .  either from rapacious 
management or tainted spoilsmen, the personnel function, many 
thought, should be shielded by the armor of an independent person-
on
nel board or Civil Service Commission.” With the coming of the 
union to the federal sector, the employee protection function has 
been taken over by the union. The federal personnel officer is 
no longer the "honest broker" between management and the employee, 
but now is an advisor to management alone.
An indicator of any weakening of the civil service system 
would be the changes in the Pendleton Act, which would then be 
reflected in changes in the Federal Personnel Manual. The Act 
has not been changed and the Federal Personnel Manual has only 
been revised in relatively minor ways, primarily to conform to 
changing conditions of employment in areas other than labor 
relations.
Another indicator of a faltering civil service system 
would be sequential provisions of the Executive Orders, each 
removing power from the Civil Service Commission. Though each 
Executive Order has enlarged the scope of bargaining (for instance, 
charges for dues withholding and the extent of paid time for 
union negotiators engaged in collective bargaining are now
20Kenneth 0. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, Public Management 
at the Bargaining Table (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 
1967), p. 299.
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negotiable), the basic power of the Civil Service Commission is 
still intact. Perhaps this power is nowhere more evident than 
in the composition of the Federal Labor Relations Council. The 
chairman of the Civil Service Commission also serves as chairman 
of the FLRC.
In summary, if the first decade of operation under the 
Executive Order program may serve as a guide, the federal Civil 
Service Merit System and the emerging formal industrial relations 
system seem to have reached an accommodation. The Civil Service 
Commission has the dual role of interpreting and putting into 
effect Civil Service laws, but the individual employee has a 
voice through his union in this interpretation. Further, again 
through his union, the employee is assured a hearing on any 
interpretation which adversely affects him. It would seem that 
the unions will continue to press for an enlarged scope of bar­
gaining within the discretionary rules imposed by the Civil 
Service Commission. At least for the foreseeable future, it 
would appear that the two systems will continue to seek accom­
modation as each adapts to the ever-changing federal sector 
personnel environment.
Changing Inter and Intra Union Relationships
Relationships within and between unions are constantly 
undergoing change. The craft union-industrial union controversy 
was the cause of the formation of the AFGE upon the withdrawal
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of Che NFFE from the AFL in 1932. Hart predicted soon after 
EO 10988 was promulgated that there would be strong union rival­
ries, with new unions appearing and old ones disappearing as a
21
result of the "Darwinian imperatives" of the Order, This 
prediction proved to be correct. For example, the National Asso­
ciation of Government Employees (NAGE), by 1973 the third largest 
federal union, was formed in 1961, just in time to take advantage 
of the new rights and responsibilities of the new federal program. 
District 44 of International Association of Machinists was 
replaced by a Government Employee Department whose organizatipn
was more nearly attuned to the privileges to be attained under
22
the new Executive Order.
A direct effect of Executive Order 10988 on the intra 
union organization was in the type of leadership needed under the 
new conditions. Soon after the EO 10988 was issued, a change in 
leadership took place in the two largest unions operating in the 
federal sector, AFGE and NFFE. The NFFE will be used to illus­
trate the significance of this changed union attitude toward the 
union leadership.
The NFFE, under the leadership of Vaux Owen, initially 
adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the Executive Order. As
^^Wilson R. Hart, "The U.S. Civil Service Learns to Live 
with Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal," op. cit., 
p. 217.
^^Machinists and Aerospace Workers, International Association 
of, Proceedings. 27th Grand Lodge Convention. Chicago, September 
3-13, 1968, pp. 136-137.
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an Independent organization not affiliated with the AFL-CIO, 
it viewed with some alarm, the introduction of collective bargain­
ing into the federal sector. This feeling is exemplified by the 
policy of NFFE as stated by Owen:
The NFFE will not engage in the "conflict of 
interest" practice of "collective bargaining."
The NFFE will not affiliate with any organization 
having members outside the federal service who 
engage in "collective bargaining" . . .23
In the face of severe losses in membership by the NFFE,
this policy toward the new program had to be modified. The
change in policy was introduced with the defeat of Owen as
President of NFFE by Nathan T. Wolkomir at the federation's 57th
Convention in September 1964. Wolkomir's new policy was to work
within the framework of the Executive Order. He stated, "We are
a pressure group, a labor lobby registered with Congress to repre-
24
sent civil servants . . . "
Wolkomir did continue the court action initiated by his 
predecessor to declare the Executive Order invalid, but this was 
a losing battle. The courts dismissed the case, concluding that 
". . . i n  case of dispute, each branch of the government is to 
remain in its proper sphere and appeal is to be made to the agency
23
Vaux Owen, cited in Kenneth 0. Warner (ed.); 
Management Relations With Organized Public Employees 
(Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1963), pp. 231-233.
24
Nathan T. Wolkomir, cited in GERR. No. 60 
(November 2, 1964), p. A-2.
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2 S
head or Che Chief Executive, not Che courts.1 Illustrative 
of the change In strategy under the new leadership, the Executive 
Council of NFFE in March 1968 urged all its locals to participate 
in organizing campaigns " . . .  with special emphasis on the
2 6
securing of exclusive recognition under the Executive Order."
This is a complete change in tactics from the days of Owen.
To add further to the confusion, the battle lines are not 
drawn clearly between the independents, such as NFFE, and unions 
affiliated with the AFL-CIO, such as AFGE. In fact, these two 
unions have their basic industrial union organizational structure 
as a common feature. Some of the hardest fought battles have 
been between members of the Government Employees' Council, AFL- 
CIO. This council was formed in 1945 as a planning organization 
for those AFL-CIO affiliates having members in the government 
service. It is presently composed of 31 unions having members in 
the federal sector and in the state and local sector. These 
unions not only raid each other's locals for members, they also
fail to present a united front on such basic issues as lobbying
27
with the Congress over legislation concerning federal employees.
^^For a full text of this decision, see GERR, No. 109
(October 11, 1965), pp. E-l to E-5.
26
Meeting of the Executive Council, NFFE March 1968, 
cited in GERR. No. 235 (March 11, 1968), p. A-3.
^ F o r  example see "Griner, AFL-CIO Take Opposite View of 
Wage Board Legislation," GERR. No. 197 (June 19, 1967), "IAM 
Blasts AFGE's Support of Central Wage Board," GERR. No. 154 
(August 22, 1966), p. A-6.
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In the federal sector, the traditional straggle between 
the craft and Industrial concepts of unionism has been transposed 
from the private sector; but the power struggle for membership 
crosses craft-lndustrlal lines. In the first decade of operation 
under the Executive Order program, each union, regardless of 
affiliation, attempted to reap the potential membership gain 
facilitated by this new program.
Professional organizations. In addition to the family 
fight between unions for power and expanded influence, the 
professional organizations within the federal sector were faced 
with a dilemma: whether to retain their status as professional
organizations or to seek recognition as unions. None of the 
Executive Orders contained a definition of the term "professional 
employee," so the Civil Service Commission developed a definition 
which was used in the program from 1962 until 1972. Assistant 
Secretary of Labor W. J. Usery, not satisfied with this definition, 
developed another which is presently being used in unit determina­
tion cases. This definition is as follows:
(A) Any employee engaged in the performance of 
work; (1) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in 
a field of science or learning customarily acquired 
by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual 
instruction and study in an institution of higher 
learning or a hospital, as distinguished from knowledge 
acquired by a general academic education, or from an 
apprenticeship, or from training in the performance of 
routine mental, manual, or physical processes; (2) 
requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and 
judgement in its performance; (3) which is predominantly 
intellectual and varied in character (as opposed to 
routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work);
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and (4) which Is of such a character that the output 
produced or the result accomplished cannot be 
standardized In relation to a given period of time; or
(B) Any employee who has completed the courses of 
specialized Intellectual Instruction and study In 
(A) above and In performing related work under the 
direction or guidance of a professional person to qualify 
himself to become a professional employee as defined in 
clause (A) above.
The advantages and basic rights which flow from recognition 
as a union are delineated in the Executive Orders. There are also 
certain disadvantages to the professional organization when it 
acquires union recognition. First, the neutrality of a federal 
agency toward its employees is compromised. It is common practice 
for an agency to encourage its professional employees to belong to 
and actively participate in professional associations and to sup­
port this participation by allowing the employee to attend meetings 
and conferences as an official duty. This privilege could no 
longer be extended to the associations if they gained recognition 
under terms of the Executive Order. Second, difficulties are 
posed by the Executive Order requirement that members of an agency 
management cannot participate in the management of the union or 
act as its representative. Traditionally, professional organiza­
tions have had supervisory officials serving in leadership posi­
tions. Even membership in the association by management officials
28ASIMR Decision No. 170 (June 26, 1972) cited in GERR. 
No. 461 (July 17, 1972), p. A-7. It should be noted that this 
definition of "professional employee" closely parallels that 
found in Section 2 (12) of the Labor-Management Relations Act 
of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).
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could give Che impression of a ''company union" and could make 
Che agency subjecC Co an unfair labor pracCice charge by a 
compeCing union.
The HampCon Committee recognized the dilemma facing profes­
sional organizations: if they did not seek recognition and
function as a labor organization, they faced loss of membership 
to unions which were actively organizingj should they obtain 
recognition, they were required to remove supervisors and managers 
from any active leadership role and forfeit privileges they had 
long enjoyed. The Committee Report stated:
In some instances, agencies may be overly fearful 
of violating the rights of recognized labor organizations 
and unnecessarily refrain from proper dealings with 
professional associations on purely professional matters.
To maintain such communications and to avoid further 
misunderstandings, we recommend that "professional" be 
explicitly included among the types of associations 
listed in section 7 (d) (3) . . .29
After two years of operating under this amendment, exact 
procedures still have not been completely worked out by management 
and the professional organizations, the amendment offers a 
reasonable option for the federal professionals and management. 
Before taking that option, the federal professionals can await 
the outcome of the activities of professional associations at the 
state and local levels of government, specifically such profes­
sional groups as the National Education Association (NEA) and 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). These
^Hampton Committee Report, op. cit., p. 27.
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professional groups are now establishing bargaining units, 
holding elections, and negotiating contracts. In all likelihood 
the federal professional association will go the same route as 
the associations at the state and local levels.
The activities of the employees in the Internal Revenue 
Service could also be used to illustrate the metamorphosis of 
a relatively quiet society of high level professionals into a 
labor union whose jurisdiction encompasses all employees, both 
professional and non-professional including many lower grade 
clerks. This metamorphosis began with the election in 1967 of 
Vincent Connery to the presidency of what was at that time the 
National Association of Internal Revenue Employees (NAIRE).
The year Connery took office, a new organization constitution 
which he supported changed the presidency into a full-time, paid 
office with greatly expanded powers, and changed the major func­
tions of the organization from social activities to collective 
bargaining and servicing of grievances. Since 1967 the juris­
diction of NAIRE has been expanded, new vice presidencies 
representing the lower level constituencies at IRS Service Centers 
have been added to the governing body, and a second full-time 
national office has been created. Two new collective bargaining 
agreements have been negotiated, covering a total of 54,000 
employees in IRS District Offices and Service Centers where the 
organization holds exclusive recognition. The metamorphosis was 
completed at the NAIRE convention in August 197 3. At this
Ill
convention the official name of NAIRE was changed to the
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) to reflect the expansion
of its jurisdiction from IRS to the entire Treasury Department,
including the Bureau of Customs and the Mint. Connery argued for
the name change on the basis that the "association" was "now a
union." The vote for the new name followed the defeat of a
resolution designed to keep the word "association" in the
30organization name.
Thus, we have two examples indicating a drift of employee 
groups toward "union" status: the NFFE, not interested in' "col­
lective bargaining" until a loss of membership forced it to seek 
the benefits offered in the Executive Orders; and NTEU, which 
changed from an "association" to a "union." The example of the 
NEA and AAUP at the state and local levels further substantiates 
this tendency.
Implication of unionization on management1s right to manage. 
Closely related to the sovereignty doctrine is the issue of 
"management's rights to manage." This issue has been the subject 
of agonizing negotiation in the private sector, and with the addi­
tional impediment of the sovereignty doctrine in the federal sector, 
there is little reason to believe that a solution acceptable to 
both labor and federal, management will be easily attained there.
30
"NAIRE Convention Changes Unions Name to National 
Treasury Employees Union," GERR. No. 519 (September 13, 1973), 
p. A-14.
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Management-reserved rights are contained In EO 11491 In Section 
12. The concept of reserving these rights followed accepted 
practice in the private sector, though some observers see this 
practice as compromised in the private sector by the NLRB. Loomis 
and Herman describe the private sector's reserved right approach 
as follows:
Until recently the prevailing approach to post- 
contractual labor management relations in the United 
States has been the reserved rights theory, under 
which an employer retains all rights to manage the 
enterprise except for those specifically surrendered 
in the collective bargaining agreement. Since the 
rights are "reserved" under this theory, an employer 
does not look to a collective agreement to ascertain 
its rights; it looks to the agreement only to ascertain 
the extent to which it has ceded away or agreed to share 
its rights and powers.31
The strong management rights provisions of EO 10988 was an 
expression of concern on the part of President Kennedy's task 
force, which was introducing a form of collective bargaining into 
the federal sector for the first time. If followed literally, 
these provisions left few areas for bargaining, as unions soon 
discovered. Bargaining became a process of redefining and eroding 
the managements' rights language.
When both the Wirtz Committee and the Hampton Committee 
were considering revisions to EO 10988, unions advocated that 
bargaining should be permitted on any subject not prohibited by
31V  alter P. Loomis, Jr. and Joseph Herman,
"Management's Reserved Rights and the NLRB— an Employer's View," 
Labor Law Journal. Vol. 19 (November 1968), p. 695.
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law. President Meany of the AFL-CIO testifying before the Wirtz 
Consnittee, stated:
We urge deletion from the Executive Order of the 
references to management rights contained in Section 7 
(2). Most of the six items listed in this section are 
governed by law or regulation. There Is no reason why 
these matters cannot be subject to negotiation within 
the framework of existing laws.^2
If this advice had been followed it would have made Civil 
Service Coimnission and agency regulations susceptible to change 
by collective bargaining. The Hampton Committee was apparently 
not persuaded by the union argument, since the reserved rights 
section was retained in EO 11491 and was not amended by EO 11616. 
Local negotiators must still bargain within the framework of 
provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual and agency regulations. 
Since the Civil Service Commission had had ninety years to develop 
personnel regulations to cover almost any eventuality, there is 
little of real substance to negotiate at the local level. Further, 
detailed agency regulations impede the development of the bargain­
ing process at lower levels of the federal agency, especially at 
the local installation.
From a review of over sixty contracts signed by unions and 
federal agency management in 1971 and 1972, it is apparent that 
the agreements are more procedural than substantive. These
George Meany, testimony before the Wirtz Committee,
October 23, 1967, Washington, cited in CERR. No. 215,
(October 23, 1967) In Executive Order 10988, Managements 
Reserved rights were contained in Section 7 (2).
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agreements were mostly concerned with qualifying or implementing 
procedures on subjects still within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
management. For example, though a reduction in force (RIF) would 
be accomplished in accordance with Civil Service Regulations, the 
union would be notified concurrently with management that a RIF 
was to be effected. Management retained the right to require 
overtime work, but the union was given a voice in determining who 
would perform the overtime work. Though the installation reserved 
the right to implement an installation-wide parking plan, the 
union was given a voice in determining specific parking spaces.
The scope of bargaining in the federal sector during the 
first ten years after the promulgation of EO 10988 did not ap­
proach that of the private sector, but this does not mean that the 
bargaining program had no impact on management. The very act of 
consultation with unions on personnel policies and actions, begun 
by EO 10988 and expanded by EO 11491 and decisions of the ASLMR, 
tempered managements' right to manage. No longer could the federal
manager retire to the sanctuary of his office and make unilateral
decisions without input from the unions. In addition to those 
contractual relationships established at the bargaining table, the 
union is always available to see that management follows the 
dictates of the Executive Order. This is especially true at the 
local level, where the majority of contracts are negotiated.
No figures are available to indicate the cost of the total
program; however, the Air Force alone invested $142,958 in
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33negotiating 64 contracts during 1972. This figure covers only 
the hours spent at the bargaining table; it does not cover costs 
of management officials and union negotiators who are Air Force 
employees during the time they were preparing to go to the bar­
gaining table. Assuming the Air Force's costs to be relatively 
standard throughout the federal sector, the 1,694 contracts now 
in being cost approximately $3,8 million for time spent at the 
bargaining table alone.
SUMMARY
This chapter has indicated some significant impacts of the 
federal sector industrial relations program. The first signifi­
cant change was in the rapid growth of unions in the federal sector 
in terms both of membership and of employees represented. The 
membership in AFGE increased sixfold in the decade following the 
promulgation of EO 10988, and the employees represented exclusive­
ly by AFGE increased over twelvefold. It is also significant that 
three out of every four federal employees who opted for union 
representation selected a union affiliated with AFL-CIO. Naturally 
this fact suggests that these affiliated unions would influence the 
emerging system in the federal sector toward that of the private 
sector.
Statistics on costs of negotiation from Department of the 
Air Force, Labor and Employee Relations Division, Directorate 
of Civilian Personnel. Conclusions are those of the researcher.
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The first decade of the emerging federal system saw the 
death of the sovereignty doctrine as a viable concept. The 
policy decision to establish collective bargaining procedures in 
the federal sector was in itself a sovereign act. The special 
status of the federal government as an employer affects the limit 
and degree of the collective bargaining process, but can no longer 
be used to preclude that process.
The first decade of the evolving federal program also saw 
the unions attempting to have a greater voice in federal personnel 
relations through the merit "system" while still retaining the 
merit "principle." The merit principle presumes that federal 
employment requires the hiring, use, and separation of employees 
on the basis of qualification, without improper discrimination 
and in accordance with substantive and procedural equity. The 
merit system is a particular set of laws, regulations, and organ­
izational structures designed to gain the goals of the merit 
principle. The main thrust of union activity has been toward 
securing a voice in establishing the rules by which the "principle" 
is effected, particularly through consultation on Civil Service 
Commission and agency regulations.
Perhaps the area in which the unions have had the least 
success is in enlarging the scope of bargaining, A strong manage­
ment rights section in each of the Executive Orders has greatly 
circumscribed critical issues which the union would like to settle 
at the bargaining table. This is an area in which the unions have
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much to accomplish In the decade of the seventies.
The first decade after EO 10988 also saw the unions 
themselves vying for positions of power and influence under the 
"Darwinian imperatives" of the new program. It was a decade of 
organizational effort. Professional employees had to make, and 
are still having to make, decisions on the advantages of remaining 
as a professional association or becoming a union in terms of the 
advantages to be obtained under the Executive Orders.
Although many questions remain to be answered concerning 
the nature and activities of public employees unions in the 
federal sector, the rapid increase in union representation and 
the outline of "rules" developed following the promulgation of 
EO 10988 justify calling this decade the period of the "take­
off". Whether the decade of the seventies will bring the "drive
C
to maturity" by federal sector unions remains to be seen. The 
following chapter will examine the principal divergence of the 
federal sector system from private sector practice: the areas
of impasse settlement and wage determination.
CHAPTER V
STRIKES AND WAGE SETTING: SERIOUS DEVIATIONS
FROM PRIVATE SECTOR PRACTICE
The cumulative thrust of preceding chapters Indicates 
that the emerging federal sector Industrial relations system is 
merging with that of the private sector in many procedural areas. 
Significant areas where this merging has not taken place in the 
first decade after the promulgation of EO 10988, are In strikes 
and in other job actions and in wage determination.
Chapter V analyzes these divergencies. The first part 
of the chapter compares and contrasts present practices in the 
federal and private sectors relating to the strike question.
The latter part of the chapter is concerned with the institu­
tional arrangements presently in effect in the federal sector 
in the area of wage determination. By the use of basic economic 
analysis, the impact of these institutional arrangements will 
be discussed in order to illustrate that in these two important 
substantive areas, federal unions have only an advisory role.
THE STRIKE ISSUE
The Private Sector
Historically, strikes in the private sector have resulted 
from impasses between union and management in the following areas:
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organizational disputes, recognition disputes, interest disputes 
and grievance disputes. Organizational disputes are those in which 
the employer actively opposes the unionization of his employees. 
This type of strike has become relatively rare in recent years 
because of the significant percentage of union organization already 
achieved in industry, the relative slowing of union growth in the 
private sector, and the existence of more peaceful methods of unit 
determination and election of a collective bargaining representa­
tive under state and federal law.
Recognition disputes are those in which employers refuse 
to agree to procedures for establishing union claims to bargaining 
recognition or in which they refuse to recognize and bargain with 
duly certified unions or other employee representatives. In this 
latter category of strikes is the jurisdictional strike, a strike 
because of union rivalries over jobs and membership. Jurisdiction­
al strikes involve either a dispute between unions as to which 
group of employees will perform a particular piece of work or a 
contest in tAiich rival unions seek to compel the employer to recog­
nize the one rather than the other as the exclusive bargaining 
agent of a group of employees. This type of strike continues to 
exist even though the AFL-CIO and the NLRB have established 
machinery to prevent these strikes from occurring, or to settle 
them if they should occur. However, jurisdictional strikes in 
this category are relatively unimportant, constituting less than
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6 percent of all strikes In labor-management disputes each year.^ 
Interest disputes are those in which unions and management 
are unable to directly and bilaterally reach agreement on all of 
the terms of a collective bargaining contract. These are disputes 
over the "bread and butter" issues such as wages, hours and work­
ing conditions and cause the vast majority of all strikes each 
year.2
The fourth type of dispute is the grievance dispute. In 
these disputes the parties to a collective bargaining agreement, 
not being able to directly and bilaterally resolve a dispute over 
the Implementation or interpretation of a provision of the agree­
ment, have no procedures for some binding resolution of the dis­
pute. In recent years this type of dispute has also led to few 
strikes since over 90 percent of all contracts negotiated have a
3
grievance procedure which ends in binding arbitrations. Because 
it allows a peaceful settlement of disputes which, lacking a 
grievance system, could lead to a strike, the grievance procedure 
is perhaps the most important provision of a negotiated contract. 
Though unions and management are extremely reluctant to allow 
third parties to negotiate the contract for them, they seem willing 
to allow a neutral third party to settle disputes over the
^Gordon F. Bloom and Herbert R. Northrup, Economics of 
Labor Relations. (6th ed., Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1969), p. 214.
2Ibid., p. 213. 3Ibid., p. 124.
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interpretation and implementation of the contract.
The words "union" and "strike" are viewed by some as being 
nearly synonymous. Strikes are often viewed as the primary purpose 
for union organization. Yet as a percentage of total man days 
available in any one year, strikes cause a loss of less than one 
percent of this total in the non-farm economy. Table 6 illustrates 
the record of work stoppages since World War II. The year in which 
the greatest percentage of working time was lost, 1946, represented 
only one percent of available time.
The strike right has not been abandoned in the private 
sector but there is continuing discussion of viable alternatives.^ 
Though innovative thinking is being done to derive alternatives, 
there is no evidence that the strike will be eliminated from the 
private sector in the immediate future.
Strikes in State and Local Governmental Agencies
Although this study is directed toward analysis of the 
industrial labor relations system at the federal level of govern­
ment, this system is not evolving in a vacuum and is related to 
events in state and local government. The activities of imployees 
at the state and local levels in the area of work stoppages are
especially noteworthy both as an indicator of increased activity
■*
^See a special section in the Monthly Labor Review.
Vol. 96, Number 9 (September 1973), pp. 33-67, in which 
alternatives to the Btrike are explored by Theodore W. Kheel,
David L. Cole, I. W. Abel and other practitioners in the 
field of collective bargaining.
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TABLE 6
WORK STOPPAGES, 1946-1972, SELECTED YEARS®
Year
Number of 
Stoppages 
Beginning 
in Year
Workers
Involved
(Thousands)
Man-days Idle
Number
(Thousands)
Percentage 
of total 
Working Time
1946 4985 4,600 116,000 1.04
1948 3419 1,960 34,100 .30
1950 4853 2,410 38,800 .33
1952 5117 3,540 59,100 .48
1954 3464 1,530 22,600 .18
1956 3825 1,900 33,100 .24
1958 3654 2,060 23,900 .18
1960 3333 1,320 19,100 .14
1962 3614 1,230 18,600 .13
1964 3655 1,640 22,900 .15
1966 4405 1,960 25,400 .15
1968 5045 2,649 49,018 .28
1970. 5716 3,305 66,414 .37
1972 5100 1,700 26,000 .14
aThe data include all known strikes or lock outs 
including 6 workers or more and lasting a full day or shift 
or longer. Figures on workers Involved and man-days idle 
for as long as 1 shift in establishments directly involved 
in a stoppage. They do not measure the indirect or secondary 
effects on other establishments or industries whose employees 
were made idle as a result of material or service shortages.
L
Preliminary data.
Source: Data selected from "Current Labor Statistics,"
Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 96, Number 9 (September 1973), 
p. 133.
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in the public sector and as a portent of coming events in the 
federal sector.
The most exhaustive study of strikes in the public sector 
was the one accomplished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the 
Labor Department covering the years 1958-1968.^ The number of 
strikes against a governmental unit rose from 15 in 1958 to 254 
in 1968; workers involved increased from 1,700 to 202,000; and 
man-days of idleness jumped from 7,500 to 2.5 million. This trend 
is illustrated in Table 7. The leading types of government serv­
ices affected were education and sanitation services. For example, 
in the last three years of the study, work stoppages in public 
schools and libraries constituted over 44 percent of all govern­
mental stoppages and strikes by sanitation department employees 
constituted over 41 percent of the stoppages.
Issues that prompted work stoppages in the public sector 
were generally the same as those which caused private sector 
employees to strike. In the last three years of the study, 61 
percent of the strikes in government arose because the parties 
were unable to agree on wage and fringe benefits. Seventy three 
percent of all workers involved in governmental work stoppages 
and 83 percent of the resulting idleness was due to wage disputes.
Though no such exhaustive study has been made since 1968, 
the evidence suggests that there has been no slackening of the
^U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work 
Stoppages in Government. 1958-1968 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1970).
TABLE 7
WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1958-19688
Year
Number of 
Stoppages
Total
Employees
Involved
Man-Days
Idle
Percentage 
of total 
Working Time
1958 15 1,720 7,510 .022
1959 26 2,240 11,500 .028
1960 36 28,600 58,400 .340
1961 28 6,610 15,300 .077
1962 28b 31,100 79,100 .350
1963 29 4,840 15,400 .052
1964 41 22,700 70,800 .240
1965 42 11,900 146,000 .120
1966 142 105,000 455,000 .970
1967 181c 132,000 1,250,000 1.140
1968 254 201,800 2,545,000 1,650
aIncludes stoppages lasting a full day or shift or 
longer and including 6 workers or more. Data on stoppages 
and workers involved refer to all stoppages beginning in the 
year; man-days idle refers to all stoppages in effect during 
the year.
^Includes five stoppages of federal employees, 
affecting 4,190 workers and resulting in 33,800 man-days 
of idleness.
c
Includes three stoppages of federal employees, 
affecting 1,680 workers and resulting in 9,600 man-days 
of idleness.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Work Stoppages in Government. 1958-1968 (Washington 
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 7.
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pace of work stoppages in government. For example, in >.
September 1973, over 52,000 public school teachers were on 
strike.® As has been the cause of previous strikes, the salary 
issue was foremost, but class size, supplies, and preparation 
time were also In dispute.
Three states have recently enacted laws allowing state 
employees a limited right to strike.^ Though it is too recent 
an occurrence to draw any conclusion from the enactment of these 
laws, one intuitively feels that there will be a greater incidence 
of strikes in these jurisdictions as public employees experiment 
with new rights.
From this very brief description of activity at the state 
and local levels, it is logical to conclude that the strike is 
becoming a union weapon in impasse resolution attempts. The BLS
6GERR Number 520 (September 10, 1973), p. B-13.
^These states are: Alaska, 1972. Strikes are prohibited
for essential employees, limited right to strike for semi-essen­
tial employees and allowed for non-essential employees. Any 
employee in a category not specifically covered by the law will 
be placed In a category by the State Personnel Board;
Hawaii, 1971. All employees granted limited right to strike. 
Strikes endangering public health and safety are unlawful. Hawaii 
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) decides the legality of 
a strike. PERB may petition court for injunction against illegal 
strike;
Pennsylvania, 1970, Limited right to strike unless strike creates 
a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or 
welfare of the public. Court determines whether such strike is 
a danger. Cited in "Summary of State Labor Laws," Government 
Employees Relations Report Reference File 2_ (Washington: Bureau 
of National Affairs, April 1973), Section 51: 501.
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study Indicates a marked change In state and local collective 
bargaining incidence in the decade between 1958-68 and there is 
evidence to indicate that the trend toward collective bargaining 
at this level is continuing. The strike right for state employ­
ees has been granted by legislative act in three states. Though 
work stoppages in government still cause a loss of a relatively 
small portion of total man-days available, any strike or other
job action by government employees would have called for drastic
o
action in earlier times. At the state and local levels of gov­
ernment, the strike seems to be becoming an accepted employee 
action if accomplished within legal constraints of the individual 
jurisdictions.
Strikes in the Federal Sector
As indicated previously in this study, strikes are illegal 
9
in the federal sector. The few strikes which have occurred in 
the federal sector have generally been resolved in a short time 
and without resort to the discharge of employees.*^ Two recent 
strikes of federal employees, and the actions of federal manage­
ment in coping with these strikes, illustrate the need for more
®Supra, Chapter II. 
o
^Supra, p. 70.
*®The strikes in the federal sector listed in the BLS study 
previously cited were in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 
the longest of which lasted 11 days. This strike involved 2,500 
TVA construction workers and was a jurisdictional strike.
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research into Che entire strike question In the federal sector.
The first of these strikes was the strike of postal 
employees In March 1970, The strike began on March 18 in the 
New York City boroughs of the Bronx and Manhattan and before it 
was settled on March 25f over 208,000 postal employees were either 
striking or honoring picket l i n e s . T h e r e  was never any question 
that the employees were engaged in an illegal strike. As a result 
of the strike, no postal employee was suspended, fired or punished 
in any way. On the contrary in the Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Postal Department and the various postal unions, the 
Postal Department agreed to support legislation to secure a 6 
percent wage increase for all postal employees retroactive from 
the date of the agreement, April 3, 1970, to December 27, 1969.
The Postal Department also agreed to support legislation to es­
tablish a Postal Corporation with another 8 percent wage increase 
effective with the passage of this enabling legislation.
In brief, the unions got what they wanted, an immediate 
and substantial wage increase; the federal Executive Branch got 
what it wanted, a Postal Corporation. The provisions of the 
Memorandum of Agreement were carried out, the employees got the 
wage raise and the Postal Corporation was established by the 
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-375) signed by
Concise chronology of the strike is contained in GERR 
No. 341 (March 23, 1970), pp. A-5 through A-8; GERR No. 342 
(March 30, 1970), pp. A-7 through A-13; GERR No. 343 
(April 6, 1970), pp. A-5 through A-9.
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President Nixon on August 12t 1 9 7 0 . ^
At the same time the postal employees were on strike 
members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization 
(PATCO) were engaged In a "sickout" against the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). Absenteeism at the 21 major air traffic 
control centers reached about 13 percent at Its highest point on 
March 30. The "sickout" was started In protest over the involun­
tary transfer of three air traffic controllers from the airport 
tower in Baton Rouge, La., an action PATCO charged was an attempt 
by FAA to break up ". . . a  bastion of PATCO strength The
"sickout" was not effective nationwide but did cause delays in 
air traffic at such high density facilities as New York, Chicago, 
Denver, Oakland, and Kansas City. The "sickout" was ended on 
April 11 when a federal judge ordered PATCO leaders to direct a 
back-to-work movement or furnish medical proof of controllers* 
illnesses.
PATCO was charged by the FAA with violating the provisions 
of EO 11491 by conducting an illegal strike. Hearings were held 
before a Department of Labor hearing examiner. The official 
serving as trial examiner for the Labor Department was the chief 
trial examiner of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on
12
For a concise summation of this law see GERR No. 362 
(August 17, 1970), pp. G-l through G-3.
13GERR No. 343 (April 6, 1970), p. A-10.
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loan to the Labor Department for this case. This Is a further 
Illustration of the merging of the private and public sectors, 
since for precedent setting cases, NLRB experts are brought in to 
rule on federal sector cases. The trial examiner ruled that 
PATCO did engage In an unlawful strike against the FAA. However, 
he classified this action as an unfair labor practice and required 
PATCO to post notice for 60 days that they would cease and desist 
from calling or engaging in a strike or failing to take affirma­
tive action to stop a strike if one should occur.
In ASIMR Decision 10, Assistant Secretary Usery generally 
agreed with the hearing examiner's findings. PATCO was in effect 
suspended from any activity for 60 days, any pending election 
petitions were invalidated and dues withholding agreements can­
celled. Though not nearly as severe as the FAA desired, the pen­
alty against PATCO was at least an acknowledgement that there hsd 
been a violation of EO 11491.
In neither of these strikes were the penalties available 
under law mentioned as a possible management action. In the 
postal strike, neither the FLRC nor the ASLMR were even brought 
into the negotiations. In the controllers strike the provisions 
of EO 11491 were brought into operation but the strike was called 
an unfair labor practice. The actions of the federal executive 
branch in these two instances raises grave questions as to the 
determination of the federal government to enforce the law 
prohibiting federal employees from striking. It would appear
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that this law, like the prohibition laws, is honored in the 
breach. Further, does the Executive Order provision only apply 
to small unions and not those with political power? These two 
examples Beem to indicate an uneven application of Executive 
Order provisions with the no strike law being completely ignored.
Proposed Solutions to Strike Problem in the Federal Sector
The strike, or the threat of a strike, is one of the major 
economic weapons for employees in the private sector. The classic 
model of the private sector strike is that a group of employees 
withholds its labor in order to get certain concessions from the 
employer. The employer loses the revenue from the goods and serv­
ices which these employees would have produced and the employees 
give up their wages during this time period. Since the private 
sector strike inflicts damages on both parties, each should then 
exhibit some degree of reasonableness essential to continued and 
realistic collective bargaining. The right to strike following 
this model has been recognized in the National Labor Relations 
Act and its prohibition has been an important political issue.
As noted previously, although the strike weapon is available it
14is employed in only a small number of cases.
No such strike right exists in the federal sector. The 
constitutional question of whether federal employees have the 
strike right was settled for the immediate future by a 1971 court
l^Supra, p. 122.
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decision. The court In sustaining the constitutionality of the 
strike prohibition stated:
At common law no employee, whether public 
or private, had a constitutional right to strike 
in concert with his fellow worker. Indeed, such 
collective action on the part of the employees was 
often held to be a conspiracy. When the right of 
private employees to strike finally received full 
protection, it was by statute . . .  It seems clear 
that public employees stand on no stronger footing 
in this regard than private employees and that in
the absence of a statute, they too do not possess
the right to strike . . . *^
This decision does not preclude the passage of an amend­
ment to the NLRA specifically including federal employees under 
its coverage or the passage of a separate law extending the strike
right to federal employees. But assuming no such law is passed in
the immediate future, what are some of the possible alternatives 
in the federal sector? If the postal strike, the PATCO "sickout" 
and the experience at the state and local levels can be used as 
examples, a law which simply precludes strikes without an alter­
native for impasse settlement can be legally difficult, political­
ly dangerous and on the whole, counter productive to collective 
bargaining. If public policy is to dictate a strike ban on the 
one hand and allow "collective bargaining" on the other, there 
should be some method of resolving impasses other than unilateral 
determination by federal management.
l^United Federal Postal Clerks vs. Bount, 325 F. Supp. 879 
(D.D.C. 1971), Aff’d 92-S CT. 80 (1971).
132
There have been several proposals for eliminating the
V
strike as an economic weapon.*^ All of these proposals 
envisioned that employees would continue to work and that the 
employer would lose some production of goods or services. Most 
of the proposals also involved a reduction in pay to the employee 
between the declaration of the "nonstoppage" and the settlement. 
There have also been many strike substitute proposals 
relating to the public sector.*7 Though each has its own
16
A selected list of these proposals would include:
Leroy Marceau and Richard A. Musgrave, "Strikes in Essential 
Industries: A Way Out," Harvard Business Review. Vol. 27, No. 3, 
(May 1949), pp. 286-292. George W. Grable, "The Non-Stoppage 
Strike," Current Economic Comment (Urbans: University of 
Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, August 1950), 
pp. 3-11. Charles 0. Gregory, "Injunctions, Seizure, and 
Compulsory Arbitration," Temple Law Quarterly, Vol. 26 
(Spring 1953), pp. 397-402. Neil W. Chamberlain and 
Jane M. Shilling, Social Responsibility and Strikes (New York: 
Harper Brothers, 1953), pp. 279-289. R. W. Fleming, "The 
Search for a Formula," in Irving Bernstein, et al., Emergency 
Disputes and National Policy (New York: Harper Brothers, 1955), 
pp. 200-223. David B. McCalmont, "The Semi-Strike," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review. Vol. 15, No. 2 (January 1962), 
pp. 191-208.
*7Among the most interesting are those proposed by 
Professor J. H. Foegen. J. H. Foegen, "The Partial Strike: A 
Solution for Public Employment," Public Personnel Review. Vol. 
50, No. 2 (April 1969), pp. 83-87. J. H. Foegen, "Attenuated 
Strikes," Management of Personnel Quarterly. Vol. 10, No. 3 
(Fall 1971), pp. 10-14. J. H. Foegen, "Strike Trade-Off in 
Public Employment," Public Personnel Review. Vol. 33, No. 2 
(April 1972), pp. 87-93. The first two Foegen proposals are 
similar to the private sector proposals previously cited but 
applied to the public sector. The third Foegen proposal is 
that the trade-off to the public employee for giving up the 
strike "right" be a measure of tax forgiveness.
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peculiarities, each assumes that there must be something 
comparable to the strike in the public sector. One example of 
the proposals is that of Bernstein, who would combine the non-
IQ
stoppage strike with the graduated strike. In general terms 
this is the Bernstein proposal:
In a nonstoppage strike, operations would 
continue as usual, but both the employees and 
employer would pay to a special fund an amount 
equal to a specified percentage of total cash 
wages. Thus while both parties would be under 
pressure to settle, there would be no disruption 
of service. In a graduated strike, employees 
would stop working during a portion of their usual 
work week and would suffer comparable reduction in 
wages. Hence, there would be pressure not only on 
employees and employer but also on the community; 
however, the decrease in public service would not 
be as sudden or complete as In the conventional 
strike.^
Bernstein suggests that the "non-stoppage" strike and the 
"graduated" strike would work in tandem. That is, the unions 
should be required to try the non-stoppage strike for a period 
of time then if no settlement is reached, they would be permitted 
to institute a graduated strike. If the services are absolutely 
essential, such as fire and police protection, the union would be 
limited to the non-stoppage strike.
The underlying assumption of each of these proposals Is 
that the strike or a strike substitute is necessary to insure
M e r t o n  C. Bernstein, "Alternatives to the Strike In 
Public Labor Relations," Harvard Law Review. Vol. 85, No. 2 
(December 1971), pp. 459-475.
19Ibid., p. 470.
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collective bargaining. If this assumption is removed, then an
entire new area of investigation is opened. If there must be a
finality in collective bargaining, there must be ways other than
the strike for reaching this finality. This study suggests that
this finality should be obtained in the federal sector through
compulsory arbitration. In spite of the emotional appeals of 
20many writers, there is nothing inherently sacred about the 
strike right per se. It is not an end in itself but only a means 
to the end of reaching agreement between the employer and the 
employee on terms of employment.
For at least four decades collective bargaining has been 
the central feature of public regulation of private sector labor 
management relations and the strike right has been thought essen­
tial to making collective bargaining work. The decade of the 
sixties has seen collective bargaining become increasingly 
important as a feature of employee management relations in the 
federal sector, but without the strike right.
This study suggests that the strike right for federal 
employees should not be granted but these employees should have 
the right to settle negotiating impasses through compulsory 
arbitration. The principal argument against compulsory arbitration
20see A1 Bilik, "Toward Public Sector Equality: Extending 
the Strike Right,” Labor Law Journal. Vol. 21, No. 6 
(June 1970), pp. 338-356, and William W. Winpisinger, "There 
is no Alternative to the Right to Strike," Monthly Labor Review. 
Vol. 96, No. 9 (September 1973), pp. 57-58.
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as a means of settling Interest disputes centers on the necessity 
that the two parties Involved should be able to determine the 
precise nature of their final relationship as signed into contract. 
If a third party is available to impose its will on the bargaining 
parties, neither will engage in productive "bargaining" but will 
hold to an arbitrary position on each issue, since to change 
would place that side at a disadvantage in arbitration. The 
availability of compulsory arbitration thus tends to freeze the 
parties in their respective initial positions and no meaningful 
collective bargaining can take place.
Compulsory arbitration of negotiating impasses also permits 
each party to escape responsibility for the final terms of the 
agreement. If the award is unpopular with the union membership 
on the one hand or with the higher level federal managers on the 
other, each negotiator can blame the arbitrator. Since neither 
side is committed to the solution, neither party will feel a com­
mittment to honor the administration of contract terms which it 
had no hand in determining.
Yet even in the private sector, certain types of compulsory 
arbitration have been institutionalized. Compulsory arbitration 
is in effect and considered desirable in grievance procedures and 
in the unfair labor practice cases within the jurisdiction of the 
NLRB. But the existence of compulsory arbitration procedures In 
the area of contract administration has not always resulted in 
the use of this procedure. Most cases are still resolved by the
parties, though sometimes with the assistance of mediators such 
as those employed by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (FMCS). Further, some cases have been referred to arbi­
trators for political and strategic reasons as face saving 
21
measures. The arbitrator thereby fulfills a mediation role, 
allowing management or union to "lose" gracefully.
The Canadian experience may also be used as an example of
the use of compulsory arbitration at the federal level. Canada'
Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 allows the employees'
bargaining agent to choose whether any dispute resulting from
negotiation will be settled by strike or the arbitration process
In the first four years under this Act the overwhelming majority
of employees had selected arbitration yet only three agreements
2  ^had been decided by arbitration. At least in Canada, the 
availability of compulsory arbitration does not seem to have had 
a dampening effect on the bargaining process.
In the United States federal sector, the presence of the 
FSIP also does not seem to have had a dampening effect on
^ S e e  Donald J. Peterson, "Why Unions go to Arbitration: 
Politics and Strategy vs Merit," Personnel. Vol. 3, No. 4 
(July-August 1971), pp. 44-49. For the 25 year record of the 
FMCS in dispute mediation see Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, Twenty Fifth Annua1 Report. Fiscal Year 1972 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973).
22
J. Douglas Muir, "Canada's Experience with the Right of 
Public Employees to Strike," Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 62,
No. 7 (July 1969), pp. 54-59.
^ J .  Joseph Loewenberg, "The Effect of Compulsory 
Arbitration on Collective Negotiations," The Journal of 
Collective Negotiations. Vol. I, No. 2 (May 1972), p. 180.
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collective bargaining.^ Perhaps it is time that the traditional 
argument that compulsory arbitration and collective bargaining 
are Incompatible be questioned. This is an area where the federal 
sector can perhaps lead the private sector instead of adapting, 
without innovation, the private Bector practices. Since impasse 
settlement still has not been institutionalized in the federal 
sector, there is opportunity for experimentation. For example, 
the present Executive Order could be amended to provide for a . 
permanent Impasse Panel consisting of five members, who are full 
time panel members. Competent neutrals could be found to fill 
these positions for a specific term appointment. Though there is 
an admitted lack of experienced neutrals with federal sector ex-
O C
pertise, this is a part of shaping the evolving federal system.
If an impasse occurs between the union and agency manage­
ment, the parties would be required to seek assistance from the
FMCS. If settlement is not reached the Panel conducts fact find­
ing hearings. These hearings would be conducted by a staff member
of the Panel who would make reconsnendations for settlement. If 
the recoranendations are not accepted, then and only then, could
24
Supra, pp. 67-69.
25
Concern has been expressed about the shortage of competent 
professional, experienced neutrals even in the private sector.
This argument is not persuasive in terms of a five member panel.
See Harold W. Davy, "The Use of Neutrals in the Public Sector," 
Labor Law Journal. Vol. 21, No. 8 (August 1969), pp. 529-38; 
and Harold W. Davy, Contemporary Collective Bargaining (3rd. ed., 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 358-360.
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the Impasse be taken to the Panel. The Panel would have the 
right to Impose a final and binding settlement.
Since the scope of bargaining in the federal sector does 
not Include subjects covered by law, the actions of the Panel 
would not constitute an illegal delegation of power by the legis­
lative branch. Wage settling Is also done in accordance with 
congressional action, so the Panel would be acting primarily in
the area of working conditions and conditions of contractual 
26employment. Civil Service Regulations mandated by law and wage 
determinations would be outside the license of the panel. Would 
this proposal absolutely remove the strike threat from the federal 
sector? The answer to this question is obviously that it would 
not. "Wildcat" strikes still occur in the private sector even in 
the face of no-strike clauses in negotiated contracts. And if 
the experience of the postal strike and the air controllers strike 
is meaningful, it suggests that if working conditions are unac­
ceptable to a group of employees and no one within the bureaucracy 
will listen to these real or imagined grievances, work stoppages 
will occur in spite of laws prohibiting such action. But the 
impasse panel removes many obstacles to a neutral environment, 
and gives both the agency and the union a "court of last resort" 
in which grievances may be aired.
26See infra, pp. 139-169 for a discussion of wage determina­
tion in the federal sector.
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Though compulsory arbitration is not the solution to 
every Impasse which might arise, it has possibilities for uses, 
in the areas previously described, as an alternative to the 
strike. Since the federal system is still evolving and impasse 
settlement has not been institutionalized, there is no true 
conventional wisdom in the federal sector. Compulsory arbitration 
on a trial basis under the present executive order system would 
be a worthwhile experiment.
FEDERAL SECTOR COMPENSATION TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
The wages and salaries of federal civilian employees are 
determined through two separate and distinct systems. These are 
the Coordinated Federal Wage System (CFWS), which is used to set 
wages for blue collar employees and the General Schedule system 
(GS) which is used to determine salaries of white collar employ­
ees. The cornerstone of each system iB the principle of 
comparability, which seeks to relate federal sector compensation 
to private sector remuneration for the same levels of work. Each 
of these systems will be analyzed in turn.
Wage Setting Under the Coordinated Federal Wage System
The purpose of the CFWS is to fix the wage rates of:
. . . federal employees in recognized trades or 
crafts, or other skilled mechanical crafts, or in 
unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled manual labor 
occupations, and other employees involving foremen
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and supervisors In positions having trade, craft or
laboring experience and knowledge as the paramount
requirement.27
In short, the CFWS is designed to set the wages of all 
federal blue collar employees. Though the principle of comparing 
federal blue collar wages with those of like skills in the private 
sector occurred at various times prior to 1861, it was in this 
year that a system was formally established to gather wage data 
and set rated "in conformance with those of private establishments 
in the immediate v i c i n i t y . T h e  first "wage boards" to collect 
and evaluate this comparative data were established by the Depart­
ment of the Navy, but other agencies soon followed the Navy 
example. However, each agency established its own job standards 
for classifying positions and since there was wide variation in 
the scope of the jobs classified, wide divergencies developed in 
the hourly rates of pay for similar jobs in different agencies in 
the same geographic area. There was not one federal wage system 
but a great many different systems by agency.
Not only were there discrepancies between agencies, but 
also within agencies. Each agency developed wage-setting proce­
dures which were utilized on a regular basis. For example, the
^Uni t e d  States Congress, House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Manpower of the Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service, Hearings Before Subcommittee. 89th Congress. 2nd Session. 
The Wage Board System (Washington: Government Printing Office,
March 1966), p. 1.
^®Harry A. Donian , "A New Approach to Setting the Pay of 
Federal Blue Collar Workers," Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 92,
No. 4 (April 1969), p. 30.
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defense establishment, which by 1966 had evolved into the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and employed 500,000 of the 800,000 
federal blue collar employees, had two separate boards for setting 
the wages of its employees. These were the Army-Air Force Wage 
Board and the Navy Wage Board. The procedures of these two 
boards resulted in discrepancies even within DOD itself.
With such a hodge-podge of "systems" Congress, with the 
help and insistence of the federal unions, sought to rationalize 
the wage board systems. In October 1967, the Senate passed a bill 
creating a new coordinated system, but before Congress had com­
pleted action, Chairman Macy of the Civil Service Commission 
announced that President Johnson had approved:
. . .  a new Coordinated Federal Wage System which 
will cover the government's 800,000 wage board employees 
in trade, craft and laboring occupations beginning in 
July 1968. The new system, when operational, will replace 
the many separate wage board systems now maintained by 
the individual departments and agencies.29
The CFWS as devised by the Civil Service Commission was in 
effect from July 1968 through July 1972. The CFWS system was 
legalized in August 1972 by PL 9 2 - 3 9 2 . This law made only minor 
adjustments to the administratively developed system. In summary, 
prior to 1861, there was no federal service-wide system for wage 
setting of federal blue collar employees. The Navy instituted
^ J o h n  W. Macy, Jr., "Coordination Comes to the Wage System," 
Civil Service Journal. (Jan.-March 1968), pp. 2-8.
30PL 92-392; 8 6  Stat 564.
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a wage board system whose central premise was that federal blue 
collar employees would be paid at the same rates as their private 
sector counterparts. Other agencies followed suit but with no 
federal government-wide policy. In 1968, the CFWS established a 
single regular wage schedule for each local geographic area elim­
inating differences in wage rates for the same job paid by dif­
ferent federal agencies. This system, with minor modifications 
was legalized by PL 92-392 in 1972.
The present system will be briefly described in general 
terms. The top policy making body in the CFWS is the National 
Wage Policy Committee (NWPC). The NWPC consists of eleven members
L
appointed by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Five 
of the members are from the ranks of agency management, four are 
from unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO having members in the 
federal sector, one is from a national independent (not affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO) union, and the chairman of the NWPC is a neutral 
from outside the federal sector. The primary function of the NWPC 
is to review and recommend basic policies which govern the system.
The Civil Service Commission has the responsibility of 
designating geographical survey areas, the "wage survey" for all 
federal employees must be confined to that specific geographic
"^For the reader interested in a more detailed description 
of the system see, United States Civil Service Commission,
Federal Personnel Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1968), Section 532-1, as amended. Especially see Appendices A-K 
which cover wage survey areas, survey job descriptions, instruc­
tions for data collectors, computing a trend line, a sample wage 
schedule and description of key ranking jobs.
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area. The survey Is accomplished by a survey team which makes 
an on site survey every two years, that Is, the team visits 
selected Industrial establishments within the survey area to make 
Job comparisons and compare wages. The teams are comprised of 
two representatives of management and one representative of the 
union which has the greatest number of wage employees in the 
survey area.
Just as in wage bargaining in the private sector, the sur­
vey team does not survey each individual Job and rate but surveys 
key rates in various Job clusters. A Job cluster is defined as a 
stable group of Job classifications or work assignments within a 
firm which are so linked by technology, the administrative organ­
ization of the production process, or social custom that they 
have common wage making characteristics. Each cluster may be 
viewed as consisting of a key rate and associated rates. Once 
these key rates are established, the associated rates fall into 
line.
When the survey team has completed its survey, the data is 
referred to the "lead agency," the agency with the majority of 
wage employees in the area, for analysis and establishment of the 
new wage rate.33 New wage schedules go into effect at the start
^ J o h n  T. Dunlop, "The Lack of Contemporary Wage Theory," in 
George W. Taylor and Frank C. Pierson (eds,), New Concepts in 
Wage Determination (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957), p. 129.
33speclflc survey team instructions and "lead agency" 
computation methodology is outlined in the Federal Personnel 
Manual, op. cit., Supplement 532-1.
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of the first pay period that begins 45 days after the start of 
the wage survey.
At the present time wage grade employees are divided into 
three categories: regular non-supervisory employees (WG), regular
leaders (WL) and regular supervisors (WS). There are fifteen 
grades within the WG and WL categories and nineteen grades within 
the WS category. Further, each grade has five steps. Steps four 
and five were added to the structure by PL 92-392. Under this 
law entry-grade employees (step 1) receive 96 percent of the pre­
vailing local wage rate; employees at the second step receive the 
prevailing local wage rate; employees at the third step receive 
104 percent of the prevailing rate; at the fourth step 108 percent 
of the prevailing rate; and at the fifth step 1 1 2  percent of the 
prevailing rate. The minimum time requirement in each step is: 
eighteen months each in steps 1  & 2 , and two years each in steps 
3 & 4. The employee is eligible for promotion to these succeeding 
steps after serving the specified time period if he is performing 
his job satisfactorily.
The unions representing federal wage grade employees are 
able to influence wage setting in two principal ways: by the
presence of union representatives on the NWPC and by the presence 
of a union representative on the local wage survey team. The 
influence of the union member on the local survey team is limited 
to ascertaining that the institutionalized procedures are carried 
out. The potential influence of the union members on the NWPC is
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significant since they can make proposals regarding the scope 
of the wage survey, the geographic boundaries of the survey areas, 
the job cluster to which the new wage schedule will apply and the 
way In which each pay line is computed. But their impact is 
limited to persuasion and there is no significant evidence indi­
cating that they have had any impact since the NWPC was established 
in 1968 and its duties amplified in 1972. the unions do now have 
a voice at the policy making level, something which they did not 
have as a right prior to PL 92-392. At the present time the activ­
ities of private sector unions in changing the prevailing rate is 
of much greater significance than the activities of federal sector 
unions. But the institutional arrangement for federal sector wage 
setting causes an upward spiral of wages in areas where there are 
significant numbers of federal employees. First, examples will 
be given showing how private sector unions may have significant 
impacts on wage determination, then the local area upward spiral 
caused by wage setting will be examined.
Local markets can be classified in many different ways but 
take as examples the perfectly competitive labor market and the 
monopsonistic labor market. The perfectly competitive labor 
market will be considered first. Assume the labor market has a
For example, in Montgomery, Alabama and Columbus, Georgia, 
federal wage setting has a significant impact. In Atlanta, 
Georgia, or Houston, Texas the federal manager would see his 
supply curve of labor as perfectly elastic at the going rate.
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positively sloped supply curve, that is, at higher wage rates 
more workers will enter the labor market. Assume a negatively 
sloped demand curve, that is, a greater number of workers will be 
employed at a lesser wage rate. This labor market is depicted in 
Figure 4 where D and S are the demand for and supply of labor 
respectively. In the absence of a union, Q units of labor would 
be supplied at wage H. Now assume the labor market is organized. 
If the union, and the worker are satisfied, the wage and employ­
ment situation could remain the same. The coming of the union 
could be for reasons other than wage bargaining, i.e., to estab­
lish a grievance system or simply to give the employee a voice in
✓
his conditions of employment. But assume the union does attempt 
to raise wages and is successful in bargaining the wage rate to 
0 Wj in Figure 4. The union supply curve for labor is now WjSiS 
and O Q} units of labor are now employed. The result of the 
unionizing of the labor market is a rise in wages but a decline 
in employment. In the perfectly competitive labor market, unions 
may benefit their membership but only at a cost as illustrated 
above. There is usually a trade off between higher wages and 
unemployment for a portion of the membership. The trade off will 
be determined by the goals of the particular union at that 
particular time.-*-*
35For an excellent discussion of the economic aims of trade 
unions see Allan M. Cartter, Theory of Wages and Employment 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959), pp. 77-94.
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Figure 4. Economic Effects of a Labor Union in a 
Perfectly Competitive Labor Market.
148
In monopsonistlc markets, however, unions will benefit 
their members if they employ rational policies. Consider the
monopsonistlc labor market depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 5, 
units of labor hired are Indicated along the X axis, while the 
cost of labor and its productivity in terms of money wages are 
indicated along the Y axis. The supply curve of labor S is again 
assumed to be rising in this labor market. Each point on this 
supply curve indicates the wage which will have to be paid to 
attract the amount of labor indicated along the X axis. The wage 
paid and the average cost of labor are therefore identical. H o w
t *.
ever, since the average cost of labor is rising, the marginal cost 
(M) will be greater since the marginal cost curve considers not 
only the higher wage paid to the last employee hired, but the addi­
tion to total wage costs resulting from a higher wage rate to all 
employees already hired in the labor market. Without unionization, 
and assuming employers who desire to maximize profits, the amount 
of labor hired will be that where the marginal cost of labor is 
equated to its marginal revenue product, point a in Figure 5, where 
0  Qi units of labor will be hired at a money wage of 0  W^.
Now assume the labor market is unionized. The union has 
several options open to it in terms of wage bargaining depending 
on its relative strength compared to that of management, and its
^^The discussion of monopsonistlc markets draws heavily 
from C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (3rd. ed., Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 447-449.
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Figure 5. Economic Effects of a Labor Union in a 
Monopsonistic Labor Market.
150
own desires. One alternative Is to maintain the present level 
of employment and secure a significant wage rate increase. To 
accomplish this goal, it could bargain the supply curve of labor 
to W 2  b S, the corresponding marginal curve would then be W 2  b c M. 
Since marginal revenue product is equal to marginal cost of labor 
at point a, equilibrium employment remains at 0  Q^, while money 
wages have increased from 0 to 0 W^. It should be noted that 
0  Wg is the maximum money wage rate attainable without a reduction 
of employment.
At the other extreme the union goal could be maximum 
employment of the labor force. In this instance it would bargain 
for a supply curve of labor W^dS, the associated marginal curve 
would then be W^dem in Figure 5. Marginal revenue product now 
equals the marginal cost of labor at point d, the union has now 
increased employment from OQ^ to OQ 2  and also increased wages 
from OW^ to OW 3 . This is the point which would obtain under 
perfectly competitive labor market conditions. Between the two 
polar positions OW^ and OWj, maximum employment or maximum wage 
increase, the union has other alternatives and trade offs between 
employment and wage increases.
From this brief analysis of two possible labor markets and 
the impact of a union in each it is demonstrated that unions have 
various impacts on private sector wages and employment. It is 
not necessary to show all impacts that the union may have, for 
as in most institutions, union motivations may not be purely or
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even primarily economic. But it is required that the strength 
of these motives be measurable by the price system. The previous 
examples reveal options available to the union regardless of 
motivation.
Federal sector wage setting will now be examined; first, 
at a federal Installation in a perfectly competitive local labor 
market and second, in a local labor market containing a monop- 
sonistic employer. Assume the establishment of a federal instal­
lation in a local labor market without private sector unions and 
where perfectly competitive conditions exist. The assumption of 
perfect competition incorporates the basic assumptions of ration­
ality, mobility, and knowledge. Assume further that unions of 
federal employees have no strike right but do play a role in wage 
setting through participation in the wage survey team. Wage 
setting in the federal wage grade categories has a built-in one 
year lag. A full scale survey is made every other year to 
establish rates for all wage grade employees. A wage change 
survey is a more limited survey conducted in the year following 
the full scale survey to ascertain any changes made in the pay 
rates for the previously surveyed jobs. This survey is usually 
taken by telephone. This procedure sets wages on a basis of the 
wage patterns of the private sector in the preceding year.
Assume also that the new federal installation employs a 
negligible portion of the labor market supply. This market is 
illustrated in Figure 6 . The initial wage survey would show OA,
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Figure 6 . Supply and Demand for Blue Collar Employees, 
Initial Wage Survey Conducted by Federal Installation in Purely 
Competitive Local Labor Market.
153
the equilibrium wage rate In the market, to be the "prevailing" 
wage rate for a particular occupation and skill level. Since It 
is assumed that the federal Installation Is a relatively small- 
employer In this labor market, the federal manager sees the rele­
vant supply curve as perfectly elastic at the prevailing rate.
Assume that a union now enters this labor market. If the 
union negotiated rate is equivalent to the equilibrium rate, 
there will be no change in employment conditions. But assume 
that the union now negotiates a wage above the equilibrium wage 
as in Figure 4. During the first time period the federal instal­
lation would still be able to hire at the old prevailing rate OW, 
for now there is a pool of employees, QQj, who are still willing 
to work at wage OW. But when the next wage survey is made, the 
new prevailing wage would now be OW^, so that in effect all federal 
employees would get a wage increase of WW^. This would occur 
because of the negotiated rate in the private sector, not because 
of the efforts of the federal union. That is, if the organized 
market rate is above the equilibrium rate, federal wages will also 
be above the equilibrium rate because of the institutional proce­
dures of the comparability doctrine. Negotiating power of private 
sector unions is transmitted to the federal employee through the 
wage survey.
Drop the assumption that the federal installation has no 
impact on the local labor market. Some possible impacts of a 
large federal installation being established in the local labor
/
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market are Illustrated In Figure 7. These Impacts may be seen 
as both the demand for and the supply of labor In the labor market. 
The demand for labor vlll be affected, not only by the workers 
demanded by the federal Installation, but also by changes result­
ing from Increases in demand for products and services produced 
in the private sector. The supply of labor may be affected 
through the effects of the installation in attracting workers to 
the area in expectation of the increased demand for labor. If 
the establishment of the installation causes a change in demand 
equal to the supply response, wage OA will remain the "prevailing" 
wage and NNj additional workers will be employed. If the change 
in demand is greater than the supply response, NN 2 additional 
workers will be employed but at an equilibrium wage of OC. If the 
change in demand is less than the supply response, NN 3  additional
f.
workers will be employed but at a wage of OD which is less than 
the prevailing wage OA in effect prior to the establishment of 
the federal Installation. With the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market, absent a private sector union, the relation­
ship between increased demand and supply response will determine 
both the wage rate and the number of employees.
Assume that a private sector union has been able to nego­
tiate a wage rate above equilibrium prior to the establishment of 
the federal installation, such as wage OB in Figure 7. At thii 
wage, additional employees would be hired and since the pre­
vailing rate would now be OB, federal employees would receive :he
Money
Wage
Rate
B
C
A
D
N 5  N Na N 2  NtN
Number of Employees
Figure 7. Possible Effects of Changes in Supply and 
Demand of Blue Collar Employees in a Local Labor Market.
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benefit of the private sector negotiated rate. Further, if the 
union la able to maintain a differential between the new equilib­
rium wage rate (OB with employees) and the negotiated wage 
rate, federal wages will again follow (with a one year lag). The 
important point is that the principle of prevailing rates and 
comparability with private sector wage rates makes the federal 
employee dependent on the private sector union for wage adjust­
ments, not on the union of which he is a member. The primary 
role of the federal sector union is to ascertain that the insti­
tutional procedures, both at the local level and at the national 
level, are followed.
In a monopsonistlc private market, again assuming that 
the federal installation is so small that its demand for labor 
does not appreciably affect labor demand in the market, the fed­
eral employee is dependent on the private sector union. In Fig­
ure 5 when there is no private sector union, the initial survey 
would indicate a wage of OW^ so the imperfection in the market 
would be transmitted to the federal sector by way of the wage 
survey. With the coming of a private sector union to this market, 
the federal employee is again dependent on the private sector for 
a wage change. The federal employee would see his wages raised 
in the range WjW '2 according to the option exercised by the private 
sector union; the federal employees' wage rate will follow with a 
one year lag.
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If Che federal installation becomes a large user in this 
market, the monopsonistlc market changes to an oligopsonlstic 
market. The analytical principle is the same however, since now 
there are two significant buyers of labor services instead of 
one. Since the two buyers of labor do not compete in the product 
market, the MRP of the private sector firm would not change. The 
demand for labor for the newly established public sector firm can 
be considered to be perfectly inelastic since labor is hired with 
a fixed budget and a given number of budgeted positions. There­
fore, although the demand for labor in the labor market becomes 
more inelastic, the oligopsonlstic private sector firm sees no 
change in the demand for labor. The private sector firm will, 
however, see a change in the supply of labor to-his firm as the 
public sector firm hires a significant part of the available 
labor force in the area.
Assume that the new competition for workers moves the 
supply schedule for the private sector firm in Figure 8  to 
and the corresponding Marginal Expense of Input schedule for the 
private sector employer to M ^ . The wage rate would change from 
OW^ at employment to a wage rate of OW 2  at employment Q 2 . The 
effects of union organization in the private sector could be the 
same as shown above for a monopsonistlc market when the federal 
installation is relatively small. Just as in the case shown in 
Figure 7, however, the monopsonistlc private sector market could 
be affected by increases in the demand and supply of labor
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resulting from the establishment of the federal installation.^ 
Again, however, as explained above, the effects of such changes
would be transmitted to the public sector firm after a one year
i „ 38 lag.
The two new steps added to the blue collar system by
PL 92-392 could tend to exaggerate the upward spiraling effects
of the interrelationships between private and federal sector wage
setting. This provision of PL 92-392 has been in effect for such
a short time that no specific evidence exists as to its impact.
However, since one of the most important arguments in private
sector wage negotiations is comparison with like jobs, private
sector unions cannot avoid considering these two new steps when
*10
negotiating for new private sector wage rates. 7
In summary, though every possible labor market was not 
analyzed, an analysis of two markets strongly indicates that 
federal sector wage rates are dependent on market forces in the 
absence of private sector unions or on private sector negotiated 
rates. The primary functions of federal unions in the wage set­
ting area are to insure that institutional arrangements for 
comparative wage setting are carried out, and to lobby at the 
Congressional level to change the institutional procedures to
■^Supra, p. 154.
38
Supra, p. 156.
39See Bloom and Northrup, op. cit., pp. 318-324.
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Che benefit of the employees they represent.
The inability of federal unions to directly benefit their 
constituency by bargaining with management over wages is a 
significant departure from private Bector practice. As long as 
federal unions are limited to a vigilant guardian role, the actions 
of unions In the private sector are the key to wage changes in the 
federal blue collar sector.
It should be noted that the wage surveys address only 
money wages and do not take into account fringe benefits such as 
vacations and security of employment. The question of compara­
bility of the federal sector and the private sector in the area 
of fringe benefits will be presented later in this chapter.
Salary Determination for General Schedule Employees
The second large group of federal employees encompasses 
employees whose salaries and related benefits are determined 
directly by an act of Congress. This group of "white collar" 
employees contains those paid under the Classification Act of 
1949, as amended. The Classification Act covers virtually the 
entire spectrum of white collar employment, from jobs Involving 
routine clerical tasks to the highest level of professional and 
administrative work.
The Classification Act provides for a national salary 
schedule applicable to 18 grades or work levels. Each grade, 
except the top grade (GS-18) contains a range of rates. In 
effect, positions under the Act are placed in the appropriate
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grade on the baala of job evaluation. Each grade typically 
contalna a great variety of positions, all of which, In theory 
at least, are considered equivalent In terms of responslbllty, 
level of difficulty, and qualifications required. Grades 16-18 
(the so-called "super grades’O were added to the structure by the 
1949 Act to provide a measure of upward mobility in the Civil 
Service. Congress, however, has placed specific limitations on 
the number of positions which can be placed in these three grades. 
The principle of comparability of federal white collar salaries 
to those in the private sector is a relatively new concept, first 
embodied in the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 (PL 87-793).
Prior to the Salary Reform Act of 1962, there was no 
clearly established framework within which salary legislation 
could be considered. Prior to 1962 when some form of salary 
adjustment was indicated^® a wide variety of bills would be intro­
duced in the Congress. Hearings would be held before the appro­
priate comnittees of the House and Senate and eventually some new 
pay legislation would emerge. Though data would be introduced at 
the hearings to reflect trends in the cost of living, productivi­
ty, and wages in the private economy, no organized body of data 
on salaries by occupation in the private sector was used as a 
comparison with the federal salary structure as a whole.
^®This "indication" usually took the form of lobbying by 
the postal unions.
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The Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 remedied this 
deficiency by stating as a matter of law that "Federal Salary 
rates shall be comparable with private enterprise salary rates 
for the same levels of work."4^ The Act also established elab­
orate machinery and a systematic procedure for review of federal 
pay by the Executive Branch and for policy recommendations to 
the Congress.
Although Federal employee unions were not initially given 
an official voice in salary determination in the 1962 Act, this 
omission was changed by the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 
1970, PL 91-656. The latter Act retains the 1962 declaration 
of Congressional policy that federal salaries will be comparable 
to private sector rates for the same or similar jobs and that the 
device used to make changes in white collar salaries would be the 
Professional Administrative and Technical Survey (PATS) conducted 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The Act further provided 
that, beginning in 1972, the President will, in October of each 
year, make the comparability adjustment indicated by the BLS 
survey. To make this adjustment, he will be assisted by an agent 
of his own choosing plus the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay 
and the Federal Employees Pay Council.
Briefly, the system is projected to work in the following 
manner. The agent of the President will make recommendations
41PL 87-793, Section 502.
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concerning adjustments for the current year based on the PATS
42
survey. This report Is forwarded to the Advisory Committee 
where a panel of three Individuals known for their expertise In 
labor relations and pay policy and who will not otherwise be 
employed by the government prepares a report based on its own 
findings and recommendations, as well as those forwarded to it 
by unions, agency management and others.
The Pay Council consists of five representatives of 
employee organizations which represent employees paid under the 
Classification Act schedule. The members are appointed by the 
Agent of the President but no more than three at any one time may 
be from a single union or federation. The Pay Council makes 
recommendations concerning such matters as the coverage of the 
BLS survey, methods of making comparisons with private sector 
positions, and the size of the adjustments needed. The final 
report and recommendations of the Agent, the Committee and the 
Council is submitted to the President in one document. The 
President will then adjust salaries with no Congressional action 
required.
If the President determines that due to adverse economic 
conditions or a national emergency no adjustment should be made,
^ T h e  "Agent" of the President during the first three years 
under PL 91-656 was the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission 
and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
/ *1
The present composition of the Committee is Jerome M. 
Rostow, Chairman, Robert B. McKersie and Frederick R. Livingston.
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he must then prepare an alternate proposal which will go into 
effect unless either the House or the Senate disapproves. If 
the President's proposal is disapproved, then the comparability 
adjustment must be made.
The General Schedule (GS) employees are paid salaries 
based on the BLS survey nationwide. There are 18 grades in the 
schedule with 10 "steps" per grade (with the exception of GS-18 
which has only one step). A GS-4, step 2 employee would be paid 
the same wage whether he worked in Washington, D.C., or Elko, 
Nevada.
The institutional arrangement for wage setting in the
federal white collar area requires a different analysis than that
required in the wage board area. The pure application of the
comparability doctrine on the national level may lead to severe
distortions in the local labor market. The local labor market
for General Schedule employees is defined as all job opportunities
within conmuting distance of the federal installation. This
definition is in contrast to the geographic wage survey area used
to establish comparable wage rates for Wage Board employees.
Cartter and Marshall state: "The relevant market concept depends
primarily on two factors: (1 ) the propensity of the typical
worker to respond to opportunities at various distances from his
44home and (2) knowledge of job opportunities'' They also contend
^ A l l e n  M. Cartter and F. Ray Marshall, Labor Economics; 
Wages. Employment and Trade Unionism (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 200.
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that within commuting distance of the work site, the worker is 
more likely to be responsive to another job opportunity, since 
it does not Involve a movement of his abode, and he is more likely 
to have access to better information on available positions.
Consider two local labor markets such as those in Figure 9. 
These two markets could be Montgomery, Alabama and Washington, 
D.C., for example. Assume that labor market M  is at the national 
average wage rate for CS 4s and that all the required GS 4s may 
be hired at salary OA, that is, the Demand for GS 4s is something 
less than ON^. In market W, the federal manager will either have 
to hire less qualified employees, perhaps GS 3s, to fill the GS 4 
positions; or hire fewer qualified GS 4s, a shortage of N 2 N 3 ; or 
rewrite the job description to require a GS 5 at salary OB so 
that the position may be filled. Any of the available options 
distorts the theoretical national system. The difficulty is that 
there is not a national market for the lower GS grades. Labor 
markets for the lower GS grades are local and should be so treated.
One further suggestion can be made regarding the determina­
tion of federal white collar salaries, assuming that a match can 
at least be approximated by the BLS surveyed jobs and federal 
comparable positions.^ The suggestion is that the PAT survey be
^ T h i s  is a heroic assumption but an orderly attempt is 
made at comparability. The fourth step of each grade is used 
as the reference point for comparison of private sector pay 
and federal pay. Each grade is compared in turn then an average 
is taken of the 18 comparisons. See Appendix F for an example 
of the proposed Fiscal Year 1974 increase as proposed by the 
President's Agent and the Advisory Committee.
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broadened to Include job data from nonprofit organizations, state 
and local governments, and health care organizations. It would 
seem that these organizations are surely In competition for the 
same employees that the federal government would seek to hire. 
Provision should be made to incorporate data from this area into 
any system designed to make the federal white collar salaries com­
petitive with those of the institutions, both private and public, 
with which the federal government is competing for employees.
The record of pay increases since the first law incorpo­
rating the "comparability principle" was passed in 1962 is 
illustrated in Appendix G, Since the passage of PL 91-656, there 
have been salary negotiations between the unions on the Federal 
Employees Pay Council, the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay and 
the President's Agent, the three bodies charged with making a 
recommendation for pay change.^ Further, this "negotiation" has 
been carried to the Congress after the President has acted. A 
resume of the three years experience under PL 91-656 will give 
insight into the process now being used to determine federal GS 
salaries.
In 1971, the President recommended to the Congress that 
no routine federal salary adjustment be made on October 1, 1971, 
in spite of contrary law, but any such raise should be postponed 
until July 1972 because of the newly instituted wage and price
A t
See Appendix F for an example of conflicting 
recommendations given to the President.
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control program. Neither House of Congress overrode the 
President's suggested alternative but did give'all federal GS 
employees a 5.5 percent pay raise effective January 1, 1972 In 
line with the suggested guidelines for salary Increases in the 
private sector.
In 1972, the President again proposed that the increase In
salary be postponed from October 1972, to January 1, 197 3, on the
grounds that federal employees had received a pay Increase only 
nine months previously. Neither House of Congress overrode this 
alternative plan and the Increase of 5.1 percent went Into effect 
on January 1, 1973.
In 1973, the President proposed that the increase In
salary be postponed from October 1, 1973 to December 1, 1973. But
in this instance the Senate, by a 72-16 vote, overruled the 
President's proposed 60 day postponement and required that the 
4.77 percent increase by effective on October 1, 1973.
It should be noted that in each instance, the President 
followed the recommendation of his Agent as to the amount of the 
increase. The Congress did not change the amount, only the ef­
fective date. The policy of the President In following the 
recommendation of his Agent regarding the amount of the increase 
would seem to indicate a weak "bargaining" position of both the 
Federal Employees Pay Council and the Advisory Committee. But 
the ability of the union to lobby the Congress to change the 
effective date of the increase would seem to indicate that
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"bargaining" with the Congress is still more effective than 
"bargaining" with the Executive Branch.
Fringe Benefits and the Federal Employee
The previous analysis of federal sector wage setting was 
in terms of money wages and did not take into consideration so 
called fringe benefits. Fringe benefits include those costs to 
the employer added to the regular money wages of the employee. A 
complete description of all fringe benefits negotiated in the 
private sector Is beyond the scope of this study but they are 
usually found in these areas: government required insurance
benefits, employee comfort and protection, employment security, 
employee recreational benefits, and employee financial extras.
A study made of comparative benefits by Donald Herzog 
indicated that in general, the federal employee was in the better 
position in the first three enumerated areas while the private 
employee was in the better position in the latter t wo.^  
Specifically Herzog found that the federal employee fares better 
than the Industrial employee in the areas of job security, unem­
ployment compensation, protection from disabling accidents and 
work-connected illnesses, and retirement. The private sector 
employee fares better in the area of recreational activities, prof­
it sharing plans, stock option plans, low cost meals and other
^ D o n a l d  R. Herzog, "Fringe Benefits: The Federal Government 
vs. Private Industry," Labor Law Journal. Vol. 22, No. 2 
(February 1971), pp. 89-99.
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company sponsored facilities, and In low cost company loans. 
However, all things considered, Herzog concludes that the federal 
employee profits more from the overall fringe benefit package
AQ
than does his counterpart in private industry. °
The Comptroller General of the United States, Elmer B.
Staats, also believes that federal fringe benefits outweigh those
49
of the private sector. In the judgement of Staats, the federal 
government gives more benefits to its employees in the area of 
leave and retirement but private sector employers lead in expendi­
tures for medical and insurance programs, unemployment compensation 
and bonuses related to promotions.
Whether or not federal employment does lead in the area of 
fringe benefits, the federal employees themselves do not seem to 
be convinced that this is so. Constantly under attack as having 
the best of all worlds, they have turned to the union in ever 
increasing numbers."** One recently conducted study shows that the 
primary reason for joining a union was not because of social pres­
sure or for psychological reasons but because the federal employee
48Ibid., p. 99.
49Elmer B. Staats, cited in GERR No. 495 (March 19, 1973), 
p. A-17.
■*^Ibid., Staats has initiated a study of comparative fringe 
benefits by the General Accounting Office to be completed by 
March 1975.
^*For example, see E. S. Savns and Sigmund G. Ginshurg, "The 
Civil Service-*A Meritless System?" The Ptihlic Interest. No. 32 
(Summer 1973), pp. 70-86.
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11, . . believed that membership in the union was the best way
52
to get wage and fringe benefit increases."
Public employees, and especially federal employees, have 
traditionally enjoyed significantly greater job security than have 
their counterparts in the private sector. At least prior to the 
decade of the sixties, the lower salaries paid the public employ­
ees were accepted by employee and employer alike as an equitable 
trade-off for the virtual guarantee of continuing employment. 
However, a recent study concludes that public employees are no 
longer convinced that public employment guarantees tenure, even 
assuming a "satisfactory" performance level. Weisberger pre­
dicts that this issue will become an even more significant item 
for public sector negotiators in the future.^
A study by a psychologist further indicates that public
employees are not impressed by the traditional benefits of public 
55
employment. Using Herzberg's two factor theory of motivation,
52Louis V. Imundo, Jr., "Why Federal Employees Join Unions:
A Study of AFGE Local 916," Public Personnel Management. Vol. 2, 
No. I (January-February 1973), pp. 23-29. The findings of this 
article were based on Dr. Imundo's unpublished doctoral disser­
tation completed at the University of Oklahoma.
53June Weisberger, Job Security and Public Employees 
(Ithaca: Institute of Public Employment, New York State School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1973).
54Ibid., pp. 83-85.
^^Lance W. Seberhagen, "What Motivates Civil Service 
Employees?" Public Personnel Review. Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (January 
1970), pp. 48-51. This was a study of municipal employees in 
a large Southwestern city, but the results also hold some 
validity for federal employees.
172
Seberhagen found that civil service employees have basically
the same motivations as their counterparts in private industry.
Seberhagen selected eleven job factors and asked lov job level
employees, middle level employees, and high job level employees
to rank these factors in terms of job satisfaction. Security of
employment is sometimes assumed as one of the prime attractions
of civil service employment, yet in the Seberhagen study, low
level employees ranked security sixth, middle level employees
ranked it eighth, and higher level employees ranked it ninth.^
Both the wage surveys for wage grade employees and BLS
survey upon which GS salary changes are based, consider only
money wages and do not consider fringe benefits. Behavioral
reasons for job seeking and job satisfaction are difficult to 
57quantify. If a fringe benefit is too great or too small in
specific areas of federal employment as compared with the benefit
in private sector employment, this noncomparability should be
corrected at the congressional level through changes in the law
58specifically directed at that fringe benefit, A wage survey
56Ibid., p. 51.
57
The costs of fringe benefits to the employer in the 
private sector after years of negotiating are still difficult 
to quantify. A cursory search of the literature reveals that 
estimates of the cost of fringe benefits as a percent of payroll 
varied from 25 to 38 percent, a rather wide range indeed.
58An example of a change in a fringe benefit for federal 
employees is recent legislation to increase government contri­
butions to employee health insurance benefit programs from 40 
percent to 50 percent in 1974 and to 60 percent in 1975. Cited
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la complex enough in itself without adding the burden of 
additional "factors" seeking to relate the survey, or the FATS, 
to fringe benefit comparability. Just as money wages are compared, 
so should each individual fringe benefit be compared.
SUMMARY
This chapter has examined two areas in which the evolving 
federal industrial relations system has not converged with that of 
the private sector. Impasse settlement is still largely in the 
hands of federal management through the composition of the FLRC.
The strike as the ultimate union weapon is still illegal in the 
federal sector and compared to the recent experience of state and 
local government or the private sector during the organizing drives 
of the thirties, the strike avoidance record of the federal govern­
ment is outstanding. Yet if the postal strike and the air traffic 
controllers "sickout" are any indication, the mandatory penalties 
of dismissals, fines, and jail sentences for striking federal 
employees now provided by law are unrealistic and seemingly unen­
forceable. Further, the continuing increase is strikes at the 
state and local levels must put pressure on federal union leaders 
for similar actions unless a method of impasse settlement is found. 
This study suggests that an appropriate method of impasse
in GERR No. 544 (March 4, 1974), p. D-l. It should be noted 
that this change in fringe benefits does not change in any way 
the wage survey or the PATS for a projected salary Increase 
for October 1, 1974.
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settlement In the federal sector should be binding arbitration 
of disputes by a panel of neutrals whose only employment Is as a 
panel member. The dlclslons of this panel should be enforceable 
through the courts and appealable through the courts. Presently 
the FSIP has no enforcement power other than moral suasion and 
the only appeal from decisions of the FSIP is to a higher level of 
federal management, the FLRC. The argument against compulsory 
arbitration In the private sector, that It has a chilling effect 
on bargaining, is not persuasive for the federal sector. This Is 
an area where experimentation could be carried on in the federal 
sector much as limited strike right experimentation is being accom­
plished in some state and local jurisdictions.
The wage and salary picture changed dramatlcolly for the 
better for federal employees in the decade of the sixties. Unions 
have been given a significant, though presently not fully utilized, 
role in federal pay setting through the Federal Pay Comparability 
Act of 1970 and the Coordinated Federal Wage System Act of 1972. 
Unions have not, as yet, taken full advantage of the powers to 
negotiate granted them by these two laws. Though there may be a 
cause and effect relationship between a union negotiated wage 
increase and a tax increase at the local level, this same relation­
ship does not necessarily exist at the federal level. In a $300 
billion budget a 5 percent increase in wages for federal employees 
is not immediately related to increased tax liability of the 
individual tax payer. Therefore, bargaining should take place
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with the Congress who, In effect, establishes the Institutional 
procedures for changing the federal pay system. The institutional 
procedures, newly evolved, have areas for Improvement but this is 
where the federal unions can serve both their membership and the 
taxpayer, by "bargaining" with the Congress to assure true compa­
rability in both the GS and wage grade categories.
This study has further shown that private sector unions can 
have positive effects on raising money wages and this effect is 
transmitted to the federal sector through the "prevailing rate" in 
the case of wage grade employees and the PATS in the case of GS 
employees. The new provisions of PL 92-392 for setting blue col­
lar wages are projected to have an upward bias because of the two 
additional steps above the "prevailing rate."
In contrast to private sector unions, federal unions have 
little impact on two of the most critical issues in collective 
bargaining, impasse settlement and wage and salary negotiation. 
Market forces and private sector wage settlements are crucial to 
the federal employee, not what his own union secures for him in 
these areas.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY
This study has traced the nature and growth of unions 
composed of civilian employees of the Executive Branch of the 
United States Government. The purpose of the study was to 
compare and contrast the emerging formal industrial relations 
system in the federal sector with that presently in being In 
the private sector. The material used to investigate the 
conditions and consequences of federal employee collective 
actions covers the ideas, events, institutions, motivations, 
and practices which have evolved over approximately 200 years 
of employee management relations in the federal sector. The 
basic criterion for assessing the present federal system was, 
how nearly does this system merge with that of the private 
sector?
Although federal sector unionism is as old as unionism 
in the private sector, federal union leaders found that they had 
greater success in lobbying for legislation from the Congress, 
or seeking assistance from a sympathetic President, than through 
the collective bargaining process. Prior to the promulgation of 
Executive Order 10988 by President John F. Kennedy in 1962,
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Congress had tratltlonally been more favorably disposed than 
the Executive Branch toward federal unions. Executive orders 
initiated prior to EO 10988 were generally aimed at restricting 
union activity. In spite of the generally favorable attitude 
of the Congress toward the unionization of federal employees, 
legislation in this area was extremely limited. The Lloyd- 
LaFollette Act of 1912 was the only law which directly addressed 
the problem of unionization in the federal sector. Prior to the 
promulgation of EO 10988, federal unions served primarily as 
lobbying organizations with none of the privileges and responsi­
bilities of collective bargaining.
EO 10988 created a broad set of rules and procedures for 
employee-management relations in the federal sector. The basic 
concepts of the Executive Order included the right of a federal 
employee to join or refrain from joining a union. It established, 
for the first time, forms of union recognition and procedures for 
unions to follow in order to acquire recognition. It limited 
recognition to bona fide labor organizations which met specific 
criteria. It provided a basic structure for employee-management 
relations but still allowed a great deal of flexibility in the 
administration of the program within federal agencies during the 
transitional stages.
EO 10988 was hailed by a majority of federal union leaders 
as the beginning of a new era in federal labor management relations. 
The decade of the sixties was a period of significant union growth
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in terms both of membership and number of employees represented. 
New unions of federal employees were formed, some older unions 
disappeared, others merged, and some professional associations 
took on the trappings of unions as the "Darwinian imperatives" 
of the Executive Order affected unions as well as management.
EO 10988 was replaced by EO 11491 in 1969. The latter 
Executive Order was modified by EO 11616 in 1971. These Executive 
Order changes represent an attempt to fine tune the existing sys­
tem based on the experience gained through a decade of operation 
under Presidential executive orders. These modifications were 
basically procedural in nature and did not mark significant changes 
in substantive areas.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions may be drawn from this study of 
recent policy declarations as contained in the series of Executive 
Orders. Executive Order 10988 fulfilled a need for a definitive 
system of employee-management relations in the entire federal 
executive branch. It served as an effective transitional device 
from the management dominated civil service system to an evolving 
system of collective bargaining patterned after the system present­
ly existing in the private sector. But the merging of the two 
systems is more procedural than substantive. Though private 
sector industrial relations procedures have been adopted en masse 
by the federal sector, the real power to make substantive changes
179
in the employment relationships in the federal sector still 
remains with management. This power is illustrated by the 
limited scope of bargaining on substantive issues (in the private 
sector, these are wages, hours and working conditions); and an 
almost absolute control of Impasse settlement by management 
through the institutional arrangements Incorporated by law and 
executive order.
The principle of comparability has enabled the federal 
employee to make impressive gains in both blue collar wages and 
white collar salaries. But the operation of the labor market 
and of private sector unions transmitted to the federal sector 
through the institutional arrangements for comparability are of 
significantly greater importance to the federal employee than 
are the actions of his own union. The federal union serves only 
to lobby for improved institutional arrangements at the congres­
sional level and to ascertain that these arrangements are complied 
with at the local level.
Experience at the federal, state, and local levels has 
indicated that a law prohibiting strikes is ineffective without 
a viable means of impasse settlement. This study suggests that 
binding arbitration of disputes in the federal sector is a viable 
alternative to the strike right. As experimentation with the 
limited strike right is being carried out in some state and local 
jurisdictions, so could experimentation with a form of binding 
arbitration by a full time impartial panel be implemented in the
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federal sector. The very nature of labor-management relations 
causes real or imagined conflicts of interest. These disputes 
should be kept outside the range of direct action, not because 
of the sovereign employer-employee relationship but because direct 
action la not an end in Itself. It is only a means of reaching 
ultimate agreement. Binding arbitration would be a logical 
extension of the evolving federal labor relations system.
The evidence presented in this study suggests that the 
Executive Orders have caused a substantial amount of negotiation 
and consultation between federal management and federal unions. 
Federal managers no longer have a completely unilateral decision 
making power, concerned only with the legality of the action or 
its conformity to appropriate regulations. The decade of the 
sixties was a time of union organization when both unions and 
management were concerned with evolving rules and procedures for 
this new relationship. If the evolving industrial relations 
system in the federal sector is to approach that of the private 
sector, federal unions must become less concerned with procedural 
and rule making issues. These unions are now well established in 
the federal sector and should be able to move beyond rules of the 
game to the issues with real substance. There are two principal 
avenues through which the unions may accomplish this goal. The 
first is to press for a complete revision of the Federal Personnel 
Manual in order that the scope of bargaining may be enlarged at 
the local level. The second is to press for more extensive
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bargaining units— agency wide for example--thereby moving the 
locus of bargaining closer to focus of real management decision 
making.
The principal gain for the individual employee from the 
appearance of the union in the federal sector is that now he has 
a voice, muted though it may be, in determining his conditions 
of employment. This study has suggested that the voice of the 
employee, as heard through his union, has been effective in 
procedural areas but is severely limited in areas of real sub­
stance. Collective bargaining as practiced in the private sector 
has not been thoroughly transplanted to the federal civil service.
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APPENDIX A
THE WHITE HOUSE
Following is the text of a Memorandum from the 
President addressed to heads of departments and 
agencies on the subject of Employee-Management 
Relations in the Federal Service, June 22, 1961.
The right of all employees of the federal government to 
join and participate in the activities of employee organizations, 
and to seek to improve working conditions and the resolution of 
grievances should be recognized by management officials at all 
levels in all departments and agencies. The participation of 
federal employees in the formulation and implementation of employee 
policies and procedures affecting them contributes to the effective 
conduct of public business. I believe this participation should 
include consultation by responsible officials with representatives 
of employees and federal employees organizations.
In view of existing policy relating to equal employment 
opportunity, management officials will maintain relationships 
only with those employee organizations which are free of restric­
tions or practices denying membership because of race, color, 
religion, or national origin. Further, such officials shall 
refrain from consultation or relationships with organizations 
which assert the right to strike against or advocate the overthrow 
of the government of the United States.
Further steps should be explored fully and promptly. We 
need to improve practices which will assure the rights and. obliga­
tions of employees, employee organizations and the Executive Branch 
in pursuing the objective of effective labor-management cooperation 
in the public service. I know this is not a simple task. The 
diversity of federal programs, the variety of occupations and 
skills represented in federal employment, the different organiza­
tional patterns of federal departments and agencies, and the 
special obligations of public service complicate the task of formu­
lating government-wide policy guidance. Nevertheless, this impor­
tant subject requires prompt attention by the Executive Branch.
With that objective in mind, I am designating a special task force 
to review and advise me on employee-management relations in the 
federal service, composed of the following officials:
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The Secretary of Defense 
The Postmaster General 
The Secretary of Labor
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission 
The Special Counsel to the President
The Secretary of Labor will serve as Chairman of this task 
force. This study will cover the broad range of issues relating 
to federal employee-management relations, including but not 
limited to definition of appropriate employee organizations, 
standards for recognition of such organizations, matters upon 
which employee organizations may be appropriately consulted, and 
the participation of employees and employee representatives in 
grievances and appeals. In the course of this study employees 
and employee organizations representatives, department and agency 
officials, consultants in labor-management relations, and interest­
ed groups and citizens shall be given an opportunity to present 
their views for the consideration of the task force. In view of 
the need for decisions of this important issue at a reasonably 
early date, I am asking the task force to report their findings 
and recommendations to me not later than November 30, 1961.
All department and agency heads and their staffs are 
directed to cooperate fully with the task force in the accomplish­
ment of this study.
APPENDIX B
THE WHITE HOUSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10988, EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT 
COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
WHEREAS participation of employees in the formulation and 
implementation of personnel policies affecting them contributes 
to effective conduct of public business; and
WHEREAS the efficient administration of the Government and 
the well-being of employee require that orderly and constructive 
relationships be maintained between employee organizations and 
management officials; and
WHEREAS subject to the law and the paramount requirements 
of public service, employee-management relations within the 
Federal service should be improved by providing employees an 
opportunity for greater participation in the formulation and 
implementation of policies and procedures affecting the conditions 
of their employment; and
WHEREAS effective employee-management cooperation in the 
public service requires a clear statement of the respective rights 
and obligations of employee organizations and agency management: 
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me 
by the Constitution of the United States, by section 1753 of the 
Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 631), and as President of the United 
States, I hereby direct that the following policies shall govern 
officers and agencies of the executive branch of the Government 
in all dealings with Federal employees and organizations repre­
senting such employees.
Section 1. (a) Employees of the Federal Government shall
have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right, freely 
and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, to join and 
assist any employee organization or to refrain from any such 
activity. Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the freedom 
of such employees to assist any employee organization shall be 
recognized as extending to participation in the management of the 
organization and acting for the organization in the capacity of 
an organization representative, including presentation of its 
views to officials of the executive branch, the Congress or other 
appropriate authority. The head of each executive department and
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agency (hereinafter referred to as "agency") shall take such 
action, consistent with law, as may be required In order to 
assure that employees in the agency are appraised of the rights 
described in this section, and that no interference, restraint, 
coercion or ciscrimination Is practiced within such agency to 
encourage or discourage membership in any employee organization.
(b) The rights described in this section do not extend 
to participation in the management of an employee organization, 
or acting as a representative of any such organization, where 
such participation or activity would result in a conflict of 
Interest or otherwise be incompatible with law or with the offi­
cial duties of an employee.
Section 2 . When used in this order, the term "employee 
organization" means any lawful association, labor organization, 
federation, council, or brotherhood having as a primary purpose 
the improvement of working conditions among Federal employees, 
or any craft, trade or industrial union whose membership includes 
both Federal employees and employees of private organizations; 
but such term shall not include any organization (1) which asserts 
the right to strike against the Government of the United States 
or any agency thereof, or to assist or participate in any such 
strike, or which imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist 
or participate in any such strike, or (2) which advocates the 
overthrow of the constitutional form of Government in the United 
States, or (3) which discriminates with regard to the terms or 
conditions of membership because of race, color, creed or nation­
al origin.
Section 3 . (a) Agencies shall accord informal, formal
or exclusive recognition to employee organizations which requests 
such recognition in conformity with the requirements specified in 
sections 4, 5, and 6 of this order, except that no recognition 
shall be accorded to any employee organization which the head of 
the agency considers to be so subject to corrupt influences or 
influences opposed to basic democratic principles and recognition 
would be Inconsistent with the objectives of this order.
(b) Recognition of an employee organization shall continue 
so long as such organization satisfies the criteria of this order 
applicable to such recognition; but nothing in this section shall 
require any agency to determine whether an organization should 
become or continue to be recognized as exclusive representative
of the employees in any unit within 12 months after a prior deter­
mination of exclusive status with respect to such unit has been 
made pursuant to the provisions of this order.
(c) Recognition, in whatever form accorded, shall not--
(1) preclude any employee, regardless of employee organiza­
tion membership, from bringing matters of personal concern to the 
attention of appropriate officials in accordance with applicable
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law, rule, regulation, or established agency policy, or from 
choosing his own representative in a grievance or appellate 
action; or
(2 ) preclude or restrict consultations and dealings be­
tween an agency and any veterans organization with respect to 
matters of particular interest to employees with veterans 
preference; or
(3) preclude an agency from consulting or dealing with 
any religious, social, fraternal or other lawful association, 
not qualified as an employee organization, with respect to mat­
ters or policies which involve individual members of the associa­
tion or are of particular applicability to it or its members, 
when such consultations or dealings are duly limited so as not
to assume the character of formal consultation on matters of 
general employee-management policy or to extend to areas where 
recognition of the interests of one employee group may result in 
discrimination against or injury to the interest of other 
employees.
Section 4 . (a) An agency shall accord an employee
organization, which does not qualify for exclusive or formal 
recognition, informal recognition as representative of its member 
employees without regard to whether any other employee organiza­
tion has been accorded formal or exclusive recognition as 
representative of some or all employees in any unit.
(b) When an employee organization has been informally 
recognized, it shall, to the extent consistent with the efficient 
and orderly conduct of the public business, be permitted to 
present to appropriate officials its views on matters of concern 
to its members. The agency need not however, consult with an 
employee organization so recognized in the formulation of personnel 
or other policies with respect to such matters.
Section 5 . (a) An agency shall accord an employee organ­
ization formal recognition as the representative of its members 
in a unit as defined by the agency when (1 ) no other employee 
organization is qualified for exclusive recognition as representa­
tive of employees in the unit, (2 ) it Is determined by the agency 
that the employee organization has a substantial and stable mem­
bership of no less than 1 0  per centum of the employees in the unit, 
and (3) the employee organization has submitted to the agency a 
roster of its officers and representatives, a copy of its consti­
tution and by-laws, and a statement of objectives. When, in the 
opinion of the head of any agency, an employee organization has a 
sufficient number of local organizations or a sufficient total 
membership within such agency, such organization may be accorded 
formal recognition at the national level, but such recognition 
shall not preclude the agency from dealing at the national level 
with any other employee organization on matters affecting its
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members.
(b) When an employee organization has been formally 
recognized, the agency, through appropriate officials, shall 
consult with such organization from time to time in the formula­
tion and implementation of personnel policies and practices, and 
matters affecting working conditions that are of concern to its 
members. Any such organization shall be entitled from time to 
time to raise such matters for discussion with appropriate offi­
cials and at all times to present its views thereon in writing.
In no case, however, shall an agency be required to consult with 
an employee organization which has been formally recognized with 
respect to any matter which, if the employee organization were 
one entitled to exclusive recognition, would not be included with­
in the obligation to meet and confer, as described in section 6  
(b) of this order.
Section 6 . (a) An agency shall recognize an employee
organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in 
an appropriate unit when such organization is eligible for formal 
recognition pursuant to section 5 of this order, and has been 
designated or selected by a majority of the employees of such unit 
as the representative of such employees in such unit. Units may 
be established on any plant or installation, craft, functional or 
other basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable community 
or Interest among the employees concerned, but no unit shall be 
established solely on the basis of the extent to which employees 
in the proposed unit have organized. Except where otherwise 
required by established practice, prior agreement, or special 
circumstances, no unit shall be established for purposes of exclu­
sive recognition which includes ( 1 ) any managerial executive (2 ) 
any employee engaged In Federal personnel work in other than a 
purely clerical capacity, (3) both supervisors who officially 
evaluate the performance of employees and the employees whom they 
supervise, or (4) both professional employees and non professional 
employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote 
for inclusion in such unit.
(b) When an employee organization has been recognized as 
the exclusive representative of employees of an appropriate unit 
it shall be entitled to act for and to negotiate agreements 
covering all employees in the unit and shall be responsible for 
representing the interests of all such employees without discrimi­
nation and without regard to employee organization membership.
Such employee organization shall be given the opportunity to be 
represented at discussions between management and employees or 
employee representatives concerning grievances, personnel policies 
and practices, or other matters affecting general working condi­
tions of employees in the unit. The agency and such employee 
organization, through appropriate officials and representatives, 
shall meet at reasonable times and confer with respect to person­
nel policy and practices and matters affecting working conditions,
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so far as may be appropriate subject to law and policy require­
ments. This extends to the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, the determination of appropriate 
techniques, consistent with the terms and purposes of this order, 
to assist in such negotiation, and the execution of a written 
memorandum of agreement or understanding incorporating any agree­
ment reached by the parties. In exercising authority to make 
rules and regulations relating to personnel policies and practices 
and working conditions, agencies shall have due regard for the 
obligation imposed by this section, but such obligation shall not 
be construed to extend to such areas of discretion and policy as 
the mission of an agency, its budget, its organization and the 
assignment of its personnel, or the technology of performing its 
work.
Section 7 . Any basic or initial agreement entered into 
with an employee organization as the exclusive representative of 
employees in a unit must be approved by the head of the agency or 
any official designated by him. All agreements with such employee 
organizations shall also be subject to the following requirements, 
which shall be expressly stated in the initial or basic agreement 
and shall be applicable to all supplemental, implementing, subsid­
iary or informal agreements between the agency and the organization:
(1) In the administration of all matters covered by the 
agreement officials and employees are governed by the provisions 
of any existing or future laws and regulations, including policies 
set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual and agency regulations, 
which may be applicable, and the agreement shall at all times be 
applied subject to such laws, regulations and policies:
(2) Management officials of the agency retain the right, in 
accordance with applicable laws and regulations, (a) to direct 
employees of the agency, (b) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, 
and retain employees in positions within the agency, and to suspend, 
demote, discharge, or take disciplinary action against employees,
(c) to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or
for other legitimate reasons, (d) to maintain the efficiency of the 
Government operations entrusted to them (3) to determine the 
methods, means and personnel by which such operations are to be 
conducted; and (f) to take whatever actions may be necessary to 
carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency.
Section 8 . (a) Agreements entered into or negotiated in
accordance with this order with an employee organization which is 
the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit 
may contain provisions, applicable only to employees in the unit,
concerning procedures for consideration of grievances. Such
procedures (1) shall conform to standards issued by the Civil 
Service Commission, and (2) may not in any manner diminish or 
impair any rights which would otherwise! be available to any
employee in the absence of an agreement providing for such
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procedures.
(b) Procedures estsbllshed by an agreement which are 
otherwise in conformity with this section may include provisions 
for the arbitration of grievances. Such arbitration (1) shall be 
advisory in nature with any decisions or recommendations subject 
to the approval of the agency head; (2) shall extend only to the 
interpretation or application of agreements or agency policy and 
not to changes in or proposed changes in agreements or agency 
policy; and (3) shall be invoked only with the approval of the 
individual employee or employees concerned.
Section 9 . Solicitation of memberships, dues, or other 
internal employee organization business shall be conducted during 
the non-duty hours of the employees concerned: Officially request­
ed or approved consultations and meetings between management offi­
cials and representatives of recognized employee organizations 
shall, whenever practicable, be conducted on official time, but any 
agency may require that negotiations with an employee organization 
which has been accorded exclusive recognition be conducted during 
the non-duty hours of the employee organization representatives 
Involved in such negotiations.
Section 10. No later than July 1, 1962, the head of each 
agency shall issue appropriate policies, rules and regulations 
for the implementation of this order, including: A clear statement
of the rights of its employees under the order; policies and 
procedures with respect to recognition of employee organizations; 
procedures for determining appropriate employee units, policies 
and practices regarding consultation with representatives of 
employee organizations, other organizations and Individual employ­
ees; and policies with respect to the use of agency facilities by 
employee organizations. Insofar as may be practicable and appro­
priate, agencies shall consult with representatives of employee 
organizations in the formulation of these policies, rules and 
regulations.
Section 11. Each agency shall be responsible for determin­
ing in accordance with this order whether a unit is appropriate 
for purposes of exclusive recognition and, by an election or other 
appropriate means, whether an employee organization represents a 
majority of the employees in such a unit so as to be entitled to 
such recognition. Upon the request of any agency, or of any em­
ployee organization which is seeking exclusive recognition and 
which qualifies for or has been accorded formal recognition, the 
Secretary of Labor, subject to such necessary rules as he may 
prescribe, shall nominate from the National Panel of Arbitrators 
maintained by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service one 
or more qualified arbitrators who will be available for employment 
by the agency concerned for either or both of the following pur­
poses, as may be required: (1 ) to investigate the facts and issue
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an advisory decision as to the appropriateness of a unit for 
purposes of exclusive recognition and as to related Issues submit­
ted for consideration; (2 ) to conduct or supervise an election or 
otherwise determine by such means as may be appropriate, and on 
an advisory basis, whether an employee organization represents the 
majority of the employees in a unit. Consonant with the law, the 
Secretary of Labor shall render such assistance as may be appropri­
ate in connection with advisory decisions or determinations under 
this section, but the necessary costs of such assistance shall be 
paid by the agency to which it relates. In the event questions 
as to the appropriateness of a unit or the majority status of an 
employee organization shall arise in the Department of Labor, the 
duties prescribed in this section which would otherwise be the 
responsibility of the Secretary of Labor shall be performed by 
the Civil Service Commission.
Section 12. The Civil Service Commission shall establish 
and maintain a program to assist in carrying out the objectives 
of this order. The Commission shall develop a program for the 
guidance of agencies in employee-management relations in the 
Federal Service; provide technical advice to the agencies on 
employee-management programs; assist in the development of pro­
grams for training agency personnel in the principles and proce­
dures of consultation, negotiation and the settlement of disputes 
in the Federal service, and for the training of management offi­
cials in the discharge of their employee-management relations 
responsibilities in the public interest; provide for continuous 
study and review of the Federal employee-management relations 
program and, from time to time, make reconntendations to the 
President for its improvement.
Section 13. (a) The Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Labor shall jointly prepare (1) proposed standards 
of conduct for employee organizations and (2 ) a proposed code of 
fair labor practices in employee-management relations in the 
Federal service appropriate to assist in securing the uniform 
and effective implementation of the policies, rights and responsi­
bilities described in this order.
(b) There Is hereby established the President's Temporary 
Committee on the Implementation of the Federal Employee-Management 
Relations Program. The Committee shall consist of the Secretary 
of Labor, who shall be chairman of the Committee, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Postmaster General, and the Chairman of the Civil 
Service Commission. In addition to such other matters relating to 
the implementation of this order as may be referred to it by the 
President, the Committee shall advise the President with respect 
to any problems arising out of completion of agreements pursuant 
to sections 6  and 7, and shall receive the proposed standards of 
conduct for employee organizations and proposed code of fair 
labor practices in the Federal service as described in this
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section, and report thereon to the President with such recommenda­
tions or amendments as it may deem appropriate. Conaonant with 
law, the departments and agencies represented on the Committee 
shall aa may be necessary for the effectuation of this section, 
furnish assistance to the Committee in accordance with section 214 
of the Act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 (31 U.S.C, 691). Unless 
otherwise directed by the President, the Committee shall cease to 
exist 30 days after the date on which it submits its report to the 
President pursuant to this section.
Section 14. The head of each agency, in accordance with 
the provisions of this order and regulations prescribed by the 
Civil Service Commission, shall extend to all employees in the 
competitive civil service rights Identical in adverse action 
cases to those provided preference eliglbles under section 14 of 
the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended. Each employee 
in the competitive service shall have the right to appeal to the 
Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of the adminis­
trative officer so acting, such appeal to be processed in an 
identical manner to that provided for appeals under section 14 of 
the Veterans' Preference Act. Any recommendation by the Civil 
Service Commission submitted to the head of an agency on the basis 
of an appeal by an employee in the competitive service shall be 
complied with by the head of the agency. This section shall become 
effective as to all adverse actions commenced by issuance of a 
notification of proposed action on or after July 1, 1962.
Section 15. Nothing in this order shall be construed to 
annul or modify, or to preclude the renewal or continuation of, 
any lawful agreement heretofore entered into between any agency 
and any representative of its employees. Nor shall this order 
preclude any agency from continuing to consult or deal with any 
representative of its employees or other organization prior to the 
time that the status and representation rights of such representa­
tive or organization are determined in conformity with this order.
Section 16. This order (except section 14) shall not apply 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, or any other agency, or to any office, bureau or entity 
within an agency, primarily performing intelligence, investigative, 
or security functions if the head of the agency determines that 
the provisions of this order cannot be applied in a manner con­
sistent with national security requirements and considerations.
When he deems it necessary in the national interest, and subject 
to such conditions as he may prescribe, the head of any agency may 
suspend any provision of this order (except section 14) with 
respect to any agency installation or activity which is located 
outside of the United States.
JOHN F. KENNEDY
THE WHITE HOUSE 
January 17, 1962
APPENDIX C
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11491 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
WHEREAS the public interest requires high standards of 
employee performance and the continual development and imple­
mentation of modern and progressive work practices to facilitate 
improved employee performance and efficiency; and
WHEREAS the well-being of employees and efficient adminis­
tration of the Government are benefited by providing employees an 
opportunity to participate in the formulations and implementation 
of personnel policies and practices affecting the conditions of 
their employment; and
WHEREAS the participation of employees should be improved 
through the maintenance of constructive and cooperative relation­
ships between labor organizations and management officials; and 
WHEREAS subject to law and the paramount requirements of 
public service, effective labor-management relations within the 
Federal service require a clear statement of the respective 
rights and obligations of labor organizations and agency management: 
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, Including 
sections 3301 and 7301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and 
as President of the United States, I hereby direct that the follow­
ing policies govern officers and agencies of the executive branch 
of the Government in all dealings with Federal employees and 
organizations representing such employees.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Policy, (a) Each employee of the executive 
branch of the Federal Government has the right, freely and without 
fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join, and assist a labor 
organization or to refrain from any such activity, and each 
employee shall be protected in the exercise of this right. Except 
as otherwise expressly provided in this Order, the right to assist 
a labor organization extends to participation in the management of 
the organization and acting for the organization in the capacity 
of an organization representative, including presentation of Its 
views to officials of the executive branch, the Congress, or other 
appropriate authority, The head of each agency shall take the
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action required to assure that employees in the agency are 
apprised of their rights under this section, and that no inter­
ference, restraint, coercion, or discrimination is practiced 
within his agency to encourage or discourage membership in a 
labor organization.
(b) Paragraph (a) of this section does not authorize par­
ticipation in the management of a labor organization or acting as 
a representative of such an organization by a supervisor, except 
as provided in section 24 of this Order, or by an employee when 
the participation or activity would result in a conflict or ap­
parent conflict of interest or otherwise be incompatible with law 
or with the official duties of the employee.
Sec. 2. Definitions. When used in this Order, the term --
(a) "Agency" means executive department, a Government 
corporation, and an independent establishment as defined in section 
104 of title 5, United States Code, except the General Accounting 
Office;
(b) "Employee" means an employee of an agency and employee 
of a nonappropriated fund Instrumentality of the United States but 
does not include, for the purpose of formal or exclusive recogni­
tion or national consultation rights, a supervisor, except as pro­
vided in section 24 of this order;
(c) "Supervisor" means an employee having authority, in the 
interest of an agency, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, 
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, 
or responsibility to direct them, or to evaluate their performance, 
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such 
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of author­
ity is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires 
the use of independent judgment;
(d) "Guard" means an employee assigned to enforce against 
employees and other persons rules to protect agency property or 
the safety of persons on agency premises, or to maintain law and 
order in areas or facilities under Government control;
(c) "Labor organization" means a lawful organization of 
any kind in which employees participate and which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with agencies concerning 
grievances, personnel policies and practices, or other matters 
affecting the working conditions of their employees; but does not 
include an organization which--
(1 ) consists of management officials or supervisors, 
except as provided in section 24 of this order;
206
(2) asserts the right to strike against the Government 
of the United States or any agency thereof, or to assist or 
participate in such a strike, or imposes a duty or obligation to 
conduct, assist or participate in such a strike;
(3) advocates the overthrow of the constitutional form of 
government in the United States; or
(4) discriminates with regard to the terms or conditions 
of membership because of race, color, creed, sex, age, or 
national origin;
(5) "Agency management" means the agency head and all man­
agement officials, supervisors, and other representatives of 
management having authority to act for the agency on any matters 
relating to the implementation of the agency labor-management re­
lations program established under this Order;
(g) "Council" means the Federal Labor Relations Council 
established by this Order;
(h) "Panel" means the Federal Service Impasses Panel 
established by this Order; and
(i) "Assistant Secretary" means the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for Labor-Management Relations.
Sec. 3 Application (a) This Order applies to all employees 
and agencies in the executive branch, except as provided in para­
graphs (b), (c) and (d) of this section.
(b) This Order (except section 22) does not apply to--
(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(2) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(3) any other agency, or office, bureau, or entity within 
an agency, which has as a primary function intelligence, investi­
gative, or security work, when the head of the agency determines, 
in his sole judgment, that the Order cannot be applied in a manner 
consistent with national security requirements and considerations; 
or
(4) any office, bureau of entity within an agency which has 
as a primary function investigation or audit of the conduct or 
work of officials or employees of the agency for the purpose of 
ensuring honesty and integrity in the discharge of their official 
duties, when the head of the agency determines, in his sole judg­
ment, that the Order cannot be applied In a manner consistent
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with the Internal security of the agency.
(c) The head of an agency may, in his sole judgment, 
suspend any provision of this Order (except section 22) with 
respect to any agency Installation or activity located outside 
the United States, when he determines that this is necessary In 
the national interest, subject to the conditions he prescribes.
(d) Employees engaged in administering a labor-management 
relations law or this Order shall not be represented by a labor 
organization which also represents other groups of employees under 
the law of this Order, or which is affiliated directly or indirect­
ly with an organization which represents such a group of employees.
ADMINISTRATION
Sec. 4. Federal Labor Relations Council, (a) There is 
hereby established the Federal Labor Relations Council, which con­
sists of the Chairman of the Civil Service Conmission, who shall 
be chairman of the Council, the Secretary of Labor, an official 
of the Executive Office of the President, and such other officials 
of the executive branch as the President may designate from time 
to time, The Civil Service Commission shall provide services and 
staff assistance to the Council to the extent authorized by law.
(b) The Council shall administer and interpret this Order, 
decide major policy issues, prescribe regulations, and from time 
to time, report and make recommendations to the President.
(c) The Council may consider, subject to its regulations--
(1) appeals from decisions of the Assistant Secretary issued 
pursuant to section 6  of this Order;
(2 ) appeals on negotiability issues as provided in section 
11 (c) of this Order;
(3) exceptions to arbitration awards; and
(4) other matters it deems appropriate to assure the effec­
tuation of the purposes of this Order.
Sec. 5. Federal Service Impasses Panel, (a) There is here­
by established the Federal Service Impasses Panel as an agency 
within the Council. The Panel consists of at least three members 
appointed by the President, one of whom he designates as chairman. 
The Council shall provide the services and staff assistance needed 
by the Panel,
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(b) The Panel may consider negotiation impasses as 
provided in section 17 of this Order and may take any action it 
considers necessary to settle an Impasse.
(c) The Panel shall prescribe regulations needed to admin* 
ister its function under this Order.
Sec. 6 . Assistant Secretary of Labor-Management Relations,
(a) The Assistant Secretary shall--
(1 ) decide questions as to the appropriate unit for the 
purpose of exclusive recognition and related issues submitted for 
his consideration;
(2 ) supervise elections to determine whether a labor 
organization is the choice of a majority of the employees in an 
appropriate unit as their exclusive representative, and certify 
the results;
(3) decide questions as to the eligibility of labor 
organizations for national consultation rights under criteria 
prescribed by the Coundll; and
(4) except as provided in section 19 (d) of this Order,
decide complains of alleged unfair labor practices and alleged
violations of the standards of conduct for labor organizations.
(b) In any matters arising under paragraph (a) of this 
section, the Assistant Secretary may require an agency or a labor 
organization to cease and desist from violations of this Order 
and require it to take such affirmative action as he considers 
appropriate to effectuate the policies of this Order.
(c) In performing the duties imposed on him by this section, 
the Assistant Secretary may request and use the services and assis­
tance of employees of other agencies in accordance with section I 
of the Act of March 4, 1915, (38 Stat. 1084, as amended; 31 U.S.C. 
686).
(d) The Assistant Secretary shall prescribe regulations
needed to administer his functions under this Order.
(e) If any matters arising under paragraph (a) of this 
section involve the Department of Labor, the duties of the Assis­
tant Secretary described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section 
shall be, performed by a member of the Civil Service Conanission 
designated by the Chairman of the Commission.
Sec. 7. Recognition in general, (a) An agency shall 
accord exclusive recognition or national consultation rights at
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the request of a labor organisation which meets the requirements 
for the recognition or consultation rights under this Order.
(b) A labor organization seeking recognition shall submit 
to the agency a roster of Its officers and representatives, a 
copy of its constitution and by-laws, and a statement of its 
objectives.
(c) When recognition of a labor organization has been 
accorded, the recognition continues as long as the organization 
continues to meet the requirements of this Order applicable to 
that recognition, except that this section does not require an 
election to determine whether an organization should become, or 
continue to be recognized as, exclusive representative of the 
employees in any unit or subdivision thereof within 1 2  months 
after a prior valid election with respect to such unit.
(d) Recognition, in whatever form accorded, does not—
(1 ) preclude an employee, regardless of whether he is a 
member of a labor organization from bringing matters of personal 
concern to the attention of appropriate officials under applicable 
law, rule, regulations, or established agency policy; or from 
choosing his own representative in a grievance or appellate action;
(2 ) preclude or restrict consultations and dealings between 
an agency and a veterans organization with respect to matters of 
particular interest to employees with veterans preference; or
(3) preclude an agency from consulting or dealing with a 
religious, social, fraternal, or other lawful association, not 
qualified as a labor organization, with respect to matters or 
policies which involve individual members of the association or 
are of particular applicability to it or its members.
Consultations and dealings under subparagraph (3) of this para­
graph shall be so limited that they do not assume the character 
of formal consultation on matters of general employee-management 
policy, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, or 
extend to areas where recognition of the interests of one employee 
group may result in discrimination against or injury to the 
interests of other employees.
(e) An agency shall establish a system for intra-management 
communication and consultation with its supervisors or associa­
tions of supervisors. The communications and consultations shall 
have as their purposes the improvement of agency operations, the 
improvement of working conditions of supervisors, the exchange of 
information, the improvement of managerial effectiveness, and the 
establishment of policies that best serve the public interest in
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accomplishing the mission of the agency.
(f) Informal recognition shall not be accorded after the 
date of this Order.
Sec. 8  Formal Recognition, (a) Formal recognition 
Including formal recognition at the national level, shall not be 
accorded after the date of this Order.
(b) An agency shall continue any formal recognition, 
including formal recognition at the national level, accorded a 
labor organization before the date of this Order until--
(1 ) the labor organization ceases to be eligible under 
this Order for formal recognition so accorded;
(2 ) a labor organization is accorded exclusive recognition 
as representative of employees in the unit to which the formal 
recognition applies; or
(3) the formal recognition is terminated under regulations 
prescribed by the Federal Labor Relations Council.
(c) When a labor organization holds formal recognition, it 
is the representative of its members In a unit as defined by the 
agency when recognition was accorded. The agency, through appro­
priate officials, shall consult with representatives of the organ­
ization from time to time in the formulation and implementation
of personnel policies and practices, and matters affecting working 
conditions that affect members of the organization in the unit to 
which the formal recognition applies. The organization is entitled 
from time to time to raise such matters for discussion with appro­
priate officials and at all times to present its views thereon in 
writing. The agency is not required to consult with the labor 
organization on any matter on which it would not be required to 
meet and confer if the labor organization were entitled to exclu­
sive recognition.
Sec. 9. National consultation rights, (a) An Agency shall 
accord national consultation rights to a labor organization which 
qualifies under criteria established by the Federal Labor Rela­
tions Council as the representative of a substantial.number of 
employees of the agency. National consultation rights shall not 
be accorded for any unit where a labor organization already holds 
exclusive recognition at the national level for that unit. The 
granting of national consultation rights does not preclude an 
agency from appropriate dealings at the national level with other 
organizations on matters affecting their members. An agency shall 
terminate national consultation rights when the labor organization
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ceases to qualify under the established criteria.
(b) When a labor organisation has been accorded national 
consultation rights, the agency, through appropriate officials, 
shall notify representatives of the organization of proposed 
substantive changes in personnel policies that affect employees 
it represents and provide an opportunity for the organization to 
comment on the proposed changes. The labor organization may 
suggest changes in the agency's personnel policies and have its 
views carefully considered. It may confer in person at reasonable 
times, on request, with appropriate officials on personnel policy 
matters, and at all times present its views thereon in writing.
An agency is not required to consult with a labor organization 
on any matter on which it would not be required to meet and confer 
if the organization were entitled to exclusive recognition.
(c) Questions as to the eligibility of labor organizations 
for national consultation rights may be referred to the Assistant 
Secretary for decision.
Sec. 10. Exclusive recognition, (a) An agency shall accord 
exclusive recognition to a labor organization when the organization 
has been selected, in a secret ballot election, by a majority of 
the employees in an appropriate unit as their representative.
(b) A unit may be established on a plant or Installation, 
craft, functional, or other basis which will ensure a clear and 
identifiable community of Interest among the employees concerned 
and will promote effective dealings and efficiency of agency 
operations. A unit shall not be established solely on the basis 
of the extent to which employees in the proposed unit have organ­
ized, nor shall a unit be established if it includes--
(1 ) any management official or supervisor, except as 
provided in section 24;
(2) an employee engaged in Federal personnel work in other
than a purely clerical capacity;
(3) any guard together with other employees, or
(4) both professional and nonprofessional employees, unless
a majority of the professional employees vote for inclusion in
the unit.
Questions as to the appropriate unit and related issues may be 
referred to the Assistant-Secretary for decision.
(c) An agency shall not accord exclusive recognition to a 
labor organization as the representative of employees in a unit 
of guards if the organization admits to membership, or is
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affiliated directly or Indirectly with an organization which 
admitB to memberahlp, employees other than guards.
(d) All elections shall be conducted under the supervision 
of the Assistant Secretary, of persons designated by him, and 
shall be by secret ballot. Each employee eligible to vote shall
.be provided the opportunity to choose the labor organization he 
wishes to represent him, from among those on the ballot, or "no 
union." Elections may be held to determine whether-**
(1 ) a labor organization should be recognized as the 
exclusive representative of employees in a unit
(2 ) a labor organization should replace another labor 
organization as the exclusive representative, or
(3) a labor organization should cease to be the exclusive 
representative.
(e) When a labor organization has been accorded exclusive 
recognition, it is the exclusive representative of employees in 
the unit and is entitled to act for and negotiate agreements 
covering all employees in the unit. It is responsible for 
representing the interests of all employees in the unit without 
discrimination and without regard to labor organization member­
ship. The labor organization shall be given the opportunity to 
be represented at formal discussions between management and 
employees or employee representatives concerning grievances, 
personnel policies and practices, or other matters affecting 
general-working conditions of employees in the unit.
AGREEMENTS
Sec. 11. Negotiation of agreements, (a) An agency and a 
labor organization that has been accorded exclusive recognition, 
through appropriate representatives, shall meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to personnel policies 
and practices and matters affecting working conditions, so far 
as may be appropriate under applicable laws and regulations, in­
cluding policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual, 
published agency policies and regulations, a national or other 
controlling agreement at a higher level in the agency, and this 
Order. They may negotiate an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder; determine appropriate techniques, consistent with 
section 17 of this Order, to assist in such negotiation; and 
execute a written agreement or memorandum of understanding.
(b) In prescribing regulations relating to personnel 
policies and practices and working conditions, an agency shall
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have due regard for the obligation Impoaed by paragraph (a) of 
this section. However, the obligation to meet and confer does 
not Include matters with respect to the mission of an agency; Its 
budget; Its organization; the number of employees; and the numbers, 
types, and grades of positions or employees assigned to an organ­
izational unit, work project or tour of duty; the technology of 
performing its work; or Its internal security practices. This 
does not preclude the parties from negotiating agreements provid­
ing appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by 
the impact of realignment of work forces or technological change.
(c) If, In connection with negotiations, an issue develops 
as to whether a proposal is contrary to law, regulation, control­
ling agreement, or this Order and therefore not negotiable, it 
shall be resolved as follows:
(1) An issue which involves interpretation of a controlling 
agreement at a higher agency level is resolved under the procedures 
of the controlling agreement, or, if none, under agency regulations;
(2) An issue other than as described in subparagraph (1) 
of this paragraph which arises at a local level may be referred 
by either party to the head of the agency for determination;
(3) An agency head's determination as to the interpretation 
of the agency's regulations with respect to a proposal is final;
(4) A labor organization may appeal to the Council for a 
decision when--
(i) it disagrees with an agency head's determination that 
a proposal would violate applicable law, regulation of appropriate 
authority outside the agency, or this Order, or
(1 1 ) it believes that an agency's regulations, as interpreted 
by the agency head, violate applicable law, regulation of appropri­
ate authority outside the agency, or this Order.
Sec. 12. Basic provisions of agreements. Each agreement 
between an agency and a labor organization is subject to the 
following requirements--
(a) in the administration of all matters covered by the 
agreement, officials and employees are governed by existing or 
future laws and the regulations of appropriate authorities, includ­
ing policies set forth in the Federal Personnel Manual; by pub­
lished agency policies and regulations in existence at the time 
the agreement was approved; and by subsequently published agency 
policies and regulations required by law or by the regulations of 
appropriate authorities, or authorized by the terms of a control­
ling agreement at a higher agency level;
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(b) management officials of the agency retain the right, 
in accordance with applicable laws and regulations--
(1 ) to direct employees of the agency;
(2 ) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees 
in positions within the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge, 
or take other disciplinary action against employees;
(3) to releve employees from duties because of lack of 
work or for other; legitimate reasons;
(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government operations 
entrusted to them;
(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which 
such operations are to be conducted; and
(6 ) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out 
the mission of the agency in situations of emergency; and
(c) nothing in the agreement shall require an employee to 
become or to remain a member of a labor organization, or to pay 
money to the organization except pursuant to a voluntary, written 
authorization by a member for the payment of dues through payroll 
deductions. The requirements of this section shall be expressly 
stated in the initial or basic agreement and apply to all supple­
mental, implementing, subsidiary, or informal agreements between 
the agency and the organization.
Sec. 13. Grievance procedures. An agreement with a labor 
organization which is the exclusive representative of employees in 
an appropriate unit may provide procedures, applicable only to 
employees in the unit, for the consideration of employee grievances 
and of disputes over the interpretation and application of agree­
ments. The procedure for consideration of employee grievances 
shall meet the requirements for negotiated grievance procedures 
established by the Civil Service Commission. A negotiated 
employee grievance procedure which conforms to this section, to 
applicable laws, and to regulations of the Civil Service Commission 
and the agency is the exclusive procedure available to employees 
in the unit when the agreement so provides.
Sec. 14. Arbitration of grievances, (a) Negotiated 
procedures may provide for the arbitration of employee grievances 
and of disputes over the interpretation or application of existing 
agreements. Negotiated procedures may not extend arbitration to 
changes or proposed changes in agreements or agency policy. Such 
procedures shall provide for the invoking of arbitration only with 
the approval of the labor organization that has exclusive
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recognition and, In the caae of an employee grievance, only 
with the approval of the employee. The costs of the arbitrator 
shall be shared equally by the parties.
(b) Either party may file exceptions to an arbitrator's 
award with the Council, under regulations prescribed by the 
Council.
Sec. 15. Approval of agreements. An agreement with a 
labor organization as the exclusive representative of employees 
in a unit is subject to the approval of the head of the agency 
or an official designated by him. An agreement shall be approved 
if it conforms to applicable laws, existing published agency 
policies and regulations (unless the agency has granted an 
exception to a policy or regulation) and regulations of other 
appropriate authorities. A local agreement subject to a 
national or other controlling agreement at a higher level shall 
be approved under the procedures of the controlling agreement, 
or, if none, under agency regulations.
NEGOTIATION DISPUTES AND IMPASSES
Sec. 16. Negotiation disputes. The federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service shall provide services and assistance to 
Federal agencies and labor organizations in the resolution of 
negotiation disputes. The Service shall determine under what 
circumstances and in what manner it shll proffer its services.
Sec. 17. Negotiation impasses. When voluntary 
arrangements, including the services of the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service or other third party mediation, fall to 
resolve a negotiation impasse, either party may request the 
Federal Service Impasses Panel to consider the matter. The Panel, 
in its discretion and under the regulations it prescribes, may 
consider the matter and may recommend procedures to the parties 
for the resolution of the impasse or may settle the impasse by 
appropriate action. Arbitration or third-party fact finding with 
recommendations to assist in theresolution of an impasse may be 
used by the parties only when authorized or directed by the Panel.
CONDUCT OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
Sec. 18. Standards of conduct for labor organizations.
(a) An agency shall accord recognition only to a labor 
organization that is free from corrupt influences and influences 
opposed to basic democratic principles. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this section, an organization is not required
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to prove that it has the required freedom when It is subject 
to governing requirements adopted by the organization or by a 
national or International labor organization or federation of 
labor organizations with which It is affiliated or in which it 
participates, containing explicit and detailed provisions to which 
it subscribes calling for--
(1 ) the maintenance of democratic procedures and practices, 
including provisions for periodic elections to be conducted sub­
ject to recognized safeguards and provisions defining and securing 
the right of individual members to participation in the affairs
of the organization, to fair and equal treatment under the govern­
ing rules of the organization, and to fair process in disciplinary 
proceedings;
(2 ) the exclusion from office in the organization of 
persons affiliated with Communist or other totalitarian movements 
and persons identified with corrupt influences;
(3) the prohibition of business or financial interests on 
the part of organization officers and agents which conflict with 
their duty to the organization and its members; and
(4) the maintenance of fiscal integrity in the conduct 
of the affairs of the organization, including provision for 
accounting and financial controls and regular financial reports 
or summaries to be made available to members.
(b) Notwithstanding the fact that a labor organization 
has adopted or subscribed to standards of conduct as provided in 
paragraph (a) of this section, the organization is required to 
furnish evidence of its freedom from corrupt influences or 
influences opposed to basic democratic principles when there is 
reasonable cause to believe that—
(1 ) the organization has been suspended or expelled from
or is subject to other sanction by a parent labor organization
or federation of organlzat ons with which it had been affiliated 
because it has demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to 
comply with governing requirements comparable in purpose to those 
required by paragraph (a) of this section; or
(2 ) the organization is in fact subject to influences 
that would preclude recognition under this Order.
(c) A labor organization which has or seeks recognition
as a representative of employees under this Order shall file 
financial and other reports, provide for bonding of officials 
and employees of the organization, and comply with trusteeship 
and election standards.
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(d) The Assistant Secretary shall the regulations 
needed to effectuate this section. Complaints of violations 
of this Bection shall be filed with the Assistant Secretary.
Sec. 19. Unfair labor practices, (a) Agency 
management shall not--
(1 ) interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in 
the exercise of the rights assured by this Order;
(2 ) encourage or discourage membership in a labor 
organization by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, 
promotion, or other conditions of employment;
(3) sponsor, control, or otherwise assist a labor 
organization, except that an agency may furnish customary and 
routine services and facilities under section 23 of this Order 
when consistent with the best interests of the agency, its 
employees, and the organization, and when the services and 
facilities are furnished, if requested, on an impartial basis 
to organizations having equivalent status:
(4) discipline or otherwise discriminate against an 
employee because he has filed a complaint or given testimony 
under this Order;
(5) refuse to accord appropriate recognition to a labor 
organization qualified for such recognition; or
(6 ) refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with a labor 
organization as required by this Order.
(b) A labor organization shall not—
(1 ) interfere with, restrain, or coerce an employee in 
the exercise of his rights assured by this Order;
(2 ) attempt to induce agency management to coerce 
an employee in the exercise of his rights under this Order;
(3) coerce, attempt to coerce, or discipline, fine, or 
take other economic sanction against a member of the organization 
as punishment or reprisal for, or for the purpose of hindering or 
impeding his work performance, his productivity, or the discharge 
of his duties owed as an officer or employee of the United States;
(4) call or engage in a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown; 
picket an agency in a 1 abor-management dispute; or condone any 
such activity be failing to take affirmative action to prevent
or stop it;
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(5) discriminate against an employee with regard to the 
terms or conditions of membership because of race, color, creed, 
sex, age, or national origin; or
(6 ) refuse to consult, confer, or negotiate with an agency 
as required by this Order.
(c) A labor organization which is accorded exclusive 
recognition shall not deny membership to any employee In the 
appropriate unit except for failure to meet reasonable occupation­
al standards uniformly required for admission, or for failure to 
tender initiation fees and dues uniformly required as a condition 
of acquiring and retaining membership. This paragraph does not 
preclude a labor organization from enforcing discipline in accord­
ance with procedures under its constitution or by-laws which 
conform to the requirements of this Order.
(d) When the issue in a complaint of an alleged violation 
of paragraph (a) (1), (2), or (A) of this section is subject to 
an established grievance or appeals procedure, that procedure
is the exclusive procedure for resolving the complaint. All 
other complaints of alleged violations of this section initiated 
by an employee, an agency, or a labor organization, that cannot 
be resolved by the parties, shall be filed with the Assistant 
Secretary.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 20. Use of official time. Solicitation of membership 
or dues, and other Internal business of a labor organization, shall 
be conducted during the non duty hours of the employees concerned. 
Employees who represent a recognized labor organization shall not 
be on official time when a negotiating an agreement with agency 
management.
Sec. 21. Allotment of dues, (a) When a labor organization 
holds formal or exclusive recognition, and the agency and the 
organization agree in writing to this course of action, an agency 
may deduct the regular and periodic dues of the organization from 
the pay of members of the organization in the unit of recognition 
who make a voluntary allotment for that purpose, and shall 
recover the costs of making the deductions. Such an allotment is 
subject to the regulations of the Civil Service Commission, which 
shall include provision for the employee to revoke his authoriza­
tion at stated six month intervals. Such an allotment terminates 
when—
(1 ) the dues withholding agreement between the agency and 
the labor organization is terminated or ceases to be applicable 
to the employee, or
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(2 ) the employee has been suspended or expelled from the 
labor organization.
(b) An agency may deduct the regular and periodic dues
of an association of management officials or supervisors from the
pay of members of the association who make a voluntary allotment 
for that purpose, and shall recover the costs of making the 
deductions, when the agency and the association agree in writing
to this course of action. Such an allotment is subject to the
regulations of the Civil Service Commission.
Sec. 22. Adverse action appeals. The head of each agency, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Order and regulations 
prescribed by the Civil Service Commission, shall extend to all 
employees in the competitive civil service rights identical in 
adverse action cases to those provided preference eliglbles under 
sections 7511-7512 of title 5 of the United States Code. Each 
employee in the competitive service shall have the right to appeal 
to the Civil Service Commission from an adverse decision of the 
administrative officer so acting, such appeal to be processed in 
an identical manner to that provided for appeals under section 
7701 of title 5 of the United States Code. Any recommendation 
by the Civil Service Commission submitted to the head of an 
agency on the basis of an appeal by an employee in the competitive 
service shall be complied with by the head of the agency.
Sec. 23. Aaencv implementation. No later than 
April 1, 1970, each agency shall issue appropriate policies and 
regulations consistent with this Order for its implementation.
This includes but is not limited to a clear statement of the 
rights of its employees under this Order; procedures with respect 
to recognition of labor organizations, determination of appropriate 
units, consultation and negotiation with labor organizations, 
approval of agreements, mediation, and impasse resolution; 
policies with respect to the use of agency facilities by labor 
organizations; and policies and practices regarding consultation 
with other organizations and associations and individual employees. 
Insofar as practicable, agencies shall consult with representatives 
of labor organizations in the formulation of these policies and 
regulations, other than those for the implementation of section 7
(e) of this Order.
Sec. 24. Savings clauses, (a) This Order does not 
preclude—
(1 ) the renewal or continuation of a lawful agreement 
between an agency and a representative of its employees entered 
Into before the effective date of Executive Order No. 10988 
(January 17, 1962); or
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(2 ) the renewal, continuation, or initial according to 
recognition for units of management officials or supervisors 
represented by labor organizations which historically or 
traditionally represent the management officials or supervisors 
in private industry and which hold exclusive recognition for 
units of such officials or supervisors in any agency on the date 
of this Order.
(b) All grants of informal recognition under Executive 
Order No. 10988 terminate on July 1, 1970
(c) All grants of formal recognition under Executive Order 
No. 10988 terminate under regulations which the Federal Labor 
Relations Council shall issue before October 1, 1970.
(d) By not later than December 31, 1970, all supervisors 
shall be excluded from units of formal and exclusive recognition 
and from coverage by negotiated agreements, except as provided 
in paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 25. Guidance, training, review and information.
(a) The Civil Service Commission shall establish and 
maintain a program for the guidance of agencies on labor- 
management relations in the Federal Service; provide technical 
advice and information to agencies; assist in the development 
of programs for training agency personnel and management 
officials in labor-management relations; continuously review 
the operation of the Federal labor-management relations program 
to assist in assuring adherence to its provisions and merit 
system requirements; and, from time to time, report to the 
Council on the state of the program with any recommendations 
for its improvement.
(b) The Department of Labor and Civil Service Commission 
shall develop programs for the collection and dissemination of 
information appropriate to the needs of agencies, organizations 
and the public.
Sec. 26. Effective date. This Order is effective on 
January 1, 1970 except sections 7 (f) and 8  which are effective 
Immediately. Effective January 1, 1970, Executive Order No.
10988 and the President's Memorandum of May 21, 1963, entitled 
Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations and Code of 
Fair Labor Practices, are revoked.
RICHARD NIXON
THE WHITE HOUSE 
October 29, 1969
APPENDIX D
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11616 
AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11491, RELATING TO 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution 
and statutes of the United States, including sections 3301 and 
7301 of title 5 of the United States Code, and as President of the 
United States, Executive Order No. 11491 of October 29, 1969, 
relating to labor-management relations in the Federal service, is 
amended as follows:
1. Section 2(b) is amended by deleting the words "formal
2. Paragraph (2) section 2(e) is amended to read as 
follows:
"( 2 ) assists or participates in a strike against the 
Government of the United States or any agency thereof, or imposes 
a duty of obligation to conduct, assist, or participate in such a 
strike;"
3. Section 4(a) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) There is hereby established the Federal Labor
Relations Council, which consists of the Chairman of the Civil 
Service Commission, who shall be chairman of the Council, the 
Secretary of Labor, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and such other officials of the executive branch as the 
President may designate from time to time. The Civil Service 
Commission shall provide administrative support and services to 
the Council to the extent authorized by law."
4. Section 6 (a) is amended—
(a) by deleting the word "and" at the end of 
paragraph (3).
(b) by substituting for paragraph (4) the following:
"(4) decide unfair labor practice complaints and alleged
violations of the standards of conduct for labor organizations; 
and"
(c) by adding at the end thereof the following:
"(5) decide questions as to whether a grievance is subject 
to a negotiated grievance procedure or subject to arbitration 
under an agreement."
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5. Section 7(d) is amended to read as follows:
" (d) Recognition of a labor organization does not--
"( 1 ) preclude an employee, regardless of whether he is in 
a unit of exclusive recognition, from exercising grievance or 
appelate rights established by law or regulations; or from 
choosing his own representative in a grievance or appelate action, 
except when presenting a grievance under a negotiated procedure 
as provided in section 13;
"( 2 ) preclude or restrict consultations and dealings 
between an agency and a veterans organization with respect to 
matters of particular Interest to employees with veterans 
preference; or
"(3) preclude an agency from consulting or dealing with 
a religious, social, fraternal, professional or other lawful 
association, not qualified as a labor organization, with respect 
to matters or policies which involve indivldusl members of the 
association or are of particular applicability to it or its 
members.
"Consultations and dealings under subparagraph (3) of 
this paragraph shall be so limited that they do not assume the 
character of formal consultation on matters of general employee- 
management policy, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this 
section, or extend to areas where recognition of the interests 
of one employee group may result in discrimination against or 
injury to the interests of other employees."
6 . Section 7(f) is amended to read as follows:
"(f) Informal recognition or formal recognition shall 
not be accorded."
7. Section 8  is revoked.
8 . Section 13 is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 13. Grievance and arbitration procedures.
"(a) An agreement between an agency and a labor organiza­
tion shall provide a procedure, applicable only to the unit, for 
the consideration of grievances over the interpretation or appli­
cation of the agreement. A negotiated grievance procedure may not 
cover any other matters, including matters for which statutory 
appeals procedures exist, and shall be the exclusive procedure 
available to the parties and the employees in the unit for 
resolving such grievances. However, any employee or group of 
employees in the unit may present such grievances to the agency 
and have them adjusted, without the intervention of the exclusive 
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent 
with the terms of the agreement and the exclusive representative 
has been given opportunity to be present at the adjustment.
"(b) A negotiated procedure may provide for the arbitration 
of grievances over the interpretation or application of the
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agreement, but not over any other matters. Arbitration may be 
invoked only by the agency or the exclusive representative.
Either party may file exceptions to an arbitrator's award with 
the Council, under regulations prescribed by the Council.
"(c) Grievances initiated by an employee or group of 
employees in the unit on matters other than the interpretation 
or application of an existing agreement may be presented under 
any procedure available for the purpose.
"(d) Questions that cannot be resolved by the parties 
as to whether or not a grievance is on a matter subject to the 
grievance procedure in an existing agreement, or is subject to 
arbitration under that agreement, may be referred to the 
Assistant Secretary for decision.
"(e) No agreement may be established, extended, or 
renewed after the effective date of this Order which does not 
conform to this section. However, this section is not applicable 
to agreements entered into before the effective date of this 
Order."
9. Section 14 is revoked.
10. Section 19(d) is amended to read as follows:
"(d) Issues which can properly be raised under an appeals 
procedure may not be raised under this section. Issues which 
can be raised under a grievance procedure may in the direction 
of the aggrieved party, be raised under that procedure or the 
complaint procedure under this section, but not under both 
procedures. Appeals or grievance decisions shall not be con­
strued as unfair labor practice decisions under this Order nor 
as precedent for such decisions. All complaints under this 
section that cannot be resolved by the parties shall be filled 
with the Assistant Secretary."
11. Section 20 is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 20. Use of official time. Solicitation of membership 
or dues, and other internal business of a labor organization, 
shall be conducted during the non-duty hours of the employees 
concerned. Employees who represent a recognized labor organiza­
tion shall not be on official time when negotiating an agreement 
with agency management, except to the extent that the negotiating 
parties agree to other arrangements which may provide that the 
agency will either authorize official time for up to 40 hours or 
authorize up to one-half the time spent in negotiations during 
regular working hours, for a reasonable number of employees, 
which number normally Bhall not exceed the number of management 
representatives."
12. Section 21 is amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 21. Allotment of dues, (a) When a labor
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organization holds exclusive recognition and the agency and the 
organization agree in writing to this course of action, an agency 
may deduct the regular and periodic dues of the organization from 
the pay of members of the organization in the unit of recognition 
who make a voluntary allotment for that purpose. Such an allotment 
is subject to the Civil Service Commission, which shall include 
provision for the employee to revoke his authorization at states 
six-month intervals. Such an allotment terminates when—
"( 1 ) the dues withholding agreement between the agency 
and the labor organization is terminated or ceases to be 
applicable to the employee; or
"( 2 ) the employee has been suspended or expelled from 
the labor organization.
" (b) An agency may deduct the regular and periodic dues 
of an association of management officials or supervisors from 
the pay of members of the association who make a voluntary 
allotment for that purpose, when the agency and the association 
agree in writing to this course of action. Such an allotment 
is subject to the regulations of the Civil Service Commission."
13. Section 24 is amended by deleting "(a)" after the 
section heading; and by deleting subsections (b), (c), and (d).
14. Section 25(a) is amended to read as follows:
"(a) The Civil Service Commission, in conjunction with 
the Office of Management and Budget, shall establish and maintain 
a program for the policy guidance of agencies on labor-management 
relations in the Federal service and periodically review the 
implementation of these policies. The Civil Service Commission 
shell continuously review the operation of the Federal labor- 
management relations program to assist in assuring adherence 
to its provisions and merit system requirements; implement tech­
nical advice and information programs for the agencies; assist in 
the development of programs for training agency personnel and 
management officials in labor-management relations; and from time 
to time, report to the Council on the state of the program with 
any recommendations for its improvement."
The amendments made by this Order shall become effective 
ninety days from this date. Each agency shall issue appropriate 
policies and regulations consistent with the Order for its 
implementation.
RICHARD NIXON
THE WHITE HOUSE 
August 26, 1971
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APPENDIX F
Fiscal 1974 Increases in General Fay Schedule Proposed by the 
Pay Agent and the Advisory Committee Majority
GS Grade Percent Increase 
Proposed by 
Pay Agent
Percent Increase Proposed 
by the Advisory Committee 
Majority
1 4.55 5.50
2 4.59 5.52
3 4.60 5.51
4 4.61 5.49
5 4.65 5.51
6 4.71 5.52
7 4.72 5.51
8 4.77 5.53
9 4.77 5.51
10 4.72 5.43
11 4.83 5.51
12 4.88 5.51
13 4.95 5.51
14 5.01 5.51
15 5.07 5.51
16 5.13a 5.51a
17 5.19a 5.51s
18 5.25s 5.51s
Average Increase 4.77 5.47
sThese increases cannot be put into effect unless the 
present $36,000 ceiling is changed.
Source: The Government Standard. (December 1973),
p. UM-4.
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APPENDIX G
Federal General Schedule Pay Increases Since 1962
...  —      — «
Effective Date Percentage Increase
September 14, 1962 5.5
January 5, 1964 4.1
July 1, 1964 4.1
October I, 1965 3.6
July 1, 1966 2.9
October 1, 1967 4.5
July 1, 1968 4.9
July 1, 1969 9.1
January 1, 1970 6.0
January 1, 1971 6.0
January 1, 1972 5.5
January 1, 1973 5.1
October 1, 1973 4.77
Source: 1962-1972 data from United States Department of
Defense (Comptroller)t The Economics of Defense Spending. A 
Look at the Realities. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
July 1972), p. 134. 1973-1974 data from GERR Number 523,
(October 1, 1973), p. A-l.
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VITA
William Vaughn Rice, Jr. was born in Hiawassee, Georgia 
in 1926 and attended public schools there. He received his B.S. 
degree from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New 
York in 1949, and started a 25 year career in the U.S. Air Force. 
His early career was spent as a crew member on various USAF 
aircraft. He received his M.B.A. degree in 1958 from the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, Dayton, Ohio' and became an Air 
Force teacher in various positions: first as Advisor to the
Commandant, Republic of Korea Air Force Academy, Seoul, Korea; 
then as Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, Louisiana State 
University; then as Senior Instructor, Academic Instructor School, 
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama.
He was a graduate student at Louisiana State University in 
1968-69, returning to Air University to become Chief, Labor- 
Management Relations Division. In this position he was responsi­
ble for all labor relations instruction in Air University.
His published articles include "A Systems Model for Labor- 
Management Relations in the Federal Sector," Personnel Journal.
May 1974; and "Unionization of the Military: A Fable for the
Seventies?," July-August 1974 issue of the Air University Review.
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After receiving the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
from Louisiana State University, he accepted a position as 
Assistant Professor of Economics and Management at the University 
of Houston in Clear Lake City, Texas, effective January 1, 1975 
following his retirement from the Air Force.
